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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the importance of the concepts of international standing 
and international reputation for understanding Australian foreign policy in the 
second half of the 20th Century. It examines the two concepts both as 
objects of policy and as instruments of policy: as dependent and independent 
variables. The study is not a comprehensive account of the interface 
between foreign policy and international standing and reputation over the 
whole period. Rather, it is built around four case studies which examine the 
issues in some depth from a multi-country perspective. These case studies 
are: Australia and the Colombo Plan; the Australian peace initiative in 
Cambodia; Australia and foundation of the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum; and Australia’s failed bid to win a non-permanent 
seat on the United Nations Security Council in 1996. Analysing Australian 
foreign policy during these episodes through the prism of international 
standing and reputation using a multi-country perspectives approach sheds 
light on hitherto unexplored aspects of Australia’s role on the world and 
regional stages, and on its relations with other countries. 
The thesis finds that international standing and international reputation were 
crucial, but largely overlooked, factors in the articulation and implementation 
of Australian foreign policy goals. Australia’s international standing is directly 
related to the influence it could exert on the world and regional stages, and 
Australia’s international reputation is an important factor for the achievement 
of these goals. Both concepts are of continuing importance for Australia to be 
heard and taken seriously in international affairs, for establishing and 
maintaining Australian esteem and respect in the world, and for Australian 
national identity and self-respect. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis examines the importance of the concepts of ‘international 
standing’ and ‘international reputation’ for understanding Australian foreign 
policy in the second half of the 20th Century. It examines the two concepts as 
objects of policy and as instruments of policy: as dependent and independent 
variables.  Its thesis is that international standing and international reputation 
were important, but largely overlooked, factors in the articulation and 
implementation of Australian foreign policy goals at pivotal times during this 
period. They were particularly important for the success of Australia’s 
leadership and participation in regional, multilateral and international 
institution-building and problem-solving activities designed to protect and 
promote Australia’s national interests.  The central research questions are:  
 What do the concepts of international standing and international 
reputation mean in the Australian foreign policy context; and  
 Do they matter? 
International standing, international reputation and the associated concepts 
of respect, esteem, image and recognition have become part of our political 
vocabulary, with equivalents in other languages1. One function of the 
concepts is to impart in us a sense of ourselves, our relations with others and 
what Australia’s relations with other countries should or could be. As the 
terms tend to be used loosely in international political discourse and in the 
                                            
1 To illustrate this point, in the one week during which this section was drafted, The Canberra Times, 
published 27 articles mentioning reputation, eight of which were about international reputation. For 
example, US Secretary of State Rice, stated ‘Russia's reputation as a potential partner in 
international institutions, diplomatic, political, security, economic is, frankly, in tatters,' (M. 
Mainville, ‘Russia keeps grip on Georgia’, C.T., 19 August 2008); the former career diplomat Greg 
Urwin was described in the national capital’s newspaper as ‘Australia’s top Pacific specialist with a 
reputation for being a genuine sympathiser for a region he seldom left’ (‘Pacific loses passionate 
diplomat who ‘had the region at heart’’, C.T., 12 August 2008); and Qantas chief executive Dixon 
admitted that the airline's reputation had been tainted by a recent series of air safety incidents and 
said Qantas had to work hard to secure its good name (J. Marszalek, ‘Qantas named world’s third 
best’, C.T., 13 August 2008).  
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media, one of the first tasks of the thesis has been to tease out the concepts 
and develop a vocabulary of their use in diplomatic and scholarly discourse.  
The linking of the terms international standing and international reputation in 
the thesis title is deliberate. The thesis takes the view that they exist in a 
symbiotic relationship. More often than not, the term international standing 
refers to a country’s ‘intrinsic’ rather than its ‘extrinsic’ properties. Intrinsic 
properties can be said to include such ‘givens’ as the size of a country’s 
population, geographic size and location, the strength of its economy, the 
size and composition of its military forces and their state of preparedness, 
foreign policy decision-making ability, diplomatic representation, and history, 
culture, traditions and lifestyle, which a country like Australia possesses, 
whether or not it seeks to engage in international affairs. International 
reputation in foreign policy, on the other hand, is an ‘extrinsic’ factor residing 
in the beliefs, perceptions and representations other countries have of 
Australia in terms of its ability, credibility and reliability, based on observing 
Australian foreign policy in action. However, in terms of exerting influence on 
the world stage, both elements are important, and go hand in hand.  
The thesis breaks new ground by bringing a multi–country perspectives 
approach to the task of assessing Australia’s role on the world and regional 
stages. Through the prism of international standing and international 
reputation, it examines the views and perceptions of the other actors on 
specific Australian initiatives in foreign policy and the judgements they make 
about Australia’s influence in international affairs. The thesis is mindful that 
the facts that underpin views about international standing or support a 
reputation may be incomplete, and that any one actor’s perceptions of their 
role may diverge from the perceptions of others.2 The thesis seeks to limit 
any particular bias in perspectives by examining a range of views and taking 
particular notice of the perspectives of countries that matter to Australia on a 
particular issue.   
                                            
2 R Jervis, ‘Deterrence and perception’, International Security, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 3‐30, p.3. 
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In addition to examining existing documentary primary sources from a new 
angle, the thesis examines new material. In order to wrestle with and tie 
down the slippery concepts of international standing and international 
reputation, the author conducted in-depth, face-to-face or telephone 
interviews with thirty key informants. These informants were chosen because 
of their ability to provide an informed and independent view on Australia’s 
international standing and reputation, both in general and in relation to the 
episodes examined in the four case studies that comprise the main body of 
the thesis. Since the thesis seeks to examine Australia’s international 
standing and reputation in the regard of others, the vast majority of the key 
informants were from other countries. They included former foreign ministers, 
ambassadors, heads and senior officials of departments of foreign affairs, 
trade and defence, and peacekeeping force commanders. The other group of 
key informants included past and current senior Australian foreign policy 
practitioners, who provided confidential background information from an 
Australian perspective.  The transcripts of these interviews, which in total 
exceed 50,000 words, provide new material for the thesis. Unless they 
agreed to speak on the record, the key informants are de-identified in the 
study. 
The focus of the study and its constituent case studies is on Australian 
diplomacy. Its primary concern is with successive Australian governments’ 
aspirations and behaviour in their dealings with the rest of the world. To that 
extent, this project is a study in the history of Australian diplomacy, rather 
than the history of Australian foreign policy as such.3 It is not a study in 
Australian military history or in Australian peace-keeping, even though the 
notions of international standing and international reputation are relevant to 
these fields. Rather than attempt to cover the whole period of Australia’s 
diplomatic history in the second half of the Twentieth Century, the thesis is 
                                            
3 WJ Hudson makes this distinction between the history of Australian diplomacy and the history of 
Australian foreign policy in the preface to his Australian diplomacy, Macmillan of Australia, 
Melbourne, 1970, p. 1. 
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built around four prominent episodes in Australia’s engagement in the world 
during this period. In each of these examples, Australia took the initiative, 
captured the international spotlight for a time and put its international 
reputation on the line. The case studies are:  
 Australia and the foundation of the Colombo Plan, 1949-51 
 The Australian peace initiatives in Cambodia, 1983-91  
 Australia and foundation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) forum and APEC leaders’ meetings, 1989-94  
 Australia’s failed bid to win a non-permanent seat on the United 
Nations Security Council, 1994-96.  
The selection of case studies resulted from a five-step process. First, 
historical surveys of Australia and the world in the second half of the 
Twentieth Century, such as David Lee’s Australia and the world in the 
Twentieth Century4 and the Australia Institute of International Affairs Australia 
in world affairs series5, academic studies in Australian foreign policy, such as 
Coral Bell’s Dependent ally (1984)6 and diplomatic memoirs, such as Richard 
Woolcott’s The Hot Seat 7 were examined for views on significant episodes in 
Australia’s engagement in the world over this period. This resulted in a list of 
24 possible candidates. 
The second step was to look at claims from Australian political leaders about 
the significance of past events. This investigation proved to be of limited 
value, since the identification of significant events in Australia’s history 
tended to be, in Alasdair MacIntyre’s phrase, ‘tradition-constituted’ - for 
                                            
4 D Lee, Australia and the world in the Twentieth Century: international relations since federation, 
circa, Melbourne, 2006. 
5 G Greenwood & N Harper (eds), Australia in world Affairs, 1950‐55, F.W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 
1957, and subsequent volumes in the series by Greenwood & Harper and other editors. 
6 C Bell, Dependent ally: a study of Australia's relations with the United States and the United 
Kingdom since the fall of Singapore, Deptartment of International Relations, Australian National 
University, Canberra, 1984.  
7 R Woolcott, The hot seat: reflections on diplomacy from Stalin's death to the Bali bombings, 
HarperCollinsPublishers, Sydney, 2003. 
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example, the prominence assigned to Evatt in the Labor tradition and the role 
of Casey and Spender in the Liberal-Country Party Coalition’s foreign policy 
tradition. 
The third step was a major culling exercise. As this is a study of Australia’s 
international standing and international reputation, the episode had to have 
global salience; and Australia had to be seen as the protagonist, or at least 
one of the main protagonists on the world stage, taking independent action, 
sustaining a focus on an issue, devoting considerable of its own resources to 
the task over a period of time, and taking a risk by putting its reputation on 
the line, where possible with bipartisan support. The decision to focus on 
Australian diplomacy in a global, multilateral or regional, rather than a 
bilateral context, resulted in the exclusion of important (but for Australia, 
predominantly bilateral) developments, such as the establishment of the 
ANZUS Treaty, the establishment of diplomatic relations with China and the 
1976 Basic Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Japan and 
Australia. The decision to focus on diplomatic history, rather than military 
history, excluded military episodes, such as Australia’s involvement in the 
Korean War, the Vietnam War and the Gulf War, even though Australian 
diplomacy played a significant role in each of these episodes. In some of the 
remaining cases, the choice between possible candidates was not easy, for 
example, the decision to include APEC instead of Australian leadership in the 
establishment of the Cairns Group of agricultural free-traders; and to include 
a study of Australia and the UN Security Council instead of Australian 
leadership with regard to the establishment of a Chemical Weapons 
Convention. Some episodes were also excluded by the simple fact that they 
occurred or overlapped the admittedly arbitrary time frame, such as Evatt’s 
involvement in the UN in the immediate post-war years, and the Australian 
intervention in East Timor, beginning in September 1999. 
The fourth step was to include only those candidates for which available data 
sources (whether they be archival documentary sources, memoirs, private 
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papers, oral history narratives or transcripts of personal interviews) were 
sufficient to sustain an argument about Australia’s international reputation 
and international standing with regard to the views of others. 
The fifth step was to identify similarities between pairs, e.g. the Colombo 
Plan and APEC and the Cambodian initiative and Australia’s role in the 
United Nations, for comparative and argument building purposes.  
The Colombo Plan provided the framework for Australia’s aid program to 
countries in the South and South-East Asian region until the 1970s. Although 
conceived in a Cold War context, it had progressive elements and prepared 
the ground for a much closer relationship between Australia and the region.8  
The Cambodian peace initiative sought to restore peace in Cambodia and to 
bring an end to years of suffering. It involved Australia in a good international 
citizenship role, including peace keeping. The Australian APEC initiative 
provides an example of an Australian contribution to regional institutional 
building; while the UNSC bid in 1996 sought to continue the practice of 
Australia seeking and securing election on the Council at roughly twelve-year 
intervals. Although, arguably, they should not be so, elections to the Security 
Council are generally regarded as a litmus test of a country’s standing in the 
world at a particular time.9   
All four case studies address an aim in Australian foreign policy, expressed 
in the 1994 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) corporate plan, 
‘to win a future for Australia in the world’ in a radically changing international 
environment; and to overcome the disadvantages of being regarded as a 
peripheral country.10 The first and third examples can be regarded as 
successes of Australian diplomacy, the second a moderate success, and the 
last a failure. Analysis of Australian foreign policy during these episodes in 
                                            
8 D Oakman,‘The seed of freedom: regional security and the Colombo Plan’, Australian Journal of 
Politics and History, vol. 46, no.1, 2000, pp. 67‐85. 
9 Key informant interview # 23, 6 November 2007. 
10 D Goldsworthy, 'Perspectives on Australian foreign policy, 1995’, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, vol. 50, no. 2, 1996, pp. 199‐207,  pp. 199‐200. 
7 
 
this way sheds light on unexplored aspects of Australia’s position in the 
world, its use of multilateralism, and on its relations with other countries.  
Australian Foreign Ministers Spender and Evans were the respective driving 
forces in relation to the Colombo Plan and on the Australian peace initiative 
on Cambodia. Prime Ministers Hawke and Keating pursued APEC regional 
institution-building as prime-ministerial initiatives, in which foreign ministers 
and their departments played supportive roles. Spender, Evans and Keating 
were, in Keating’s often-used description, ‘policy makers’ rather than ‘policy 
takers’. They were also makers of history in a dual sense - successful 
politicians on the international or regional stage, and chroniclers of their own 
life and times.11  When examining their own claims to fame, it has been 
necessary, therefore, to consider the roles, contributions and counter-claims 
of other countries, and to ascertain their views on Australia’s role. 
The historical time gap between the first and second chosen studies requires 
an explanatory note. Evans and Grant claim that the Cold War period put a 
‘dampener’ on the evolution of Australian foreign policy in the 1950s and the 
1960s such that ‘the political atmosphere of the time was so fraught with 
global consequences, so caught up with the desire to be loyal to wider 
interests than the national interest of Australia, that not much was done 
except in the margin’,12 and that, in particular, the Vietnam War (1965-75) 
dominated Australian politics and foreign policy for a decade.13 In other 
words, it was not a time for major Australian initiatives. On the other hand, 
contemporary scholars see this period as a busy period for Australian 
diplomacy,14 in which Australia was required to adopt a more self-reliant 
stance, accept more responsibility for its own defence and devise a new 
                                            
11 P Williamson, ‘Baldwin’s reputation: politics and history, 1937 – 1967’, Historical Journal, vol. 47, 
no. 1, 2004, pp. 127‐168, p. 130. 
12 G  Evans & B Grant, Australia's foreign relations: in the world of the 1990s, 2nd edn, Melbourne 
University Press, Melbourne, 1995, p. 23. 
13 Ibid, p. 25. 
14 For example, G Greenwood & N Harper (eds), Australia in World Affairs, 1960‐1965, F.W. Cheshire, 
Melbourne, 1968, preface v. 
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foundation for its foreign policies in response to important changes in major 
power relationships, such as the decline in British strength and influence in 
the region, an increase in US involvement in the region, the emergence of 
Japan as a major economic power and in response to local conflicts, such as 
the Indonesian policy of confrontation against Malaysia. During this period 
Asia became more important diplomatically for Australia. Australian 
representation in Asian countries greatly increased. Colombo Plan activities 
continued to be an asset in developing bilateral relations in the region. 
Australia’s diplomatic service reached maturity, aided by a ‘distinguished 
group of senior diplomats who have shown sensitivity, perceptiveness, an 
overall grasp of the problem, and both adaptability and firmness in the pursuit 
of their policy objectives’.15 The consolidation of Australian relations with 
Asian countries during this period, despite Indonesian confrontation with 
Malaysia and the Vietnam War, provided the foundation on which later major 
Australian regional initiatives, such as the search for a resolution of the 
Cambodian conflict and Asia-Pacific regionalism, could be built. 
Multilateralism, or the way Australia achieves its national interests jointly or in 
concert with other countries, is a common theme in all case studies. The 
APEC leaders’ meetings and international conferences, in one form or 
another, figure prominently in the studies. Reynolds’s recent book on 
Summits provides the schema for examining the dynamics of these meetings 
and the ways in which reputations are made or broken at the meetings. Such 
meetings, as Reynolds points out, have their own dynamics, promoted by the 
epic nature of such meetings. After surmounting ‘the foothills’ of domestic 
affairs, the elected politician is faced with ‘new vistas’, a moment when he or 
she ‘risks all before the gaze of multitudes’, with a ‘chance to make or break 
his reputation’ and a journey ‘from which, once started, is painfully hard to 
turn back’.  Further, such meetings can also have unintended personal 
outcomes - in the words of Reynolds, quoting Karl Marx: ‘human beings 
                                            
15 G Greenwood, ‘Australian foreign policy in action’ in G Greenwood & N Harper (eds), Australia in 
World Affairs, 1960‐1965, F.W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1968, pp. 1‐133, p. 24. 
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make their history but they do not make it … under circumstances of their 
own choosing’.16 
The thesis draws on theoretical literature to develop its argument. Key 
sources included Mercer’s Reputation and international politics (1996) 
McNamara’s Reputation and defamation (2007) and Tomz’s Reputation and 
international cooperation: sovereign debt across three centuries (2007). 
Tomz’s study, in particular, made an important contribution to reputational 
theory of cooperation, explaining the different ways governments acquire 
reputations and the different types of reputation that are established. His 
study concludes by highlighting the implications of his reputational logic for 
other areas of international transactions beyond sovereign debt.17 There are 
obvious parallels between international standing and international reputation 
in foreign policy and international credit-worthiness and confidence, which 
are pursued further in this study. 
In its consideration of international standing and international reputation, the 
thesis explores Nye’s notion of ‘soft power’, without being beholden to the 
concept. Nye defines soft power in the following way: 
What is soft power? It is the ability to get what you want through attraction 
rather than coercion or payments. It arises from attractiveness of a country’s 
culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as 
legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced.18 
While Nye’s definition of soft power embraces the whole gamut of soft power 
sources, such as culture, domestic values and foreign policy, this thesis 
focuses on the foreign policy domain (while not, of course, overlooking the 
importance of culture and domestic values in the making of foreign policy). 
For Nye, soft power is wielded by a country in its foreign policy in the way it 
                                            
16 D Reynolds, Summits: six meetings that shaped the Twentieth Century, Allen Lane, London, 2007, 
p. 5.  
17 M Tomz, Reputation and international cooperation: sovereign debt across three centuries, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2007, pp. 236‐7. 
18 JS Nye Jr., Soft Power: the means to success in world politics, Public Affairs, New York, 2002, 
Preface, p. x. 
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handles its relations with others (p.8); the way it defines its national interest 
to include attractive causes, such as economic aid or peacemaking (p. 8); 
has foreign policies which are seen as legitimate and having moral authority 
(p.11); and has policies that are based on broadly inclusive and far-sighted 
definitions of the national interest (p. 60) or contribute to common goods (p. 
81). However, Nye claims that in a diverse world ‘all three sources of power -
military, economic, and soft - remain relevant, although in different degrees in 
different relationships’;19 and that ‘smart power means learning better how to 
combine our hard and soft power’.20 
Key informants for this thesis, however, do not see any dichotomy between 
Nye’s notion of ‘soft’ power and the traditional notion of ‘hard’ power, which is 
based on the possession of military power, economic power and resources 
that could be used for military purposes. For example: 
Nye articulated something that we’ve long known ... it’s certainly true that 
countries can exercise influence in the world in ways beyond simple military 
force and weight of economy and so on by being sort of active...21 
Nye … was right to lay that all out, but … I think the best hand is one where 
you can speak softly but there can be some iron in the glove if that’s needed. 
And I don’t think that’s really changed. … Reputations are built and 
maintained on the ability to be seen to be active across the entire spectrum 
of what is regarded as being relevant international activit …and not just only 
playing on one part of the keyboard.22 
The thesis takes the view that in the real world of international relations, soft 
power is dependent upon, and often works in tandem with, elements of hard 
power and behaviour that is normally associated with hard power to achieve 
outcomes. For example, two of the ‘attractive’ causes mentioned by Nye - 
economic aid and peace-keeping - depend on a country having, respectively, 
the hard power attributes of a strong economy and national armed forces 
capability. In wielding soft power, proponents do not rely solely on 
attractiveness and moral persuasion. As shown in this study, foreign 
                                            
19 Ibid, p. 31, 
20 Ibid., p. 32. 
21 Key informant interview # 29, 10 September 2010. 
22 Key informant interview # 2, 28 May 2008. 
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ministers and senior foreign policy officials are not shy of using the whole 
gamut of ‘inducements or threats’, such as lecturing, blaming, shaming, 
ostracising, wedge politics, and the particular Australian trait of ‘sledging’, to 
achieve their goals.  
The thesis makes a contribution to the study of ‘soft power’ by examining its 
influence, amongst other influences, in particular foreign policy episodes. 
One of the main criticisms of the notion of soft power is that it is intangible, 
making measurement problematic.23 Nye uses public opinion in other 
countries as a proxy indicator of a country’s soft power influence. He also 
provides some examples of the use of soft power, for example, Norway’s role 
in peace-seeking in the Philippines and Sri Lanka. However, soft power’s 
influence can only be gauged in particular contexts, as Ochihara states, 
(thereby supporting the case study approach that is used in this thesis): 
What policy outcome the soft power actually effected, and whether any soft 
power influenced the policy outcome indeed, can be understood by 
investigating each individual case and by conducting content analysis. 
Because the context in which actors operate determines the kind of power 
they utilize, it may not be clear whether soft power has substantial influence 
on a particular outcome without taking into account the nature of the context 
itself. Also, because various actors wield their own soft powers, it is hard to 
tell which one of these actors’ soft power affects the policy outcome without 
investigating each individual case in detail. 24  
Broinowski has written extensively on the related topic of Australia’s image in 
Asia, which proved extremely helpful, particularly in relation to the case study 
on APEC. In her About face: Asian accounts of Australia (2003),25 for 
example, Broinowski sets out to trace the sources of Australia’s reputation in 
ten Asian societies. Her investigations led her to the conclusion that Australia 
has an image problem in Asia, which must be overcome if Australia wishes to 
be accepted in Asian circles. In her view, this image problem can, to a large 
part, be addressed at the Federal Government level by means of increasing 
                                            
23 M Ichihara, ‘Making the case for soft power’, SAIS Review, vol. 26, no. 1, 2006, pp. 147‐150, p. 147, 
retrieved 23 November 2007, Proquest database. 
24 Ibid., p. 198. 
25 A Broinowski, About face: Asian accounts of Australia, Scribe, Melbourne, 2003.  
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funds for the Department of Foreign Affairs to promote public diplomacy and 
understanding of Australia in the region.  
The vast literature in the late 1980s and the early 1990s on the concept of 
middle powers26 is of direct interest to the study, particularly with respect to 
the need of countries like Australia to rethink their international roles in the 
1990s and to take advantage of opportunities to exercise technical and 
entrepreneurial leadership. However, the thesis is principally not a study 
about the international standing and reputation of Australia as a middle 
power - partly because the concept lacks definitional clarity27- but mainly 
because Australian political leaders and leaders of other countries did not 
always think of Australia in these terms over the period of the study.  
Apart from being a piece of innovative research which will add to the body of 
knowledge about Australia's standing and reputation in international affairs 
and assist foreign policy practitioners to develop more holistic strategies, the 
research will be of general interest. Australian politicians place considerable 
emphasis on the Government’s foreign and economic policy and defence 
achievements in earning unprecedented esteem and respect around the 
world.28 Projecting a favourable image of Australia is considered helpful for 
pursuing Australia’s national security and commercial interests, and 
international standing is considered an important foreign policy and domestic 
outcome.29 There is, of course, an element of self-congratulation and 
boosting of national ego and party morale, often combined with reference to 
Australia ‘punching above its weight’ in all this, which academics and foreign 
                                            
26 For example, AF Cooper, RA Higgott & KR Nossal, Relocating middle powers: Australia and Canada 
in a changing world order, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1993. 
27 Ibid. 
28 For example, The Hon John Howard MP, ‘Transcript of the Prime Minister’s closing address to 
Sydney Institute, Intercontinental Hotel, Sydney, 1 July 2003’, retrieved 4 February 2007, 
<http://www.pm.gov.au.news/speeches/2002>. 
29 For example, A Calvert, ‘The evolving international environment and Australia’s national interest’ 
in W Tow (ed.), Changing utterly? Australia’s international policy in an uncertain age, Lowy Institute, 
Sydney, 2004. 
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policy practitioners find irritating.30 But politicians may be more in tune with 
the national psyche on these matters than the academics and foreign policy 
practitioners. Most importantly, what others think of Australia does seem to 
matter to ordinary Australians.31 The study will also be of interest to other 
countries, and to academics wrestling with the concepts of international 
standing and international reputation in foreign policy.  
Historical context 
The second half of the Twentieth Century was characterised by a range of 
profound shifts in Australia’s geo-strategic and economic international 
environment, which impacted on its international status, influenced 
Australia’s outlook on international affairs, and conditioned the influence 
Australia could bring to bear in international affairs. The Cold War dominated 
Australia’s international strategic environment in the 1950s and the 1960’s 
and, to some extent in the 1970s, although by then there were signs that the 
world was moving from a bipolar to a multi-polar power world with the 
emergence of Japan as a world economic power, the development of the 
European Communities and the Sino-Soviet split. Four main themes 
dominated Australia’s political outlook on international affairs during these 
earlier decades: maintaining and strengthening the British association; 
collaboration with the United States; developing an accord and a policy of 
good neighbourliness with its Asian and Pacific neighbours; and continued 
support for the United Nations and for a multilateral economic world order 
based on free trade and convertible currencies. The period, however, also 
witnessed a number of shocks and new opportunities for Australia’s standing 
and influence in the world: the end of the British Empire; Britain’s decision to 
join the European Common Market; Britain’s decision to withdraw its forces 
                                            
30 P Hartcher, ‘Feelgood words used to boost our national ego’, SMH, 23 April 2008 
(http://www.smh.com.au/cgi‐bin/common/popuDPrintArtinle.r)l?path=/articles/2008/04/22), 
retrieved 23 April 2008.  
31 J Fitzgerald, ‘Who cares what they think? John Winston Howard, William Morris Hughes and the 
pragmatic vision of Australia's national sovereignty’, in A Broinowski (ed.), Double vision: Asian 
accounts of Australia, Pandanus Books, Canberra, 2004, pp. 15‐39. 
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east of Suez; the US articulation of the US Guam doctrine of self reliance for 
alliance partners in defence matters; and the opening up of Asian markets, 
particularly Japan and other North-East Asian countries. The late 1980s and 
the 1990s saw the end of the Cold War, major changes in the structure of the 
international economy brought about by globalisation and  trade 
liberalisation, and growing interconnectedness between governments, 
business and societies across nation-state boundaries, assisted by rapid 
growth in information technology and information dissemination. 
These dramatic changes in Australia’s operating environment were 
accompanied by changing registers of international standing and 
international reputation. Notions of being a committed and responsible 
member of the British Commonwealth (and subsequently the Commonwealth 
of Nations), accompanied by occasional displays of world statesmanship, 
were important for Australia’s reputation with Britain and the Commonwealth 
in the earlier years of the study. However, with the reduction in Britain’s 
military presence in the area east of Suez in the 1970s and dramatic shifts in 
the composition and direction of Australia’s trade, these considerations 
declined in importance in the later decades. As Australia’s links with 
countries in its region and Australian support for regionalism and regional 
institution in the Asia and Pacific region grew, notions of concern, relevance, 
commitment, responsibility and initiative in Australia’s international standing 
and reputation became part of Australia’s regional garb through which it 
sought to identify itself with the region.  Australia’s strategic alliance with the 
US and the strengthening of the bilateral relationship illustrated the dilemma 
of strategic and diplomatic dependency in the alliance.32  The dilemma was 
illustrated by seeking an alliance reputation for being a trusted and loyal ally 
                                            
32 C Bell, Dependent ally: a study of Australia's relations with the United States and the United 
Kingdom since the fall of Singapore, Department of International Relations, Australian National 
University, Canberra, 1984.  
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and, at the same time, wanting a reputation for taking a self-confident and 
independent stance in international affairs. The major changes taking place in 
the global economy, particularly in the later years of the study, highlighted 
the importance of international competitiveness and comparative advantage 
as markers of a country’s standing and reputation. Finally, globalisation and 
the realisation of an increasing connectedness between countries and 
societies re-emphasised the importance of duties beyond boundaries and 
being seen as a good international citizen. In the earlier years of this study, 
Australia regarded itself as a ‘small’ power in terms of the influence it could 
exert on world affairs; but in the later years it had graduated to being a 
‘middle’ power. The development of the Australian Department of External 
Affairs (subsequently the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade) and the development of Australia’s overseas 
representation, particularly in Asia, over the period provided agency for the 
extension of Australia’s influence in international affairs and was important 
for establishing and maintaining Australia’s international reputation in foreign 
policy. 
The structure of the thesis 
Following the Introduction, Chapter One on keywords, approaches and 
methods explores the notions of international standing and international 
reputation, and identifies suitable methods and analytical tools for the thesis. 
Chapters Two to Five present the results, respectively, of the case studies on 
the Colombo Plan, the Australian peace initiative on Cambodia, APEC and 
the Australian 1996 UNSC bid. The results of the case studies research are 
summarised at the end of each case study. The final section presents 
conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 1. KEY WORDS, APPROACHES AND METHODS 
 
This Chapter aims to arrive at an understanding of the use of the terms 
‘international standing’ and ‘international reputation’, as they are used by 
scholars and practitioners in the broad field of international affairs. By 
examining the concepts in a range of disciplines and in specialised fields 
within these disciplines, the Chapter also seeks to identify suitable analytical 
tools that researchers in international relations could include in their tool-
boxes.  
Key words 
International standing and international reputation are rubbery words with 
multiple meanings. In this Chapter the key concepts and their properties are 
teased out and explored. The adopted approach builds on Raymond 
William’s Keywords: a vocabulary of culture and society.1 The essential 
elements of the approach are: 
 an examination of dictionary meanings;  
 an exploration of the vocabulary use of the concepts in an historical, 
cultural and societal context;  
 the exploration of linkages, including between the use of the terms in 
specialised vocabulary of a specialised discipline and general and 
variable use; and 
 a consciousness of social and political values impacting on usage.  
In the case of social and political value-laden words (like ‘international 
standing’ and ‘international reputation’), Williams argues:  
What can really be contributed is not resolution but, perhaps, at times, just 
that extra edge of consciousness. In a social history in which many crucial 
meanings have been shaped by a dominant class, and by particular 
                                            
1 R Williams, Keywords: a vocabulary of culture and society, Fontana Paperbacks, Flamingo edn, 
London, 1983.  
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professions operating to a large extent within its terms, the sense of edge is 
accurate.2 
Dictionary definitions  
English dictionary definitions of ‘standing’ refer to four principal meanings of 
the term: (a) position or rank, (b) the estimation or repute in which one is 
held, (c) duration (e.g., ‘a dispute of long standing’), and (d) motion (e.g., 
‘standing still’). The first two meanings are interrelated, whereas the latter 
two are not directly relevant to this study.  
The Macquarie Australian National Dictionary refers to ‘reputation’ as follows: 
 reputation n. 1. The estimation in which a person or thing is held, especially 
by the community or the public generally; repute: a man of good reputation. 
2. favourable repute; good name: to ruin one’s reputation by misconduct.3. a 
favourable and publicly recognised name or standing for merit, achievement, 
etc.: to build up a reputation. 4.The estimation or name of being, having, 
having done, etc., something specified.  
In Roget’s Thesaurus, ‘standing’ with respect to the first principal meaning 
mentioned above is associated with the keyword ‘state’ (of abstract 
relations), for example, ‘position’, ‘status’, or ‘rank’ and with the word 
‘prestige’; while ‘reputation’ is associated with the words and phrases: (good) 
‘report’, ‘title to fame’, ‘name’, ‘character’, ‘respectability’, ‘credit’, ‘regard’, 
‘approval’, ‘esteem’, ‘influence’ and ‘authority’. However, as Williams points 
out, while the dictionary approach is a necessary starting point, the approach 
has the limitation that it is primarily philological and etymological, and is 
much better for describing a range and variations than establishing 
connections and interaction.3 
Use 
In his Philosophical investigations, German philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein 
advises his readers to pay attention to the use of a word or phrase in order to 
                                            
2 Ibid., p. 24. 
3 Ibid., p. 19. 
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understand its meaning. He expresses this in the aphorism 'meaning is use',4 
for which he became famous. ‘Meaning is use’ should not be taken to 
conclude that any kind of use justifies any meaning. For Wittgenstein, 
'meaning is use' has its application in community; there are no private 
language games. For this study, the relevant discourse communities are the 
diplomatic, academic, media and the public, as expressed through public 
opinion polls. While the terms international standing and international 
reputation and their connections, such as prestige, status, resolve, good 
citizenship and image, are often used interchangeably, the literature 
suggests the following inter-related clusters of meaning, which will be 
followed in this thesis. 
International Standing International Reputation          
Status  
Prestige  
Esteem 
Resolve
Trust and reliability  
Legal and moral obligation  
 Good international citizenship  
Image
  
Wajnryb suggests exploring ‘rubbery’ words (such as international standing 
and international reputation) with the aid of Pragmatics, which she describes 
as an area of Linguistics that is dedicated to the notion of inferable meaning, 
or how we arrive at the between-the-line meanings that are so essential to 
the lubrication of social interaction.5 These between-the-line meanings reside 
in the ‘implicature’, which she describes as a ‘fancy word for a kind of 
pragmatic grey space where inferences go to be unravelled – like a holding 
bay’.6 She suggests that meanings are attributed to such utterances, within 
                                            
4 L Wittgenstein, Philosophical investigations, translated by GEM Ascombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 
1953, part 1, p. 43. 
5 R Wajnryb, Away with words: a frolic through the landscape of language, ABC Books, Sydney, 2005, 
p. 73. 
6 Ibid., p. 83.  
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certain contexts, by members of specific discourse communities, who by 
virtue of their membership in such communities, have agreed that these 
meanings are part of their shared understandings.7 
International standing 
In the academic literature and in politicians’ speeches, international standing 
is usually assessed objectively in both nominal and cardinal terms. For 
example, in 2006, Australian Foreign Minister Downer stated that Australia 
was the 6th largest country by land mass, the 13th largest economy, the 10th 
largest industrialised country, the 8th richest nation in per capita terms and 
possessed 10 per cent of the world’s biodiversity.8 Even in relation to 
population size, Australia ranked in the top 25 per cent of the world’s 
countries. Its military expenditure was the 12th largest in the world, and the 
4th largest in Asia. Australia was also the 6th oldest still functioning 
democracy in the world. However, international rankings such as these do 
not necessarily convert into reputation or influence. Downer’s other claims in 
his speech with respect to Australia’s regional and international standing, 
include claims that Australia’s alliance with the United States ‘gives us more 
weight in the region’; that Australia has shown leadership in the Asia Pacific 
Partnership on Clean Development; and that, as a result of building a 
competitive economy. Australia’s international economic weight had grown to 
the point that ‘we can argue for global deregulation from a position of some 
moral conviction’.9 These are representative of claims for international 
recognition, esteem and reputation, which rely for their verification on the 
judgment and perceptions of others.  
Reynolds cautions against categorising countries as ‘minor’ or ‘great’ or 
‘superpowers’, because such language can lure a country into understanding 
                                            
7 Ibid., p. 92. 
8 A Downer, ‘Should Australia think big or small in foreign policy’, Speech to the Centre for 
International Studies, Sydney, 10 July 2006, retrieved 20 July 2007, 
(www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2006/060710.bigorsmall.html).  
9 Ibid. 
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power as a permanent possession, whereas power is relative and its 
influence may vary from situation to situation: 
Power, then, is relative not absolute; its sources are intangible as well as 
tangible. What matters is not abstract rankings of great powers but the 
complex balance of forces in each particular power relationship.10  
Former DFAT Deputy-Secretary Sadlier arrives at a similar conclusion when 
he states: 
A country’s power and influence really depends on the level of its interest in 
particular situations or issues and its capacity to influence the outcome of 
those situations or issues.11  
Both views lend further support to the case study approach adopted in this 
study. 
Japan scholar Dore highlights the importance of status and prestige for 
international standing. Writing in 1975, the midpoint in the 50 year time span 
of this study, Dore states that he was struck by the general tendency of 
scholars of international affairs to play down the importance of international 
standing, status and prestige factors in international relations, more than 
seemed plausible. He comments:  
Most of my life has been spent in the study of Japanese society. One thing 
that has frequently impressed me is the importance, for explaining a variety 
of internal developments in Japanese society as well as the direction of 
Japanese foreign policy over the last hundred years, of a shared national 
concern with Japan’s standing in the international community.12  
For example: 
It is possible to interpret the trends of Japan’s foreign policy from 1870 to the 
1940s as motivated by a dominant concern with Japan’s international status. 
The drive to remove the unequal treaties, goes this argument, really was 
about inequality and pride and not about tariff autonomy; it was as much for 
                                            
10 D Reynolds, Britannia overruled: British policy and world power in the Twentieth Century, 
Longman, London, 1991, p. 6. 
11 D Sadlier, ‘Aspects of Australia’s place in and outlook on the world’. Address by DFAT Deputy‐
Secretary to the Senior Officers Strategic Studies Course, HMAS Penguin, 29 June 1987, AFAR, vol. 
56, no. 8, August 1987, p. 428. 
12 RP Dore, ‘The prestige factor in international affairs’, International Affairs, vol. 51, no. 2, April 
1975, pp. 190‐207, p. 190, retrieved 15 September 2008,  JSTOR database. 
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glory as for territory, indemnities and colonies that the wars were fought 
against China and Russia; it was the refusal of the Western powers to 
accord Japan full great power status - the humiliating rejection of its racial 
equality clause from the League of Nations’ Convention, or the exclusion 
acts in California, for example - which in the 1920s finally tipped the balance 
away from the policies of sweet reasonableness and international 
correctness, and in the 1930s allowed the army to impose its own recipe for 
achieving the national goal; if, they seemed to be saying, we cannot gain the 
esteem of the West by our conformity to their rules and norms, then we shall 
do so by the only means they seem to understand; the use of military force.13  
He asks: 
And what really, is meant by ‘standing in’ or ‘a position of equality in’ the 
international community? Why is it that most Japanese still feel that despite 
their great economic power they somehow have not achieved a ‘standing’ 
commensurate with it? And why should they appear to be so much more 
concerned than, say, the Swedes or Yugoslavs, about whether they have it 
or not?14  
Dore goes on to suggest that Japanese concern with international standing 
‘involves a presumption that there exists a prestige hierarchy of nations’ and 
a ‘certain consensus, shared by those at all levels of the hierarchy of what 
the order is’, which in turn implies the existence of a community.  
China appears to be another country whose internal and international 
policies reflect its status aspirations and concerns for international standing 
and equality, as Harris and Klintworth point out in their concluding remarks in 
China as a great power: 
International relationships are not just concerned with the distribution of 
economic, political or military power. Status and prestige are also important, 
often critically so, as is likely to be the case for China given its history. 
China’s status and prestige as the most important great power in continental 
Asia has been recognised implicitly if belatedly by most of all its regional 
neighbours, but considerably less so by the West despite its UN Security 
Council membership.15  
                                            
13 Ibid., p. 203. 
14 Ibid., pp. 190‐91. 
15 S Harris & G Klintworth, ‘Conclusion: China and the region after Deng’ in S Harris & G Klintworth 
(eds), China as a great power: myths, realities and challenges in the Asia‐Pacific region, Longman, 
New York, 1995, pp. 357‐366, p. 365. 
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India’s recent quest to become a great power and a key player in 
international peace and security reflects the efforts of Indian leaders to 
elevate India’s regional and international standing and to increase its power 
and to reclaim its standing in the near abroad - parts of Africa, the Persian 
Gulf, Central and Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region.16 India’s 
expansive relations with all the major powers at the same time - a unique 
situation for India - is considered to be a result, not only of India’s increasing 
weight in the global economy and its growing power potential, but also of 
New Delhi’s savvy and persistent diplomacy.17 
Dore posits the following model for understanding international standing in 
the world community: 
Let me summarise the model of the world community implicit in all I have 
been saying. It is of a normatively ranked hierarchy of nations in which a 
major preoccupation of its members is to raise, or to maintain, their existing 
position. It deserves the term ‘community’ precisely because one can use 
the term ‘normative’ - because there is a rough consensus, which even 
peripheral members such as the Chinese half-share, concerning which are 
top-rank nations and which are lower-rank nations. There is also - it is 
logically implicit in such an analysis - a rough consensus on the criteria 
which determine rank, and those criteria include not only power - the ability 
to coerce and deter, by the implicit or explicit threat of material damage - and 
conspicuous wealth, but also such things as ‘being ahead’ in matters of 
equality and justice; not torturing one’s citizens, and having that sort of 
national cohesion which comes from a Scandinavian confidence in the 
quality of one’s social, artistic and intellectual life, rather than from anxious 
preoccupation with external power and prestige - in short, having some 
claims to exercise moral leadership.18 
A range of meanings of international standing, from neutral to moral, is 
evident in Dore’s model of the world community. While the terms 
international reputation and international standing are mostly separated when 
used in the literature, they are sometimes used conjointly. For example, 
Reynolds reports that a senior British Foreign Office official had expressed 
his concerns over the direction of Chamberlain’s discussions with Hitler in 
                                            
16 CR Mohan, ‘India and the balance of power’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, no. 4, 2006, pp. 17‐32, p. 17. 
17 Ibid p. 24. 
18 Dore, ‘The prestige factor in international affairs’, p. 202. 
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1938 on the Sudeten problem, not so much out of consideration for the 
Czechs, but more over the way Britain’s standing in the world depended to a 
considerable extent on reputation.19 Templeton’s Standing upright here, 
which recounts the history of the development of New Zealand’s nuclear 
policies over the best part of the latter half of the Twentieth Century, makes 
the link in its title between New Zealand’s international standing and its 
reputation for standing on its own feet as an independent nation on a matter 
of government policy, principle and popular will.20  
A former Commonwealth Secretary-General said in interview that, in 
practice, international standing rather than international reputation was the 
preferred term in diplomatic discourse: 
I would say that, usually, the two phrases are used to describe how a 
country is regarded outside its borders, particularly in international 
organisations and international groupings. But, in practice, international 
standing is more often used in international discourse because it is less 
prejudicial in terms of an expression. International standing is much more 
neutral than international reputation.21  
Another key informant said that both terms were ‘slightly pejorative’ in their 
use.22 Yet another, speaking from a realist perspective, said on the 
relationship between the two phrases: 
I think that I relate them back to how power … because that’s mostly how I 
think about the world. I’m a realist tempered by a bit of liberal 
internationalism in the sense that I think that power shapes the world but 
norms can affect the way power is utilised. So with reputation I think of a 
capacity to get things done as one dimension. I suppose another dimension 
is the ordinary one, in which we would use the term when talking about other 
people - when diplomats from states get down and talk about countries. 
Singapore has a reputation for being efficient and good at promoting its own 
interests. The Philippines has a reputation for being slightly chaotic and 
unable to deliver on things. So that’s the sort of common sense and I think 
that it is used in the way the decision-making strata across the world - the 
international decision-making strata - think about countries. 
                                            
19 Reynolds, Summits, p. 73. 
20 M Templeton, Standing upright here: New Zealand in the nuclear age 1945‐1990, Victoria 
University Press in association with the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, 
2006.  
21 Telephone interview with the author, 3 November 2008. 
22 Key informant # 23, 6 November 2007. 
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Many informants, however, spoke of international standing in an holistic 
sense, encompassing such factors as the state of Australia’s military 
preparedness; the strength of its economy; its trade, especially with the 
region; its strengths in agriculture, industry, education, science and 
technology; and relevant history and cultural factors such as Australia’s 
development of a democracy, the emergence of a tolerant society on the one 
hand and the legacy of its ‘White Australia’ policy and Australia’s treatment of 
its Indigenous people on the other. International reputation, on the other 
hand, is a more behavioural and action-orientated concept, related for 
example, to its reputation as an immigrant and refugee receiving country. 
Membership of regional institutions or clubs and inclusion in regional 
deliberations can also have an impact on international standing. However, as 
Dalrymple points out, few people have had so much difficulty in defining 
themselves in regional terms or in reconciling themselves to their location as 
have the Australians.23 The cultivation of good relations with Asian countries, 
Australian understanding of Asia, and policies of engagement with Asia are 
essential, in his view, for Australia to be accepted by members of the East 
Asian region and to have a sustainable place in its regional context or, 
conversely, to avoid alienation in its own part of the world. However, an 
obsession with Australia’s standing in the world could reflect, as one key 
informant pointed out, ‘a sort of mild form of neurosis, and the neurosis is 
Australia constantly examining whether it’s the way it positions itself on the 
international stage is okay’.24 
International reputation 
Arriving at a workable concept of international reputation for the study of the 
history of international relations of a particular country is more problematic. 
                                            
23 R Dalrymple, Continental drift: Australia’s search for a regional identity, Ashgate, Sydney, 2003, p. 
1. 
24 Key informant interview # 2, 28 May 2008. 
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Jervis outlines the general problem with the use of the notion of reputation 
when he states in the early 1980s (in relation to deterrence theory): 
Some states have reputations for being bolder, more resolute, and more 
reckless than others. That is, states are seen to differ in the price they are 
willing to pay to achieve a given goal. But it is not clear how these 
reputations are established and maintained or how important they are 
compared to the other influences on credibility. We cannot predict with great 
assurance how a given behavior (e.g., refusing to change one’s position on 
an issue) will influence others’ expectations of how the state will act in the 
future.  
To start with, does reputation attach to the decision-maker, the regime, or 
the country? If one president acts boldly, will other states’ leaders draw 
inferences only about him or will they expect his successors to display 
similar resolve? After a revolution, do others think the slate has been wiped 
clean or does the reputation of the earlier regime retain some life? If one 
kind of regime (e.g., a capitalist democracy) displays willingness to run high 
risks, do others draw any inferences about the resolve of similar regimes? 
How fast do reputations decay?  
On these points we have neither theoretically grounded expectations nor 
solid evidence. In another area, we at least can be guided by a good 
theory.25  
Writing in 2007, Tomz reports: 
Jervis’s assessment of the field still holds. How do people form beliefs about 
the reliability of prospective partners? What causes reputations to change, 
and when do they remain the same? In what contexts will concerns about 
reputation exert the greatest effect on international behavior, and when are 
they less likely to matter? Existing literature does not offer clear, convincing 
answers to these questions.26 
Types of reputation in international relations 
Wajnrub’s metaphor of ‘a house with many rooms’ offers a convenient 
analytical tool to begin unravelling the notion of reputation in international 
affairs. With respect to the equally ‘rubbery’ notion of truth, Wajnryb asks: 
What would truth look like if it were a house? There’d be a number of rooms 
– one for faithfulness, another for accuracy, a third for authenticity. The 
house wouldn’t have been entirely built in the same era: the ‘faithful’ room 
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would have been part of the original design while accuracy was added later, 
perhaps with new owners.27 
This metaphor is useful for identifying the three main themes of ‘international 
reputation’ found in the academic literature and in diplomatic discourse:  
 Prestige, honour and concerns about reputation for resolve, which 
reside in the power politics room. 
 Respect for international law and moral obligations and international 
cooperation, including notions of being a good international citizen, 
which reside in the international law, moral obligations, international 
and corporate social responsibility room.  
 Reputation sought and implied in having a positive ‘brand’ image, 
which resides in the public information and public diplomacy room.  
In terms of their development in international relations, according to the 
Wajnryb metaphor, prestige, resolve and international obligations would have 
been part of the original design, while ‘brand image’ and ‘public diplomacy’ 
were later modern additions or makeovers. A proposed typology of use is set 
out in the following table. 
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Table 1: Typology of the use of the word ‘reputation’ in international relations 
Domain Type Manifestations Sample references 
 
International 
security, power 
politics, 
economic power 
 
International prestige, 
esteem and status 
 
 
 
Reputation for 
resolve 
 
Honour 
 
HJ Morgenthau, Politics 
among nations: the 
struggle for power and 
peace (1978) 
J Mercer, Reputation 
and international politics 
(1996) 
JH Elliott, Richelieu and 
Olivares (1984) 
 
 
International law 
and moral 
obligations  
 
Multilateralism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International moral 
and legal 
responsibilities; 
international and 
regional cooperation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respect for 
international treaties 
and international law 
obligations. 
 
Reputation for 
legitimate 
governance 
 
Recognition of duties 
beyond borders 
 
Being a good 
international citizen 
 
Keeping one’s word 
 
 
A Cassese, International 
law (2002) 
P Keal (ed.) Ethics and 
foreign policy (1992) 
S Hoffman, Duties 
beyond borders: (1981) 
G Evans & B Grant, 
Australia’s foreign 
relations in the world in 
the 1990s (1995) 
M Tomz, Reputation and 
international 
cooperation: sovereign 
debt across three 
centuries (2007) 
 
Public 
diplomacy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Representations of 
Australia in other 
countries 
 
 
 
Projecting a positive 
image internationally 
 
Brand imaging 
 
Corporate social 
responsibility 
 
JS Nye Jr, Soft power 
(2004) 
M Leonard, Public 
diplomacy (2002) 
Parliament of Australia, 
Australia’s public 
diplomacy: building our 
image (2007) 
JV Mitchell, Reputation 
and responsibility: the 
new corporate overhead 
(2000) 
A Broinowski, About 
face: Asian accounts of 
Australia (2003). 
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Reputation as prestige and honour and reputation for resolve 
In his review of historical studies of Spanish foreign policy in the Seventeenth 
Century, early modern historian Elliott28 remarks on ‘the persistent 
recurrence of the word reputacion in the Spanish Council of State’, where 
Count-Duke Olivares, for one, had no doubt about the importance of 
reputacion as both an object, and as an instrument of policy. ‘Reputation’, he 
writes, ‘can many times triumph without arms and resources’. Elliott 
comments on the need to understand the idea of reputation as perceived and 
used by statesmen at the time: 
Someone will perhaps one day attempt a close analysis of the idea of 
reputation as perceived and used by the statesmen of early modern Europe 
in the formulation and conduct of policy. Until then, we shall have to be 
content with registering its importance to contemporaries as the guiding 
principle for actions which may seem puzzlingly irrational to twentieth-
century minds with their tendency to define ‘rationality’ in terms of the pursuit 
of economic or strategic interests.29  
Elliott’s own comparative study of the policies and influences of Cardinal 
Richelieu and Count-Duke Olivares provides a detailed case study of the 
inter-relationship between reputation, prestige, power politics and domestic 
reform. While his subject matter is the conflict between power politics, 
reputation and domestic reform in 17th Century Europe, the lessons that can 
be drawn from the study have enduring relevance for the study of reputation 
for resolve and reputation as prestige:  
The rhetoric of reputation, which constituted the guiding principle of these 
two statesmen in foreign and domestic policy alike, imposed a logic of its 
own on their programmes for reform. Prestige brought power; power brought 
prestige; and prestige, if skillfully exploited, could sometimes make it 
unnecessary to resort to arms. But reputation, with all its overtones of 
honour derived from the military and aristocratic ethos of Early Modern 
Europe, had at all times to be defended, whatever the price; and the price to 
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France and Spain in the later 1620s was to be the definitive sacrifice of 
reform to war.30  
Both Ministers also make it plain to their royal masters that there is no short-
cut to success; that hard work and sacrifice are required if they are to play 
the exalted parts expected of them in the theatre of the world.31  
In his account of the motivations of leaders involved in the First World War, 
Offer32 revisits the theme that kings, political leaders and generals felt 
obliged to defend a country’s honour, whatever the costs. On the 
motivational source of honour in a military or civialian code of honour, he 
writes:  
Honor confers a reputation. In challenging for a duel, a man proclaims his 
willingness to sacrifice the ultimate asset, life itself, in order to avert the loss 
of social reputation.33  
In arguing his case, Offer states that military honour was alive in Kaiser 
Wilhelm’s Germany on the eve of the War; that the Kaiser regarded the 
Sarajevo assasination of Austrian Archduke Ferdinand as an insult to Austria 
who looked to Germany for support; that the Belgian position in the conflict 
was dictated by considerations of national honour; that Britain felt a sense of 
honour to support France and Belgium and that a series of insults, through 
submarine warfare, provoked the US into war. Thus: ‘A chain reaction of 
honorable intentions erupted into a slow-motion holocaust that destroyed 
scores of millions of lives in the horrors of the Western, Eastern and other 
fronts’.34 While Offer declares that honour is ‘a script inherited from forgotten 
cultures, founded on a flawed logic of belligerence and a misleading 
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31 Ibid., p. 41. 
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cognitive bias’, he also states notes that ‘scripts of honour continue to hold 
us in their grip’.35 
Reputation: politics of prestige 
In his Politics among nations, Morgenthau, introduces the ‘politics of prestige’ 
as the third basic manifestation of the struggle for power on the international 
scene (along with the maintenance and acquisition of power, as expressed in 
policies that maintain the status quo and imperialism). The primary function 
of the policy of prestige (which he notes has rarely been recognised in 
modern political literature for what it is) is to influence the evaluations of 
power relations as they exist among different nations at a certain moment of 
history and as they are likely to develop in the immediate and distant future. 
For example:  
 A policy of prestige attains its very triumph when it gives the nation pursuing 
it such a reputation for power as to enable it to forego the actual employment 
of power.36  
and:  
 To demonstrate to the rest of the world the power one’s own nation 
possesses, revealing neither too much nor too little, is the task of a wisely 
conceived policy of prestige.37  
However, in Morgenthau’s view of the world, prestige counts only as an 
instrument of foreign policy, not as an object of policy. Prestige is not an end 
in itself, but a means to reduce the transactional costs of power politics. 
Reputation for resolve 
Mercer’s Reputation and international politics38 provides a comprehensive 
account of what defines a reputation, its properties and how reputations form 
in international politics. Drawing on social psychological research and a 
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number of historical case studies of crises before World War I, he seeks to 
explain how decision-makers interpret the behaviours of both adversaries 
and alliance partners. His book focuses on reputation for resolve in 
international power politics. 
This book focuses on resolve. Resolve is the extent to which a state will risk 
war to keep its promises and uphold its threats. I also examine the flip side 
of a reputation for resolve: a reputation for loyalty among allies.39 
On the question as to whether reputations matter in international relations, 
Mercer claimed: 
Reputation has played an important role among American decision-makers 
both in the design of nuclear strategy and as a reason for intervening - or nor 
intervening - in foreign conflicts. There are many cases where the United 
States apparently acted primarily out of concern for its reputation. For 
example, concern for reputation led the United States to create a 
government in Korea below the 38th parallel, then to deploy U.S. forces in 
Korea in 1950, and finally to move from containment of communism to 
liberation of Korea. Reputational concerns appear to have been equally 
important in the Taiwan Straits Crises, the 1958 Lebanon intervention, and 
Vietnam. President Bush used reputation as an important reason to fight Iraq 
in the Gulf War and President Clinton invoked reputation to support 
intervention in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti. American decision-makers 
apparently decided not to intervene in China in the late 1940s primarily 
because of the potential reputational costs of failure. Reputation was 
advanced as a reason not to intervene in defense of Quemoy and Matsu and 
as a reason for not deploying more ground troops in Vietnam. Concern for 
America’s reputation have been a reason why President Bush decided 
against marching to Baghdad in the Gulf War and it might be a check on 
U.S. intervention against Serbia in the former Yugoslavia.40 
Milligen argues that, while prestige and reputation have been sensible and 
natural objects of concern for American policy makers since at least the early 
1950s, they were of central concern during the Vietnam War.41 She notes 
that a network of other terms accompanies the use of prestige and 
reputation. These other terms include credibility, standing, humiliation, saving 
face, and image. By the close of the Vietnam War, the term dominating policy 
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discussion was ‘credibility’, and it is this term that scholars have tended to 
use to characterise American policy. In an important contribution to the 
debate, Milligen points out that prestige and reputation are social constructs, 
dependent for their naturalness on an extensive and mostly unconscious 
system of metaphors - such as personal honour, position, pillars of peace, 
and (financial) transaction costs and gains. She recommends that the use of 
‘prestige’ and ‘reputation’ to define state practice deserve critical scrutiny.  
Tang notices an ever-widening gap between the politician’s persistent 
obsession with reputation and the scholar’s increasing doubts about its 
importance, and describes this obsession as a cult.42 On the other hand, 
from a practitioner’s point of view, Kissinger states: ‘No serious policy maker 
could allow himself to succumb to the fashionable debunking of prestige or 
honour or credibility’, and that: ‘The principles of America’s honor and 
America’s responsibility were not empty phrases to me’.43 Moreover, Tang 
makes a useful contribution to the debate over the notion of ‘credibility’ and 
to the possibility of a wider application of the notion in diplomacy by defining 
it in the following way: ‘Credibility consists of a reputation for or perception of 
capability, the perception of interest, and a reputation for resolve. In any 
given situation, an actor’s credibility is other actors’ combined assessment of 
these three factors’.44  
Reputation as good standing by nation states with respect to moral and 
legal obligations 
Many strands of this notion are indicated in the literature. Liberal 
internationalists indicate their belief in the importance of reputation. Writing in 
the period between the two world wars, liberal internationalists propose that 
the world after the Treaty of Versailles could be made more stable, more just 
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and more peaceful than any previous era in human history; and that the 
world should be governed by principles of justice, equality, reciprocal 
obligations, cooperation and mutual assistance, rather than status and 
power. McElroy states that the liberal internationalists believed that nations 
cared about their reputations as well as their standings within the community 
of nations. They believed that, as a result, international condemnation did 
carry enormous political weight apart from any other sanctions that might be 
imposed.45 In his Morality and American foreign policy: the role of ethics in 
international affairs, McElroy examines the propositions from liberal 
internationalists that widely held international moral norms do exist and do 
influence foreign policy through: 
 the consciences of individual leaders,  
 domestic political support, and  
 the desire of state decision-makers to maintain a positive reputation of 
their nation in the international system.  
McElroy examines these propositions with respect to American foreign policy 
since the Second World War, drawing on a number of key episodes. For 
example, in his case study of the transfer of the Canal and the Canal Zone to 
Panama in 1978, he points out: 
The case of the Panama Canal treaties demonstrates three different 
pathways from international moral norms to foreign-policy decision making: 
President Carter’s conscience-driven dedication to a more moral American 
foreign policy; domestic political pressure upon the Senate, generated by the 
adherence of key interest groups to the norm of anti-colonialism; and the 
ability of General Torrijos to use the anticolonial norm to form a coalition of 
nations that brought serious reputational pressure on the United States to 
alter its policies on Panama.46  
In this case, the United States concluded that it was better to transfer the 
Canal than to continue to jeopardise future cooperation with neighbouring 
countries and the Third World by retaining the waterway in perpetuity, and so 
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reduce the transaction costs involved in building and maintaining relations 
with these neighbouring countries.  
International lawyers believe that there are reputational benefits associated 
with adherence to the fundamental principles that govern state action and by 
which all member states of the United Nations should abide. These principles 
include the equality and self-determination of nations, and the obligation of 
member countries to obey the Charter, to cooperate with the UN Security 
Council and to use peaceful means to resolve conflicts. The principles 
represent the fundamental set of standards on which states agree and allow 
relatively smooth international relations. They constitute overriding legal 
standards that may be regarded as the constitutional principles of the 
international community.47 Member country obligations also include 
adherence to the conventions they have signed, such as the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
and the Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Failure to comply 
with the overriding legal standards and convention obligations are deemed to 
have consequences for a country’s international reputation.48  
In the absence of an enforceable international legal system, reputation can 
be a useful means of ensuring state compliance with international treaties, 
agreements and understandings. Writing in relation to international economic 
treaties (but with relevance to all international treaties), Waelde highlights the 
importance of reputation both for enhancement of the prospects of 
compliance, and for the reduction of transactional costs by lowering potential 
risks: 
Accession (i.e. signature and formal ratification) to treaties has a formal legal 
meaning but also a less direct signaling and symbolic effect. By accepting a 
bilateral or multilateral investment treaty, the government of a country 
signals its acceptance of rules and procedures which are normally accepted 
by the community of Western market economies. In essence, it means the 
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re-emergence of the classical concept of ‘civilised nations’ with the 
acceptance of a treaty as equivalent to membership in that select club. A 
government signifies that its domestic political process has accepted the 
formal legal implications, and that it wishes to be held accountable to such 
treaty obligations. Not only does such acceptance bestow a number of legal 
privileges to foreign investors, at the cost of government sovereignty, but it 
also expresses a formal decision to accept a rules and value system 
characteristic of developed market economies. The host state signals to 
investors – and to the global markets – that it is at least its intention to 
behave as developed market economies do or are expected to do. For the 
markets, this means the prospect of a lowering of the political risk rating as 
the treaty obligations are formally, and subsequently, materially accepted 
and implemented. For the state, it means an enhancement of its reputation 
as a reasonable host state for foreign investment and trade.49 
However, according to Waelde, reputation works best in equilibrium 
situations. It works less well with aggressive newcomers who may be 
seeking to establish a position in defiance of established rules of the game. 
Accordingly, contracts relying on reputation as a guarantee of compliance 
need to appreciate its relativity.50 
In a similar vein, Tomz examines the emergence of cooperation between 
governments and foreign investors with respect to sovereign debt across 
three centuries and concludes that reputations had formed and influenced 
behaviour in a remarkably consistent way.51 He finds that the evolving beliefs 
of investors constitute the borrower’s reputation in foreign eyes and are 
fundamental to both lending and repayment.52 Further, the beliefs of 
investors are not immutable but evolve as investors interpret behaviour in 
context: 
The Great Depression offered investors an opportunity to study behavior in a 
different context, and thereby distinguish stalwarts from mere fair-weathers. 
Many presumed fair-weathers around the world defaulted in the 1930s, but a 
handful met their obligations in full. Argentina, Australia, and Finland, in 
particular, stunned the world by repaying in dire circumstances. These 
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surprising payers gained esteem in the eyes of foreign investors and 
refinanced their debts at low rates… 
Borrowers, too, behaved according to reputational theory. Most countries 
repaid their debts most of the time. Defaults did occur, however, as expected 
in a model with incomplete information, political change, and economic 
shocks. In any given year, some 10 percent of countries in the world failed to 
satisfy private foreign lenders, and the figure soared to nearly 50 percent 
during exogenous shocks such as the Great Depression… 
Finally, governments articulated a reputational rationale for repaying their 
loans…53 
Downs and Jones provide a critique of the centrality of reputation in the 
‘dominant institutionalist theory of decentralized cooperation’ by arguing that 
states do not possess a single reputation for upholding international 
commitments.54 They maintain multiple reputations for compliance, 
depending on their assessment of the compliance costs of a particular 
agreement, the size of the treaty and on the relative importance states assign 
to it. Nevertheless, they state that reputational concerns are an important 
force for compliance in relation to particular agreements. 
Since the Second World War, there has been an evolution of the notion of 
state sovereignty where state reputation no longer rests solely on ability to 
exercise authority over territory and the population that reside in it, but also 
embraces the idea of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’. The term is used where 
a state has a duty to provide for the basic human rights in its own land mass 
and to be concerned about the abuse of rights overseas. 55 Foot argues that 
prior to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington 
DC, there has been a widespread understanding (as opposed to agreement) 
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that governments are expected to protect individual human rights and that 
failures to protect are of legitimate concern to other state, non-state, and 
international institutional actors in global society.56  
Since 11 September 2001, the assumption that modern, legitimate statehood 
increasingly entails the protection of human rights is seriously challenged, 
and a reputation for effectiveness in the counterterrorism campaign becomes 
more significant than a reputation for defending human rights, particularly in 
the Asian region. Foot argues: 
Many of the political actors affected by these trends seemingly have picked 
up the signal that building a reputation for resolve and developing an ability 
to participate effectively in the antiterrorist struggle has become increasingly 
important, overshadowing human rights matters in the appreciation of their 
standing as modern states and institutions. As a result, the level of 
contribution these state and interstate bodies make to the counterterrorist 
campaign has shown signs of reshaping hierarchies in world politics.57 
Writing in the 1990’s, Evans and Grant elevate good international citizenship 
to a third broad category of Australia’s national interests, alongside geo-
political and strategic interests and economic and  trade interests:  
The third group of national interests involves being, and being seen to be, a 
good international citizen. Global environment problems like the ozone layer 
require global solutions: so do international health problems like AIDS, or the 
international narcotics trade, or unregulated population flows, or a number of 
other phenomena sometimes referred to as ‘non-military threats to security’. 
Australia has a role to play in all these areas, just as in other fields of 
international action such as decolonisation, peace-keeping and the whole 
arms control agenda.58  
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They assert: 
In the longer term, the evolution of just and tolerant societies brings its own 
international returns - in higher standards of international behaviour, and in 
the contribution that internal stability makes to international stability and 
peace. 
In the second place, there are some more direct returns that flow to a 
country that takes seriously its international citizenship obligations. Although 
there may be occasions when taking a principled stand carries costs for us, 
an international reputation as a good citizen tends to enhance any country’s 
overall standing in the world, and will at times prove helpful in pursuing other 
international interests, including commercial ones. Idealism and realism 
need not be competing objectives in foreign policy, but getting the blend right 
is never simple.59  
In pursuing international good citizenship as a reputational goal, the asset 
that matters most, according to Evans and Grant, is credibility:  
Our ability to secure advances in the areas of human rights, refugees or 
development assistance rests on our being, and continuing to be seen to be, 
a liberal democracy with a solid record at home; a country which articulates 
and applies human rights and similar principles with absolute consistent and 
impartiality; a country which not only talks about aid but delivers it. We will 
not achieve much if in our national policies on Aboriginal affairs, immigration 
or the like we are seen to be indulging in double standards. Hypocrites are 
not merely disliked, in international relations as elsewhere. If they are our 
size, they are ignored.60 
However, in his overview for the Australian Institute of International Affairs’ 
publication on The national interest in a global era: Australia in world affairs 
1996-2000, Goldsworthy noted that by the end of the decade, the notion of 
international reputation and its relationship to good international citizenship 
became contestable in Australia: 
The key question here - on what does a good international reputation 
depend? - admits of no simple answer. Some might stress measures of 
achievement such as a country’s economic success or military effectiveness; 
others will point to measures of reliability such as punctiliousness in meeting 
obligations under treaties and other international agreements; others might 
focus on measures of political openness and the rule of law; others again will 
identify some composite of variables such as these. What might be added 
here is that, to some extent, reputation seems also to rest upon countries’ 
performances in the arena of duties beyond borders. Contributions to 
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multilateral peace-keeping efforts provide a case in point. Indeed, it was 
Australia’s leading role in INTERFET in 1999 that led Kofi Annan to describe 
Australia as a ‘model citizen.61 
Reputation as brand image in public diplomacy 
Public diplomacy is a relatively new field of study. As yet, there are no 
agreed definitions. For discussion purposes, this study adopts the broader 
definition of the Center on Public Diplomacy at the University of Southern 
California, which states that unlike standard diplomacy (which might be 
described as the ways in which government leaders communicate with each 
other at the highest levels) public diplomacy focuses on the ways in which a 
country communicates with citizens in other societies. Like standard 
diplomacy, it starts from the premise that dialogue, rather than a sales pitch, 
is often central to achieving the goals of foreign policy. To be effective, public 
diplomacy must be seen as a two-way street. It involves not only shaping the 
messages that a country wishes to present abroad, but also analyses and 
understands the ways that messages are interpreted by diverse societies, 
developing tools of listening and conversation as well as tools of 
persuasion.62 This definition also encompasses aspects of international 
relations that Nye has labeled ‘soft power’. 
Public diplomacy is considered important in an era marked by the end of the 
Cold War, the spread of democracy, the rise of global communications, and 
the growth of global non-government organisations and multilateral 
corporations, in which countries compete for a share of voice. In this new 
era, nation states, both large and small, are becoming increasingly aware of 
the importance of their image and reputation as an essential part of a state’s 
strategic equity in global affairs.63 Foreign policy reputation, in the narrower 
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sense of national state action, has also become part of the mix, as Leonard 
points out: 
Public diplomacy is based on the premise that the image and reputation of a 
country are public goods which can create either an enabling or a disabling 
environment for individual transactions. Work on particular issues will feed 
off the general image of the country and reflect back on to it – in both 
positive and negative directions. For example, Britain’s reputation for 
tradition will help heritage brands, such as Asprey’s, sell their products, and 
their advertising campaigns will also reinforce Britain’s reputation as a 
heritage nation. Equally Norway’s reputation for work in international 
mediation will help persuade the different factions in Sri Lanka that they are 
an honest broker, which will in turn add to their reputation for peace.64  
In this conception of reputation, reputation is linked with image and, in the 
first example given, commodified. Williams contends that earlier senses of 
image as conception of characteristic type have been overtaken by a use of 
image in terms of publicity, but which in practice means ‘perceived 
reputation’, as in the commercial brand image or a politician’s concern with 
his own image. This is in effect a jargon term of commercial advertising and 
public relations. Its relevance has been increased by the growing importance 
of visual media such as television.65 Reputation is thought to both influence 
and be influenced by other factors associated with the promotion of a country 
overseas. This psychological process is known in marketing as the ‘halo 
effect’, where the overall perception of person or a product brand influences 
the perceptions of the individual characteristic or traits of that person or 
product.66  
In Australia, a whole subsection of the Howard Government’s 1997 White 
Paper, In the national interest, is devoted to the need to enhance Australia’s 
reputation abroad by promoting a positive image of Australia through public 
diplomacy, a task that would involve not only government agencies, but 
business and the community as well. Noting that Australia generally had a 
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positive international image (albeit an indistinct and dated one) the White 
Paper states that presenting a contemporary and positive image of Australia 
is important for developing Australian national interests: ‘Unless others know 
us better, and we others, our relationships will remain limited and the 
capacity to pursue Australia’s national interests diminished’.67 Further, the 
White Paper reports that in its multilateral strategies, as in its regional and 
bilateral efforts, Australia’s international reputation is itself a factor in our 
capacity to advance Australian interests and that an international reputation 
as a responsible, constructive and practical country is an important foreign 
policy asset.68 In particular: 
On questions of race, as on other issues which go to the values of the 
Australian community, Australia’s international reputation matters. Australia 
has a direct national interest in an international reputation as a responsible 
member of the international community, committed to the rule of law, ready 
to assist in cases of humanitarian need, and a constructive contributor to the 
economic development of its neighbourhood. An international reputation as a 
thoughtful and creative country, genuinely committed to the peace and 
prosperity of its region, and a source of practical ideas enhances Australia’s 
capacity to influence the regional and global agenda in ways which promote 
the interests or Australia.69  
The Australian Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade’s report on Australian public diplomacy: building our image70 finds that 
a significant number of Australian government departments and agencies are 
engaged in work overseas that directly or indirectly conveys to the world a 
positive image of Australia. It commends these organisations, agencies and 
the work of educational institutions and many private organisations who work 
behind the scenes, through word and deed, helping to secure a presence for 
Australia on the international stage and for helping to build a reputation that 
will hold the county in good stead.  
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Since much of the literature on reputation in relation to image and public 
diplomacy is produced by academic centres, official sources and 
parliamentary inquiries, it is instructive to examine the issue from a business 
perspective to gain a broader understanding of what reputation means, 
particularly its properties, its benefits, its relationship to national image and 
the lessons for public diplomacy generally. For example, many CEO’s of 
large oil companies believe that a positive connection can be made between 
concern for the environment, and profits and shareholder value - to the 
extent that reputation and responsibility have become a new corporate 
overhead for their companies.71 Businesses have learnt over time that 
operational reputation with respect to relations with their various stakeholders 
(e.g., customers, employers, suppliers, investors, governments) all serve the 
simple economic purpose of reducing the risk or cost of transaction. Mitchell 
writes: 
Companies that act in accordance with principles of good corporate 
citizenship may reap a reputational dividend. Ensuring that a company has a 
good reputation in markets where consumers are increasingly socially 
aware, has been proven by experience to be of considerable economic 
importance. Also, a growing number of investors now set social responsibility 
criteria for the use of their funds. And the same selectivity can also be a 
feature of the employment market: a high profile on social responsibility will 
help to attract valuable competence. 72  
Mitchell claims that in an increasingly globalised world with an accompanying 
communications revolution, a new phenomenon has emerged where 
companies have to cultivate their reputations directly through involuntary 
transactions with a broad range of people or organisations that may be, 
variously, consumers of pollution, the supporters of social values, non-
government organisations (NGOs) or fund managers.73 Thanks to the 
Internet and international NGOs, the world is now always looking over the 
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shoulders of multilateral companies, and multinationals’ behaviour in foreign 
countries becomes leveraged in their reputations in their home countries. In 
such circumstances, companies may incur overhead expenditure whose 
effect, like advertising or brand on the retail business, is difficult to measure: 
The substance of identification, mitigation, and measurement may be more 
important than promoting slogans and symbols of greenness, but in reality 
the two go together. Reducing the costs and risk of a business to its 
involuntary social partners can be the basis of a companies’ reputation - just 
as product quality can be the basis of a reputation in the retail market. A 
company whose reputation earns it the benefit of the doubt, or at least the 
benefit of a hearing in difficult situations, will be rewarded for its ‘overhead’ 
expenditure. If it is rewarded it will be more inclined to repeat the experience. 
Reputation is the currency for a win-win game.74  
One of the key informants for the thesis, a head of a department of defence, 
expressed a similar view about the importance of reputation for gaining 
access and conducting business: 
I tend to think of it in terms of credit at the bank. It’s always easier to do 
business if you’ve got good credit lines, and your reputation, internationally, 
is a big component of that. If you have good credit lines then you can go into 
a foreign capital and you can talk to a foreign government, and if you’ve got 
a particularly difficult issue it’s easier to transact it. I think you can strike an 
analogy … without overdoing it, between the way a company goes about its 
business and the way the government goes about its business. Now, in a 
sense you could say the smaller the country the more important the credit 
line because … the higher you have to jump to get attention and to get 
business done. But in fact, I think it applies across the board. I’d say shifts 
between the first term of the Bush administration and the second was that 
recognition that you would start to pile up very big transaction costs if you 
didn’t keep your credit with your allies and other countries refreshed. And 
you might say, the US of all countries doesn’t need to, but in fact they 
discovered things started to get very hard, and so there has been much 
more willingness in this second term to engage in that sort of investment. So 
although the way it operates is obviously different for the United States than 
for Guinea Bissau, the principle, I think, is the same.75 
Foreign policy-making plays a key role in weaving these various strands of 
international standing and reputation together by identifying challenges and 
opportunities, proposing a whole-of-government response and by outlining a 
program of action consistent with a country’s national interests, as defined by 
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the government of the day. The former head of the British Diplomatic 
Service, Coles, believes that sound policies are critical for national state 
reputations to be formed and maintained: 
If, as I believe, reputations are, in the end, made or unmade by policy - and it 
is the soundness of policy which primarily determines how successful Britain 
is in pursuing its overseas interests - then time and space for policy thinking 
have to be found and preserved by whatever bureaucratic device is most 
effective.76 
On Australia’s reputation for policy-making in the 1990s, he stated: 
I think these three years in Australia, 1988 to 1991, were pretty interesting 
on the foreign policy scene. That was a time when the Hawke government 
was making a big drive to enmesh Australia in Asia. I thought that was one 
of the big things, but I also think that it was a period when a lot of thought 
was going into Australian foreign policy in general and this was partly 
because of the character of Gareth Evans …the series of White Papers and 
studies that I referred to in my book was a very impressive output, but not 
the sort of thing you find in many countries. I talked (in my book) about the 
intellectual underpinnings of Australian foreign policy, I think they were very 
strong. As to Australia’s standing in the world at that time… I think there’s 
always been in my view a genuine respect for the intellectual quality of 
Australia’s foreign policy in general and the Australian diplomatic service in 
particular, which guaranteed they’d be listened to - although at times one 
heard a lot of hype about Australia’s influence on the world, but you get that 
in any country. I think that at the levels where it mattered, there was 
realism.77 
Reputation’s definitions and its properties 
Within the literature, definitions of reputation are thin on the ground. 
McNamara’s proposed definition that ‘an individual’s reputation is a social 
judgment of the person based upon facts which are considered relevant by a 
community’, was developed for the purposes of clarifying defamation law and 
focuses on the individual, rather than a corporation or national state actor.78 
The definition also suggests useful ways of thinking about the concept’s 
general properties and provides a means of incorporating the views of other 
authors.  
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 McNamara considers reputation to be a judgement or an evaluation of a 
person. In his seminal anthropological study of reputation in small European 
communities, Bailey remarks: ‘A man’s reputation is not a quality that he 
possesses, but rather the opinions which other people have about him’.79 
Mercer adds: ‘States may be given reputations, but they do not own them: a 
reputation is not the same as a self-image. Nor is a state’s reputation a piece 
of property that it owns’.80 Tomz suggests that, in relation to the repayment of 
sovereign debt, it is the ‘evolving beliefs of investors, which constitute the 
borrower’s reputation in foreign eyes’.81 In international relations, judgements 
about reputation may include judgements by other states on a country’s 
reputation for resolve, adherence to international norms, and reliability in 
terms of contributing to international peace-keeping efforts and in repaying 
sovereign debt. Further, reputation is based on facts. These facts, according 
to McNamara, may be something a person has done (such as accepted a 
bribe) or an observable characteristic of a person.82 However, in a situation 
of incomplete information, as often prevails in international affairs, the facts 
that support a reputation may be incomplete facts, and an actor’s perceptions 
often diverge from objective reality and from the perceptions of others.83 
In relation to deterrence theory (but having wider application) Mercer 
explains: 
Two conditions are necessary for a reputation to form. First, we need to 
know when decision-makers are most likely to explain an ally’s or an 
adversary’s behavior in dispositional (or character) terms. Second, we need 
to know when they will use these explanations to predict or explain similar 
behavior in the future. The heart of the problem with the deterrence 
argument concerns when these two conditions obtain.84  
McNamara asserts that, as a social judgment, reputation is a product of 
association. Mercer also emphasises this relational aspect of reputation 
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when he states that reputation is not a property concept but a relational 
concept, noting: ‘A property concept can be defined and measured without 
reference to another actor. A relational concept refers to ‘an actual or 
potential relationship between two or more actors’.85 Associations of nation 
states include regional associations such as APEC, the Commonwealth and 
the South Pacific Forum, and special purpose associations such as the 
Cairns Group of Free Traders. Membership of each association carries with it 
rights and obligations.  
Reputation, as McNamara states; ‘Flows from a particular form of 
association: it is about what is considered relevant by a community’. He 
proceeds:  
The essence of reputation lies within this last point and, as such, requires 
some close consideration. An examination of the concept of community will 
show it to be a moral construct and, because of that, moral judgment is 
central and essential to both the social construct of ‘real’ reputation…and the 
legal construct of reputation underlying defamation law’.86  
Relevant communities in international affairs range from the international 
community of all sovereign states, regional communities, such as the 
European Community, and like-minded groups in the United Nations context. 
According to Bailey, ‘The importance of one’s reputation diminishes as the 
intensity of interaction also diminishes’.87  
McNamara limits his discussion of reputation by referring only to reputation in 
its ordinary sense for a natural person.88 He has doubts that his definition 
applies to the corporate world and does not discuss its application to 
international relations. This questions whether states can be regarded as 
having personal attributes and whether it is appropriate to attribute to them 
properties we associate with human beings - rationality, identities, beliefs, 
and so on, rather than considering state personhood as a useful fiction, 
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analogy, metaphor, or shorthand for something else.89 Wendt, nevertheless, 
regards states as ‘purposive actors with a sense of self’90 and points out that 
the idea of state personhood pervades the social sciences and international 
relations (IR), and permeates everyday life.  
Approaches  
Key Questions 
The analytical approach used in this thesis is based on four key questions 
suggested by the above examination of the existing literature on the 
concepts of international standing and international reputation and from 
discussions with foreign policy practitioners. These questions are: 
1. Reputation for (and international standing with respect to) what? 
2. Reputation and international standing with whom? 
3. Do international standing and reputation matter? 
4. How are the results assessed? 
The following simple example shows how the questions are related, and how 
they apply in a particular circumstance.  
In their Making Australian foreign policy, Gyngell and Wesley write about 
Australia’s independent national assessment agency, the Office of National 
Assessments (ONA). The Office is tasked to assemble, correlate and 
prepare reports and longer-term assessments that are of political, strategic or 
economic importance to Australia as follows: 
Like the other agencies, ONA’s value to Australian foreign policy at any 
given time depends on the quality, timeliness and relevance of its work to the 
policy making community… 
Within government, ONA has a reputation for writing directly and colourfully, 
rather than in flat bureaucratic prose. This style occasionally irritates (and 
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sometimes distorts), but it has the advantage of sharpening and dramatising 
choices for decision-makers.91 
The answer to the first question listed above is that ONA has earned a 
reputation for direct and colourful writing. The response to the second 
question is that ONA has this reputation with decision-makers within 
government. The third question is answered by the fact that ONA’s reports 
are picked up and read from a plethora of reports that land on a decision-
maker’s desk on a daily basis (because they sharpen and dramatise choices 
for decision-makers). Finally, the results are assessed by the quality, 
timeliness and relevance of ONA’s work to the policy-making community. 
Model 
For its analysis of how reputations are formed, maintained or lapsed, this 
study adopts the model outlined in Chapter Two of Tomz’s Reputation and 
international cooperation: sovereign debt across three centuries,92 suitably 
modified for the purposes of the study. Tomz’s model has three main 
components. First, it recognises that foreign investors operate and make 
decisions under a condition of incomplete information, but they nevertheless 
find ways of learning about risks and potential returns for each particular 
case. Their methods include both an economic or situational assessment of 
the borrower’s ability to pay and the borrower’s willingness to pay. Second, 
the model recognises that borrowers respond to negative shocks in different 
ways and, accordingly, lenders have developed beliefs as to whether they 
are dealing with stalwarts, fair-weathers or lemons. Lenders form these 
beliefs about different types of borrowers from observing behaviour in 
context, from the borrower’s record of repayments and the prevailing 
economic circumstances. Since these representations about borrowers’ 
reputations are central to Tomz’s argument, and since they have been 
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grafted onto this study of Australia’s standing and reputation in foreign policy, 
it is worth quoting Tomz on this point in some detail: 
My theory of reputation involves three types of debtors, which I call stalwarts, 
fair-weathers, and lemons. Each type has distinct preferences that contribute 
to different patterns of behavior. Stalwarts have the strongest preference for 
debt repayment. For stalwarts, the value of foreign capital is high, time 
horizons are long, and the antipayment coalition is weak, so the reputational 
benefits of debt service almost always outweigh the costs. Countries with 
stalwart preferences tend to pay during good times and bad. Fair-weathers, 
in contrast, have intermediate preferences. The value they attach to future 
loans is sufficient to motivate repayment in good times, but not during bad 
ones. Finally, lemons receive the least utility from paying their debts. 
Governments with lemonlike preferences regularly default in bad times and 
sometimes break faith in good times, as well.93 
Third, reputations are not immutable. Governments can and sometimes do 
act contrary to their perceived type, which may cause a particular country’s 
reputation to rise or sink. Similarly, a country with a bad reputation can signal 
willingness to change, and after a probationary period may be able to slowly 
climb the reputational ladder. Fourth, there are incentives and reputational 
returns for borrowers, in terms of access and cheaper loans, for having a 
reputation as a stalwart.  
Tomz acknowledges that current calculus theory,94  which asserts that past 
behaviour has no impact on the present beliefs and considerations of 
decision-makers, provides an alternative to his theory of reputation. 
According to calculus theory, ‘people use historical analogies for mundane 
decisions but abandon them in favor of “systematic reasoning” when the 
stakes are high. Systematic thinkers, it is argued, judge the credibility of 
foreign governments by analysing fresh intelligence about capabilities and 
interests, not past records of commitments honored or broken’.95 However, 
he concludes: 
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The theory of reputation presented in this book stresses that current 
calculations and historical analyses can, in fact, be complementary. Actors in 
international relations engage in both activities to gain a better 
understanding of the scope for cooperation. In the area of debt, investors 
use data about economic conditions - when available - to put current and 
past behavior in context. When money is on the line, investors and their 
advisors use both sources of information to draw inferences, rather than 
relying on one while ignoring the other.96 
This assumption of complementarity between decision-makers’ current 
calculations and assessments based on past behaviour will be followed in 
this study. 
Methods 
The overall approach to the study is exploratory, given that the field of inquiry 
is largely uncharted - as became evident in an initial search of the academic 
literature. Consequently, the thesis has made use of the three principal 
methods relevant to exploratory studies in the social sciences and 
humanities - review of literature, discussions with experts, and analysis of 
case studies97 to generate ideas, develop hypotheses and to help to 
operationalise the concepts of international standing and international 
reputation. These methods are considered to be appropriate research 
methods when understanding of motivations and perceptions is a priority. In 
this exploratory approach, triangulation (the use of more than one research 
method) is used to cross-check findings. 
Review of the available literature 
To gain a workable understanding of the terms ‘international standing’ and 
‘international reputation’ in the literature, the social science and humanities 
databases accessible through the Deakin University were interrogated using 
key word searches. Notes and biographical references in the initial trawl 
were followed up, yielding a much wider catch. Other documentary sources 
of a general nature, such as the memoirs and biographies of Ministers and 
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former Heads of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and foreign 
policy speeches in Australia and in other countries were examined. Other 
‘grey’ literature sources such as unpublished speeches and comments at 
conferences were also examined. The National Library’s Oral History 
recordings of interviews in their Australian Diplomats 1950-2000 collection 
proved to be particularly useful, as did similar holdings in other countries, 
such as the British Diplomatic Oral History Programme interviews held at the 
Churchill Archive Centre, Cambridge, UK. The results of the initial literature 
search are included in this Chapter. 
Interviews with key informants 
The methodology for the interviews (n=30) followed National Health and 
Medical Research (NHMRC) guidelines, and was approved by the Deakin 
University Human Research Ethics Committee. The interviewees comprised 
two main groups. The main group (n=23) comprised other country former 
foreign ministers, former high commissioners and ambassadors to Australia, 
heads of departments and senior foreign affairs and trade officials and 
peacekeeping commanders. These informants were recruited for their ability 
to provide and informed view on the research topic and / or on the subject 
matter of one or more of the case studies. The interview sample was 
opportunistic rather than representative, and relied heavily on who was 
available to be interviewed during the author’s brief overseas visits in 2007 
and 2008 to examine archival holdings in the UK, US, the UN, Canada and 
New Zealand. A ‘snowballing’ technique, whereby one informant suggested 
others whom it would be worth interviewing, was used to extend coverage. 
The second group of interviewees (n=7) comprised senior Australian foreign 
affairs and trade senior officials, former ministerial staff and former diplomats 
who had decision-making responsibility for Australian foreign policy in 
relation to the issues involved in the case studies and could, therefore, 
provide insight into the formulation and execution of government policies. 
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Members of this group were recruited for their particular expertise in relation 
to specific case studies.  
A letter of invitation introduced the researcher. Respondents were given a 
plain language statement explaining the aim of the study, the purpose of the 
interview, the proposed interview arrangements and confidentiality 
provisions. The respondents were also given a consent form and a list of 
proposed interview questions. These questions, tailored to each individual 
interview, included general questions about the terms international standing 
and international reputation and specific questions about Australia’s 
international standing and reputation in respect of particular foreign policy 
episodes. Twenty interviews were conducted face to face and were recorded 
digitally, mainly during the researcher’s overseas visits in 2008. The 
remainder were contacted by phone and, on two occasions, by email 
correspondence. Records of conversation were made of these telephone 
discussions and points were clarified, where necessary, in subsequent 
correspondence. In cases where it was proposed to quote a respondent in 
the final report by name or under a pseudonym, the respondents were 
contacted beforehand by mail or email to seek their agreement. 
The information was used to inform the study and to help tease out the 
concepts of international standing and international reputation. The overseas 
segment of the interviews played a very important role in providing a multi-
country perspective to the study, particularly in relation to the case studies. 
The domestic component of the interviews was most useful in providing a 
reality check on published accounts of the development of Australian foreign 
policy in relation to the specific episodes examined in this study. Potential 
bias in the interviews was countered in the study by interviewing more than 
one respondent on a particular issue and by adopting the research method of 
triangulation to assess the value of the information gained in the interviews 
against information provided in official records and from other sources. 
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Archival and other documentary sources 
Mercer’s Reputation and international politics98 indicates that discourses on 
international reputation are primarily to be found in the genuine beliefs of 
decision-makers rather than in public statements, which he claims are 
unreliable because they are usually meant to signal a particular disposition to 
friend and foe or to bolster an argument. Archival records, on the other hand, 
allow an examination of what decision-makers say in confidence to one 
another. Mercer tests his thesis by using case studies of the First World War, 
where ‘the enormous amount of source material’ makes it possible to 
determine how key actors explain one another’s behaviour. He concludes:  
The empirical chapters make clear that turn-of-the-century beliefs about the 
importance of reputation often governed policy decisions. Though the 
evidence is harder to gather, the same appears to be true today.99 
Dispatches from ambassadors, high commissioners and permanent 
representatives and reports of officials to international conferences and 
meetings provide a good source of information about how a country’s 
reputation is perceived at any particular time. As Dore notes: 
They are affected because their own personal standing in the real concrete 
community of international individuals is affected by the status ranking of 
their nation in the metaphorical community of nations. Their self-respect 
hinges in part on the respect accorded their nation.100 
Many of the main primary sources used in this study are already available 
publicly: in official documents, including the Australian, New Zealand and 
Canadian departments of foreign affairs and trade publications on foreign 
policy; in official speeches; parliamentary records and in the reflections of 
former foreign affairs practitioners in their memoirs, biographies, articles, and 
conference presentations. The study, however, examines these sources from 
a new angle. As mentioned above, interviews with over 30 ‘key informants’ 
provided substantial new primary source material for the thesis. Other 
                                            
98 Mercer, Reputation and international politics, p. 11. 
99 Ibid., p. 13. 
100 Dore, ‘The prestige factor in international affairs’, p. 197. 
54 
 
country newspaper sources, including French language sources, account for 
much of the ‘other country’ contemporary reporting on Australian foreign 
policy initiatives.  
The case studies 
The four case studies used in the following analysis comprise the major arm 
of the study. They are particularly relevant to exploratory studies such as this 
study as they provide in-depth, ‘insight stimulating examples’ for further 
study.101 While case studies have been criticised by research theorists on the 
grounds that one cannot generalise from a single case, Flyvberg addresses 
and counters this (and the four other most common misunderstandings about 
case study research) in a 2006 article in Qualitative Inquiry in which he 
concludes that ‘a scientific discipline without a large number of thoroughly 
executed case studies is a discipline without systematic production of 
exemplars, and a discipline without exemplars is an ineffective one. Social 
science may be strengthened by the execution of a greater number of good 
case studies’.102  
                                            
101 Sellitz et al., Research methods in social relations, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1976, 
cited in Sarantakos, op. cit., p. 115.  
102 B Flyvberg, ‘Five misunderstandings about case‐study research’, Qualitative Inquiry, vol. 12, no. 2, 
April 2006, pp. 219‐245, p. 219. 
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CHAPTER 2.  CASE STUDY: AUSTRALIA AND THE ORIGINS OF 
THE COLOMBO PLAN 
Introduction 
The Colombo Plan1 occupies a special place in Australia’s diplomatic and 
cultural history since the Second World War. The Plan for mutual aid in the 
form of economic and technical assistance commenced in 1951, providing 
the umbrella for Australia’s aid program to countries in the South and South-
East Asian region until the 1970s, when it was overtaken by alternative 
means of Australian development assistance. It provided the avenue for 
thousands of Asian students to study in universities and technical institutes in 
Australia, and will be remembered by the Australian public and in the region 
largely for the people-to-people contacts it established.  
 
The establishment of the Colombo Plan is a defining moment in Australia’s 
adjustment to, and engagement with its own region. The Australian historian 
and author Donald Horne lists the Colombo Plan as one of the signposts to 
Australia’s growth as a nation.2 Sir Percy Spender, Australia’s Minister for 
External Affairs, 1949-1951, in his Exercises in diplomacy,3 describes the 
Colombo Plan and the ANZUS Treaty as the two central pillars in Australian 
foreign policy in the 1950s and 1960s, and as evidence of Australia’s 
maturity in foreign affairs and of the role that Australia - which regarded itself 
then as a ‘small nation’ - could exercise in Asia and the Pacific. He, of 
course, played a major role in each. He told a reviewer of his book that: 
I content myself with believing that Anzus created the ‘special relationship’ 
which exists between the U.S.A and ourselves, while the Colombo Plan 
marked the commencement of the ‘special relationship’ between Australia 
                                            
1 The Plan’s full title was ‘The Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and 
South‐East Asia’. 
2 D Horne, ‘Signposts to our nation’s growth’, Daily Telegraph, 29 December 2000, p. 26. 
3 P Spender. Exercises in diplomacy: the Anzus Treaty and the Colombo Plan, Sydney University Press, 
Sydney, 1969, Preface, p. 9. 
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and Asia, of which so much has been heard since. Both evidenced 
fundamental departures from and gave, I think, new directions to Australia’s 
(sic) foreign policy.4 
While the case study is concerned with the strategic, political, humanitarian 
and cultural objectives that underlie Australian foreign policy towards the 
Colombo Plan, the primary focus is on aspects of Australia’s international 
standing and reputation as sources of influence or impediments relevant to 
the achievement of those policy objectives. Issues examined include:  
 Australian concerns about positioning itself in the world and the region 
at a time when the centre of political gravity in world politics shifted, at 
least temporarily, from Europe to Asia;  
 Spender as world statesman;  
 Australian authorship of the Colombo Plan;  
 Australia’s changing reputation as a member nation of the ‘new’ 
Commonwealth; and 
 Australia’s standing with the newly independent states of South and 
South-East Asia. 
In order to bring these issues and their inter-relationships into a clear focus, 
the study concentrates on a limited time frame, from January 1950 to 
February 1951, even though this means that some of the positions and 
attributes identified remain in embryonic form. It traces Australia’s role in the 
formation of the Colombo Plan through a series of three international 
conferences at ministerial level: the Colombo Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 
January 1950, the British Commonwealth Consultative Committee chaired by 
Australia in Sydney in May 1950, and the London Consultative Committee in 
September-October 1950. Spender was the Australian Minister for External 
Affairs for the whole period. Spender describes the1950 Colombo Foreign 
Ministers’ meeting (often referred to as the Colombo Conference) as the time 
                                            
4 ‘Holograph letter from Sir Percy Spender about his role as architect of the Colombo Plan and the 
ANZUS Treaty, written from the Hague to JG Starke, 16 October 1969’, Spender Papers, box 17, 
MS4875, NLA.  
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at which the idea of the Colombo Plan was born, the subsequent Sydney 
meeting as giving effect to the recommendations of the Colombo Conference 
and setting the stage, and the London meeting as the prologue.5  
Pre­Colombo Meeting: expectations and positionings 
From a British Commonwealth of Nations perspective, the purpose of the 
1950 Colombo Foreign Ministers’ meeting was to enable foreign ministers to 
discuss their mutual approach to world problems and to the emergence of 
new independent states and to exchange views on how they could mutually 
help each other.6 In his invitation to Commonwealth leaders, Ceylonese 
Prime Minister Senanayake suggested that, in addition to standard general 
topics at Commonwealth Heads of Government meetings (such as a review 
of the international political and economic situation), the agenda for the 
meeting should include the Japanese Peace Treaty, the situation in China 
and South and South-East Asia following the Communist victory in 1949, and 
any special problems of South East Asia which might be raised.7 The 
developmental needs of South and South-East Asia were one of the many 
items for possible discussion. The meeting had an added significance in that 
it was the first of its kind and Britain and its Commonwealth partners had a 
strong interest in its success as a Commonwealth initiative.  
As the meeting was held in Asia, Britain saw the meeting as a means of 
demonstrating the extent of consensus and cooperation that could be 
developed between East and West through the agency of the 
Commonwealth and as a bulwark against Communism.8 Britain attached 
considerable importance to, and prepared well for, the meeting. Britain’s 
                                            
5 Spender, Exercises in diplomacy,  pp. 200, 244, & 265, respectively. 
6 Broadcast speech by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the Commonwealth Conference, 
Colombo, 16 January 1950, Bevin Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge, 
UK.  
7 Cablegram to Prime Minister from the Prime Minister of Ceylon, Colombo, 8 November 1949, 
A1838, 532/7, part 1, NAA. 
8 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ‘The Colombo Conference’, 22 February 
1950, C.P. (50) 18, CAB/129/38, NAUK. 
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preparations were centred on the notion of regionalism as a means to 
support and sustain the newly-independent states in the region.9 A July 1949 
Foreign Office assessment for Cabinet on the United Kingdom in South-East 
Asia and the Far East assessed that while the United States had the greatest 
volume of trade with the Far East and South-East Asia, it did not enjoy the 
same degree of prestige as the United Kingdom, partly because it lacked the 
historical connections that the UK had with the region.10 This was due partly 
to the failure of its policy in China, partly because of its reluctance to play a 
leading role in South-East Asia, and partly because of its laissez faire 
economic philosophy which had little appeal in South and South-East Asia.  
The assessment concluded that continuing British influence in the area in 
relation to existing peace-time military commitments, trade with South-East 
Asia and the Far East, and continuing prestige and ties with countries in the 
region could be best directed to the building up of some sort of regional 
association in South-East Asia in partnership with the association of the 
Atlantic powers - which would include participation of the United States, the 
‘Asiatic Dominions’, and Australia and New Zealand. The immediate object of 
such an association would be to prevent the spread of Communism and to 
resist Russian expansion. Longer term objectives would be to create a 
system of friendly partnerships between East and West, and to improve 
economic and social conditions in South-East Asia and the Far East, thereby 
anticipating the themes which would come to dominate discussions at the 
Colombo Conference. 
A subsequent Foreign Office assessment, PUSC (53), on Regional 
cooperation in South-East Asia and the Far East, dated 24 August 1949, 
examined the difficulties in pursuing these aims, including, in particular, 
                                            
9 T Remme, Britain and regional cooperation in South‐East Asia, 1945‐49, LSE/Routledge, London, 
1995. 
10 P.U.S.C. (32), ‘The United Kingdom in South‐East Asia and the Far East’, 28 July 1949, F 17397, FO 
371, 76030, NAUK. 
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Britain’s problems with its sterling balances. The paper made a direct link 
between Britain’s international standing and influence and the achievement 
of Britain’s aims. It identified that Britain’s standing (and by association, that 
of the West) had been greatly improved by its policies of granting 
independence and seeking amicable settlement with its former colonies 
(particularly with respect to India) whereas French and the Dutch policies still 
had the danger of discrediting the West with all Asian nationalist elements in 
the area. While Asian suspicions of the West’s reputation in respect to 
imperialism and neo-colonialism died hard, something could nevertheless be 
done in the political and diplomatic fields to dissolve suspicions in attitudes in 
Asian countries against Britain’s colonial policy, and to wean them away from 
the attraction of ‘non-alignment’. In particular, concrete help of a technical, 
financial and economic nature was identified as likely to be of the greatest 
influence in achieving these two points of policy.  
PUSC (53) concluded that Commonwealth members provided the nucleus in 
the short term upon which to build any system of regional cooperation in 
order to counter the threat of communism, and in the longer term to improve 
economic and social conditions in South-East Asia. Britain remained the 
dominant power inside the Commonwealth, notwithstanding India’s growing 
influence, and London was optimistic that it could play a leading role at the 
Colombo Conference. Britain’s relations with the Commonwealth provided a 
means of influencing and co-coordinating the policies, not only of the Asiatic 
Dominions, but of Australia and New Zealand, whose strategic interest in the 
area was, it considered, equal to its own.11 With respect to Australia’s 
standing in the region, the paper stated: 
Despite Australia’s professions of sympathy for the struggling Nationalists in 
Asia there has been evidence recently that the execution of the “White 
Australia” policy has begun to cause resentment in Asian countries and there 
                                            
11 ‘The United Kingdom in South‐East Asia and the Far East’, op. cit.; ‘Conference of Foreign Ministers 
in Ceylon in 1950’, op. cit.; Remme, Britain and regional cooperation in South‐East Asia, pp. 183‐199. 
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is a danger that this policy may ultimately embitter relations between 
Australia and Asia.12 
A Dominion Office minute, written in November 1949, supported the Foreign 
Office idea of regional cooperation. It concurred with the Foreign Office view 
in relation to Australia’s participation in regional cooperation, noting that there 
was no doubt that the ‘White Australia policy’ had not increased Australia’s 
popularity among Asian peoples and might be construed by them to be 
evidence of the Australian desire to keep themselves to themselves. 
However, the correspondence also noted that Australia had recently held a 
conference of its own in Canberra, which included some recognition that 
Australia had a part to play in the affairs of South East Asia and the Far 
East.13 In the private views of British officials, therefore, Australia’s ability to 
play a constructive role in the region was restrained by its reputation for 
isolationism, its White Australia reputation and its hitherto unwillingness to 
take on its fair share of responsibilities as a member of the new 
Commonwealth of Nations (since 1949) in relation to the affairs of South East 
Asia and the Far East. 
Australian preparations 
The Liberal-Country Party Coalition in Australia swept into power on an anti-
Socialism political platform in December 1949. One of Spender’s first acts as 
External Affairs Minister was to announce, on 20 December (the day after 
being sworn in as Minister) that he would be attending the Commonwealth 
Foreign Ministers meeting in Colombo scheduled for January 1950.14 Within 
two weeks of becoming Minister, Spender was on his way to Colombo (via 
Indonesia where he was to attend their independence celebrations). The 
Colombo Conference was Spender’s first foray in international affairs and the 
coming event was of critical importance in helping him to crystalise his views 
                                            
12 P.U.S.C. (53), ‘Regional Cooperation in South‐East Asia and the Far East’, 20 August 1949, F 17397, 
FO 371, 76030, NAUK. 
13 Minute to Mr. Metcalf, processed 30.11.49, DO 35 / 2770, F 2320/26, NAUK. 
14 ‘Australian representation at Colombo Conference’, DEA Press Release, 20 December 1950, A1838, 
532/7 part 1, NAA. 
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on the prevailing themes in international affairs of world Communism, the 
problems of decolonisation and economic development and on Australia’s 
role in its region. 
In this, his first ‘exercise in diplomacy’, Spender was determined to make his 
mark on the Conference and at the same time give meaning to the 
Commonwealth. Tange recalled being contacted in December 1949 by his 
head of department while he was on holidays, and being told that Spender 
had decided to attend the forthcoming meeting in Colombo and expressed a 
wish to take with him someone who was knowledgeable about economic 
matters.15 Tange was to present himself at the Minister’s office in Sydney the 
following day, ‘properly clad’ and in his ‘right mind’. In what is described as a 
‘very lucid, rapid-fire speech, much of which was delivered as he paced up 
and down the carpet’, Spender said he wanted Tange to be in no doubt 
about the changes that were going to occur in Australian foreign policy, 
particularly in relation to the United States, the region, Britain and the 
Commonwealth. More immediately, Spender said that: 
He believed in Commonwealth relations but it was important that relations of 
this kind be given real meaning, that he was not minded to attend an 
international conference which engaged in talk and rhetoric, he wanted to 
see something come out of it. He believed there was scope for economic co-
operation in the Commonwealth and he wanted some ideas developed 
around this theme so that he could make a positive contribution.16  
Spender’s intent in moving Australia closer to American influence, while at 
the same time retaining ties with, and testing the boundaries of, the British 
Commonwealth,17 is evident in this very early exchange with one of his 
departmental senior officials. 
In his published account of the origins of the Colombo Plan in his Exercises 
in diplomacy, Spender claims that for some time before becoming Minister 
                                            
15 Recorded interview with Sir Arthur Tange by Professor JDB. Miller, 1‐23 April 1981, National 
Library of Australia Oral History Section, (TRC‐1023: Tape 5), Transcript, pp. 72‐78, NLA. 
16 Ibid. 
17 D Lowe, Australian between empires: the life of Percy Spender, Pickering & Chatto, London, 2010. 
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for External Affairs, he had been aware of, and had some understanding of, 
the economic and political problems of Asia. This knowledge had been 
gained through previous visits to various countries in the region and the 
subject had been talked about in the United Nations, Europe, the US and 
Asia. However, in his view, the time for talking and discussing the need for 
economic aid to the region had passed. What was needed now was (a) an 
examination of the problem presented by this need, (b) the presentation, set 
out in a concise working paper, of a scheme to resolve the problem and (c) a 
clear plan for its execution, including, in particular, its acceptance.18 Tange’s 
own view, as someone who subsequently was credited with some part at 
least in shaping the nature of the Australian proposals to the Colombo Plan 
Conference, was that as with all initiatives, it was very hard to find the origin 
of the idea of assistance to regional countries in Asia as many ideas were ‘in 
the air’ at the time. Fundamentally, this was not a new idea but the idea of 
promoting it as a broad-based plan with backing from Britain (the most 
powerful industrial country in the Commonwealth) and Canada certainly was 
new and the first venture by the new Minister.19 
On the eve of his departure for the Colombo Conference, Spender stated 
that Australia must orientate its foreign policy towards Asia, and that it was in 
Asia and the Pacific that Australia should make its primary effort in the field 
of foreign relations.20 Spender regarded Communism as an immediate threat, 
but he also recognised the need to develop a dynamic policy towards Asia 
which would last ‘for all times’. He envisaged Australia’s future role in Asia in 
terms of leadership:  
The rising and menacing tide of Communism in the East presents us with a 
definite threat - and not a remote threat either - to our national existence. But 
the threat is also a challenge. Australia, who with New Zealand has the 
greatest direct interest in Asia of all Western peoples, must develop a 
dynamic policy towards neighbouring Asian countries, whose people we 
                                            
18 Spender, Exercises in diplomacy, p. 194.  
19 Recorded interview with Sir Arthur Tange, p. 74. 
20 Spender claimed in his memoir: ‘This was, then I would think, quite a new concept in Australian 
foreign policy, one since increasingly recognized’. Spender, Exercises in diplomacy, p. 195. 
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must live with, not only to-day and to-morrow, but for all times. We should 
give leadership to developments in that area.21 
However, Spender also recognised an Australian obligation - in conjunction 
with the United States - to contribute towards the stability and democratic 
development of the countries of South-East Asia: 
By concerted action, we, the countries which have had greater opportunities 
in the past, can help the countries of South-East Asia to develop their own 
democratic institutions and their own viable economies and thus protect 
them against those opportunist disruptive and subversive elements which 
take advantage of changing political situation and low living standards.22  
In his preparations for the Colombo meeting, Spender was able to draw on 
working papers prepared by his department as a result of a series of 
meetings held in November 1949 attended by departmental representatives, 
senior UK and New Zealand officials, and Australian representatives in the 
region. The Department of External Affairs (DEA) Brief to Cabinet on South-
East Asia for the Colombo Conference assessed that the influence of 
communism represented the main threat to the stability of South-East Asia.23 
However, it concluded:  
For Australia the problem is at present political and economic; it calls for 
sustained and co-ordinated action to encourage and strengthen established 
governments throughout the area, to cultivate and maintain the goodwill of 
the peoples, and to help them to raise their standards of living and thereby 
increase their resistance to Communism.24  
The DEA Cabinet Brief noted that political and economic aspects were linked 
in the sense that the amount of political influence Australia could exert in 
Asia was determined largely by the extent to which it could foster economic 
development in the region. However, DEA consideration of this matter only 
served as a reminder that the resources in goods, money and services that 
Australia (despite being a wealthy country) could spare for the pursuit of 
                                            
21 Cablegram from Department of External Affairs to posts, ‘Australian relations with Asia’, Canberra, 
3 January 1950, A1838, 381/3/1/1, part 1, NAA.  
22 ‘Australian relations with Asia’, op. cit., p. 36. 
23 ‘Australian policy in South‐East Asia’, Brief for Cabinet for Commonwealth Conference, Colombo, 
Canberra, December 1949, in Australia and the Colombo Plan, doc. 14, pp. 22‐33.  
24 Ibid., p. 24. 
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political and economic objectives outside Australia were limited. Increased 
trade provided obvious opportunities, but there were difficulties with respect 
to exporters’ and manufacturers’ views on trade with Asia, existing 
contractual commitments with the UK, and with respect to low Asian demand 
for Australian capital and consumption goods.  
The Brief found that there was little that Australia could do by way of direct 
economic aid for Indo-China, Malaya, Burma, and the Philippines. Britain 
considered these countries as French, British and United States 
responsibilities within their respective fields of influence. This left Indonesia, 
where Australia had established a good reputation and much good will, inter-
alia, by bringing the Netherlands-Indonesian dispute before the United 
Nations, as the focus of Australian leadership in the region. This then led to 
discussion of the possibility of Australian assistance in terms of technical 
assistance, medical and other relief supplies, and the extension of credit.  
Educational assistance, on the other hand, was the one medium where 
Australia, through scholarships and providing places in Australian 
educational institutions, could offer assistance not only in Indonesia, but also 
throughout the region. Educational assistance also had the advantage of 
being a broad field in which Australia could earn valuable good will and at the 
same time foster a favourable image of Australia in the region through a 
better understanding of Australian conditions and way of life, provided that 
anticipated problems relating to security (both personal and institutional), 
accommodation for overseas trainees and students, and the appropriateness 
of the courses offered, could be resolved. 
The Colombo Conference and Spender’s reputation as world 
statesman 
Though technically not a summit meeting (as explored by Reynolds in his 
Summits: six meetings that shaped the twentieth century), the Colombo 
Conference was an important post-Second World War Commonwealth 
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meeting that helped shape the future of South and South-East Asia in the 
wake of Indian, Pakistani, Ceylonese, Burmese and Indonesian 
independence. The Commonwealth Meeting on Foreign Affairs (January 
1950) was chaired by Ceylonese Prime Minister Senanayake. It was a 
distinguished gathering of ministers, which Tange recalled included some 
very significant ones in the western world and in what was going to become 
the leadership of the non-aligned world, including Pandit Nehru of India 
(whose portfolios also included external affairs), British Foreign Secretary 
Ernest Bevin, and the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, 
Lester Pearson.25 The ministers were seated around a table in the Cabinet 
room in the Senate Building, according to a protocol or ‘pecking order’, which 
had the British and Indian delegations seated opposite the Chair, Australia at 
one end of the table and Canada and New Zealand at the other end.  
Ministers agreed on an agenda of five main items for discussion at their first 
meeting: the general international situation (both its political and economic 
aspects); China; Japan; South-East Asia; and Europe. In other words, the 
situation in South-East Asia was but one of the five items for discussion. 
Spender made specific interventions on the agenda items on China and 
Japan, but his main interest was the situation in South-East Asia, which was 
listed for discussion on the fourth day.  
The Australian press had great expectations of the Colombo meeting, hoping 
that it would result in cooperation in defence against aggression26 or at least 
a strengthening of member countries’ political and economic defences 
against communism, not only in their own territories but in South-East Asia 
as a whole.27 If Spender shared these views (or if he indeed had been 
responsible for giving background briefings to the press in these terms - 
which might well have been the case), or had any ambitions of establishing a 
                                            
25 Two delegates, Pearson (Canada) and Noel‐Baker (UK) were later to become Nobel Peace Prize 
recipients. 
26 ‘Disappointing trend at Colombo Conference’, SMH, 13 January 1950, editorial, p. 2. 
27 ‘Colombo Conference and the communist menace’, SMH, 29 December 1949, editorial, p. 2. 
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reputation for himself as a cold war warrior at the meeting, he changed tack 
on the first day. He told the meeting that while he agreed that a means 
needed to be found to check the growth of Communism in Asia, he did not 
favour a military or defence pact ‘certainly not at this stage’, particularly 
having regard to Nehru’s opposition and the absence of an assurance of 
United States participation.28 In his Exercises in diplomacy, Spender 
mentioned that any talk of military defensive machinery aimed at assisting 
the achievement of political stability was ‘strictly taboo’ at the meeting; and 
that any attempt to initiate a discussion would have been futile and could 
even have imperiled the proposals he intended to present to the meeting.29  
In his own account of his informal meeting with Spender, Bevin reported that, 
as a military pact in Asia did not seem possible, he suggested to Spender 
that economic power be pulled together for common purpose.30 
The Colombo Conference provided an intensive course in the realities of 
present Commonwealth relations for the new Australian and New Zealand 
Ministers of External Affairs.31 In the Conference’s opening session, Spender 
expressed Australia’s strong sentimental ties with the United Kingdom (rather 
than to the new Commonwealth of Nations as a whole). He went on to 
express the wish that the meeting result in strong recommendations to 
governments and that the delegates would pursue a common policy in Asia 
(something which Commonwealth meetings were not designed to do). He 
was immediately followed by the new New Zealand Minister for External 
Affairs who used the occasion to express his country’s intense loyalty to the 
United Kingdom and said that New Zealand was proud to think of herself as 
‘a daughter in her mother’s house, though mistress in her own’, though he 
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29 Spender, Exercises in diplomacy, pp. 13‐14. 
30 Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, 
6 September 1950, FRUS, 1950, vol. V1, p. 146. 
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did also say that he hoped the Commonwealth association would become 
stronger. This had the unfortunate effect of the two antipodean new 
representatives being lumped together in the estimation of the other 
delegates. The Canadian senior official Escott Reid observed in his notes on 
the meeting:  
The speeches of Spender, of Australia, and Doidge, of New Zealand were 
echoes of a pretty remote past. Spender spoke of the necessity of a 
common foreign policy and a common voice for the Commonwealth. He 
wanted the Commonwealth to agree on specific recommendations to 
governments on what should be done.32 
And again, with reference to the discussion on recognition of the new 
Chinese Communist Government: 
The Australian and New Zealand representative both directed their criticisms 
at the U.K. as if the United Kingdom was the only member of the 
Commonwealth which had recognised the new Chinese government and as 
if the UK were the only member of the Commonwealth which was under an 
obligation to wait until the Colombo Conference before recognising it. This 
seems to be an indication of the fact that the representatives of the two new 
governments approach these meetings as if their purpose is to discuss UK 
foreign policy, not the foreign policies of all of us.33 
Further evidence of Spender’s (initial) inability to identify with the new 
Commonwealth is suggested in his handling of the British proposal that 
member governments agree to make a loan to Burma of £Stg.7.5 million as a 
‘ways and means’ loan to be used for additional backing for the Burmese 
currency. To the horror of British officials, Spender is reported to have 
demanded a quid pro quo from London whereby Australia would agree to 
participate in the loan in exchange for British agreement that they refrain 
from criticising the Menzies government for its decision to abolish petrol 
rationing (as a means of conserving dollars).34 In the end, Spender relented 
and recommended that Australia agree to support the loan in order to show 
its intention of supporting the principles that the Australian Government 
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advocated in relation to the Commonwealth and, more importantly, not to 
undermine his planned initiative in relation to the Colombo Plan.35 
Spender’s interventions in the general debates on the region appear to bear 
out Parsons’ observations that his attitudes to Asia were laden more with 
apprehension than sympathy.36 Both Spender’s and Australia’s reputation for 
racial intolerance were on display at the meeting. In an otherwise measured 
statement on the Japanese peace settlement, Spender aired his (racial) 
prejudices against the Japanese by expressing the bitterness he said the 
Australian people felt towards the Japanese, and spoke of Australian fear of 
a resurgence of Japanese militarism. According to Escott Reid’s notes, 
Spender told the meeting: ‘The Japanese might be hissing with Japanese 
courtesy today but this did not mean that they would not bear their fangs 
tomorrow’.37 In the debate on China, Spender provided an early indication of 
the reputation he would develop in the 1950’s of trying to slow the process of 
decolonisation38 when he drew swords with Nehru over the latter’s assertion 
that the principal political objective for Commonwealth countries should be 
the complete removal of foreign domination in all of the countries in the 
region. Spender replied that Nehru’s comments would not presumably apply 
to the trust territories. Australia, he indicated, had trust territories in New 
Guinea, some of which were being administered under UN trusteeship 
arrangements, which Australia desired to educate towards self-government. 
And then, rather unconvincingly, he said that he hoped that this was an area 
where East and West could work together in the East. In the meanwhile, 
Spender had held private discussions out of session with UK Secretary for 
Commonwealth Relations Noel-Baker, proposing that Australia take over 
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Britain’s co-dominion responsibilities with France in the New Hebrides, 
thereby augmenting its territories in the region. All this was out of step with 
the nationalism that British foreign office policy assessments had concluded 
was rampant in Asia. 
Spender and the making of the Colombo Plan 
During the same week that Commonwealth foreign ministers met in 
Colombo, Commonwealth senior economic officials held their own 
conference in Colombo. They met separately in the same building as the 
Commonwealth foreign ministers to take stock of the general balance of 
payments situation in the sterling area. There were frequent contacts 
between delegates at the two meetings. Britain’s main aim at the senior 
economic officials meeting was to prevent a renewed drain on gold and dollar 
reserves, and thus avoid a further blow to sterling’s international position.39 
This position both informed and constrained the foreign ministers’ 
deliberations on the Colombo Plan. Le Pan, a senior Canadian economic 
official and adviser at the officials meeting, commented: 
It is impossible fully to understand the origins of the Colombo Plan without 
having some awareness of the anxiety felt by the British over the sterling 
balances and their eagerness that some other source of financial assistance 
should be found for the balances’ principal holders. That may not be 
apparent from the minutes. But it was crystal clear to those of us who were 
at Colombo. The British made no secret of it.40  
Similarly, it is not possible to understand fully the launch of the Colombo Plan 
and Spender’s role in its establishment without some appreciation of its 
novelty. The Colombo Plan meetings in 1950 were the first time that the 
economic problems of a very large segment of the underdeveloped world 
were faced directly and as a whole and the first time that more advanced 
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countries explicitly recognised their obligation to offer assistance.41 Further, 
according to Le Pan: 
The Colombo Plan, as it was shaped at the meetings held in1950, broke new 
ground because it called for a combination of capital and technical 
assistance; because it surveyed the needs of a very large segment of the 
underdeveloped world, taken together; because it encouraged mutual aid 
among the under-developed countries themselves; and because it numbered 
among its prospective donors countries which were unburdened by any long 
colonial past or any imperial ambitions, such as Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand. … The seed for all that activity was sown at the meeting held in 
Colombo in January of 1950.42 
Spender, for his part, while acknowledging the importance of capital 
assistance, laid emphasis on the novelty of the technical assistance aspects 
of the Plan: 
One could quote figures and facts by the page to show how the ideas put 
forward at Colombo and Sydney have borne fruit in the field of technical 
assistance. Indeed, had nothing else come from our deliberations, I am 
convinced that this form of mutual assistance, which was altogether novel in 
the area, has alone more than justified the efforts of Australia.43 
With regard to his claim to have been the author of the Colombo Plan, 
Spender told a reviewer of his Exercises in diplomacy: 
Particularly with respect to the Colombo Plan more than one person has 
claimed to have fathered it, and claimed credit for its creation. The 
documents cited by me – quite apart from the narrative – will establish that 
the Plan itself was due to and flowed directly from the Australian initiative at 
Colombo in January 1950, while the narrative will, I think, establish that there 
would have been no Technical Assistance Programme (that operated from 
July 1950) had it not been for the events described by me that took place in 
Sydney in May 1950.44  
While Spender’s account in his memoirs was based on his own experience, 
aided by his access to official and contemporary documents, his emphasis 
on the narrative is important. In addition to the documents cited by him (on 
the whole accurately, if at times selectively) the narratives of other 
participants are also necessary to establish the reality, since, as Reynolds 
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points out, no participant could have known the historical reality at the time, 
because he could not see the other participants’ cards.45  
While the issues of Communism and under-development in South and 
South-East Asia were flagged on the first day of the meeting, the idea of a 
specific plan for development aid with recommendations and prescriptions for 
action emerged gradually. In his keynote address, Senanayake set the scene 
for the consensus that would eventually emerge.46 He drew attention to 
worldwide Communist expansion, and stated that it was in Asia that some of 
the most pressing international problems were presenting themselves in their 
most acute form. While there was no present risk of Communism taking 
control in any of the three Commonwealth South Asian countries where (he 
claimed) Communism was on the decline, the real problem lay with the 
countries of South-East Asia, particularly those countries still under alien 
rule. The fundamental problems in Asia, however, were economic, rather 
than political. Asia provided a fertile field for Communist propaganda 
because its vast undernourished population was fighting a battle for life and 
could be persuaded that any change was a change for the better. He went on 
to suggest that Asia also lacked the capital equipment and technical skills 
required to combat problems of under-development, but the West could 
provide these. The peace of the world required that these problems of want 
and poverty be properly understood and he hoped that by the end of the 
Conference all Commonwealth governments would have a better idea of the 
problems facing them and some suggestions about how they could be 
resolved.47 In his welcome to all leaders of delegations, he said that Australia 
and New Zealand could perhaps be considered as belonging to the Asian 
side of the land mass of the world, and it was a matter of great satisfaction 
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that these two countries could be represented by their foreign ministers so 
soon after elections in those countries.48  
In response, India and Pakistan supported Senanayake’s appreciation of the 
problem. Nehru agreed that the peoples of underdeveloped countries were 
chiefly interested in securing the primary necessities of life and were 
receptive to any program that offered economic relief; and Pakistan’s 
Ghulam Mohammed stated that the best remedy for combating Communism 
was to improve the economic conditions in the countries under threat.  
The focus on economic assistance to South and South-East Asia on the 
opening day of the Conference provided a way for both developed and 
developing Commonwealth countries to find an area of agreement 
acceptable to politicians of different political persuasions, such as Spender, 
Bevin and Nehru. Economic assistance served a dual purpose: to assist the 
economies of the region and to create an economic and social climate in 
which it would be difficult for Communists to find recruits.49 For the Asian 
Commonwealth members, the first of these purposes was uppermost. 
Economic aid did not need to be justified in political terms.  
Spender did not play a major role on the first day of the meeting in defining 
the problem that needed to be addressed. By the time it was his turn to 
speak, the main parameters for the debate had already been set. In his main 
intervention on the first day, Spender stated that he was prepared to agree 
that the problem was essentially one of raising economic standards in certain 
areas, and while he did not disagree with the diagnoses that had been given 
- he was more interested in finding a cure.50 He asked whether 
Commonwealth countries could collaborate in raising economic standards in 
areas which were of special concern to them; and whether they might agree 
to contribute a part of their national income and resources for the economic 
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development of those areas.51 In relation to South-East Asia he stated: ‘A 
plan was required, either within the framework of the United Nations or 
outside it, to assist countries in South-East Asia in practical ways such as the 
provision of food, capital equipment and technical assistance’.52 Spender 
hoped that all countries in the area would be able to formulate and pursue a 
common policy, though no lasting solution would be possible without the 
involvement of the United States. Ceylon and Pakistan supported Spender’s 
request for Commonwealth action. At this point the Chair adjourned the 
discussion to give an opportunity for the formulation of specific proposals.53 
British shaping of the Australian memorandum prepared for the 
meeting 
While Spender and his advisers had prepared a rough draft of an Australian 
memorandum on the flight to Colombo, the Australian delegation was still 
working on the memorandum when the conference opened on 9 January. 
According to Spender, the Australian proposal was not finalised until the 
evening of the second day. It was subsequently lodged with the conference 
secretariat for circulation to other delegations on the morning of the third day 
(11 January), for debate on the afternoon of the following day.54  
As it stood on the first day, the Australian draft agenda paper called on 
Commonwealth foreign ministers to be particularly mindful of the problems of 
economic stagnation and instability in the countries in South-East Asia, and 
for their governments to consider individual and concerted action with the 
wider aim of attracting the assistance of the United States. Asia’s priority 
needs were considered to be for consumption goods, technical advice and 
for capital equipment. In addition to technical assistance, the paper 
considered a range of other measures including financial assistance, relief 
supplies, commercial supplies and credits. United States assistance was 
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essential, particularly in the provision of capital and consumption goods. 
However, before approaching the United States, Commonwealth countries 
would need to indicate the extent to which they themselves were prepared to 
make a contribution. The Australian draft paper highlighted the needs of the 
new state of Indonesia, but not exclusively. 
However, on the evening of the first day, two senior British officials, Sir 
Percival Liesching and Sir Roger Makins,55 on Bevin’s instructions, called on 
him to discuss the situation that had arisen at the afternoon session. Bevin’s 
report to Cabinet56 stated that as the Australian delegation appeared to have 
‘certain concrete ideas’ on the matter, Sir Percival Liesching and Sir Roger 
Makins were instructed to find out whether Spender would be prepared to 
take the initiative in tabling proposals before the meeting. Bevin reported that 
Spender readily agreed to do this. Bevin later told US Secretary of State, 
Dean Acheson, that when he was in Colombo he had asked Spender to 
propose the program that would eventually become the Colombo Plan, as he 
thought it was best for the proposal to come from a country other than the 
UK.57 According to Makins’ record of the meeting, Spender stated that he 
was ‘prepared to carry the ball’ for the initiative at the meeting, and the British 
officers assured him that the British delegation would give the initiative their 
general support.  
The record of the meeting also revealed that the two British officials made a 
number of important suggestions about the initiative to which Spender 
agreed.58 For example, Spender agreed that the nucleus of the organisation 
should be the Commonwealth countries directly interested in the area, and 
that the participation of Canada and the Union of South Africa should be 
optional. He also thought that the other countries in the area should be 
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associated with the proposal from the outset and other metropolitan powers 
(France and the Netherlands) could be approached later, if at all. While some 
of Spender’s advisers seemed to think that it would be sufficient to leave 
Commonwealth governments to support assistance through the various 
multilateral organisations of which they were members, the British officials 
argued that this would have the effect of dissipating the initiative and it would 
be preferable to have some regional coordinating body based on a 
Commonwealth nucleus. This was a suggestion to which Spender, according 
to Makins, did not dissent. At the conclusion of the meeting with the two 
British officials, Spender gave them a copy of a paper which he had prepared 
and suggested that they discuss it with his officials, stating that he would 
welcome any observations or suggestions. The British delegation’s cable to 
the Foreign Office reporting on the draft paper stated that the British 
delegation had made a few comments on the paper, which the Australians 
would take into account. The cable went on to say: ‘We have not, however, 
tried to rewrite it or make a joint proposal as it is desired to encourage the 
Australians to remain in the lead and accept their responsibilities. There will 
be ample scope for discussing and amending their draft. We have promised 
general support’.59 As a result of the meeting, the Australian delegation made 
a number of cosmetic and drafting changes to their draft before it appeared 
as a formal Memorandum of the Australian Delegation.  
The Australian, New Zealand and Ceylon joint memorandum 
However, on the afternoon of the following day Ceylon’s Finance Minister 
Jayawardene pre-empted the Australian proposal by tabling a draft 
resolution, in which he proposed that the Commonwealth governments 
establish a committee of officials who would gather information and prepare 
a 10 year plan for development of South and South-East Asia.60 
Subsequently, delegates of Australia, New Zealand and Ceylon met to work 
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on a joint memorandum to present to the meeting. This joint memorandum, 
more than any other single piece of paper presented to the meeting, 
deserves to be regarded, as Le Pan claimed, as the ‘kernel’ of the Colombo 
Plan.61 
The afternoon session on the fourth day was devoted to a discussion of 
economic aspects of South-East Asia. Without waiting to be formally invited 
by the Chair to lead the discussion, Spender rose and introduced his original 
paper, suggesting that the meeting adopt the recommendations in the joint 
Australia, New Zealand and Ceylon memorandum as the basis for discussion 
According to a Ceylonese account of the proceedings, Ceylon Finance 
Minister Jayawardene had prepared a speech introducing the joint 
memorandum, but before he could do so, Spender rose and made what the 
source said was an ‘excellent speech’. According to the source, 
Jayawardene was ‘decidedly put out’ and still wanted to take credit for 
initiating the ideas.62 A New Zealand account of the rivalry between Spender 
and Jayawardene stated that: ‘Spender elbowed aside the Ceylon people, 
who had put forward something similar, and even when the two propositions 
were combined he blared forth in the Press about the Spender Plan, and as 
such it became known to a wondering world’.63 
In his speech, which was his main contribution to the debate on the need for 
a Colombo Plan, Spender said that while the concept of international 
collaboration for the furtherance of economic development in South-East 
Asia was not a new one, few practical results had followed. Economic 
development of the region would also bring benefits to other parts of the 
world and contribute to the solution of the monetary problem of the sterling 
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area. While the basic priority requirements of South-East Asia were for 
consumption goods (to maintain minimum subsistence standards, technical 
advice and assistance and capital equipment, including agricultural 
equipment), Asia’s primary need, in his view, was the extension of her 
production of food and raw materials, for which there was a ready market in 
dollar countries. It was necessary that any Commonwealth action be  
co-ordinated with the United States and, indeed, not much could be achieved 
without considerable assistance from the United States; but this aid was not 
likely to be forthcoming unless South-East Asia showed that it was willing to 
help itself.  
Of the specific recommendations in the Australian Memorandum, Australia 
attached particular importance to the technical assistance program (and 
indeed had offered to Indonesia that Australia would seek means of making 
such assistance available to them). He stressed the importance of the 
envisaged consultative procedures in the Australian paper, particularly with 
respect to including countries outside the region who were interested in the 
development of South-East Asia and the need for shared responsibility with 
international organisations working in the field. Spender referred to the 
detailed recommendations in the joint memorandum, and said that he would 
recommend the Australian Government’s whole-hearted acceptance of these 
proposals, including convening the first meeting of the Consultative 
Committee in Australia. 
There was no real opposition from ministers to the recommendations 
proposed in the joint Australian, Ceylon and New Zealand memorandum. 
Nehru asked a number of questions about planning and the need for each 
country to draw up their own detailed plan of their own requirements before 
the Consultative Committee could make any real progress, but according to 
the Ceylon secretariat source, he was not hostile. New Zealand and Britain 
raised caveats about their own ability to contribute and Canada suggested 
that the recommendations be scrutinised by economic advisers present in 
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Colombo in order to avoid any ambiguities. Sir Roger Makins, who chaired 
the meeting of officials, seems to have been instrumental in having the 
possibility of mutual assistance inserted in the recommendations at the last 
moment. Although there is no direct evidence for this, Tange stated that one 
of the interesting features of the private discussions that took place during 
the period of negotiations on the final drafts was the emphasis by United 
Kingdom officials on the possibilities of mutual aid programs among the 
countries of the area itself, who also might expect some assistance from 
outside.64 This idea of mutual assistance, which found its way into the 
recommendations approved by ministers (Recommendation [1] [v]) did not 
appear in the Australia, Ceylon or the ‘Joint Memorandum’ but did appear in 
the report by the drafting committee of officials and subsequently in the final 
recommendations of the meeting. Bevin later told Cabinet that the idea of 
mutual assistance within the area was specifically introduced into the 
recommendation with an eye to United States opinion.65 The meeting agreed 
the draft recommendations with one minor amendment at its tenth meeting 
on 13 January. It also agreed that the Australian Government would be 
responsible for asking other governments whether they accepted the 
recommendations, and if so, at what stage would they be ready to send their 
representatives to a meeting of the Consultative Committee in Australia.66 
Spender’s exercises in public diplomacy and Australian reputation 
Spender’s use of the media in Colombo and during his associated overseas 
visits to Indonesia, India, Pakistan and Singapore served three main 
purposes. First, Spender’s apotheosis as a maker of history in the dual sense 
of being the author of the Colombo Plan and promoter of this idea in the 
press and academia, and through disparagement of contenders (such as 
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Ceylon’s Jayawardene),67 required a successful contemporary public 
information strategy. In this, he gave early recognition to the importance of 
his own and Australia’s image and reputation as an essential part of a state’s 
strategic equity in global affairs.68  
The reference to the ‘Spender Plan’ appears to have had its origin in off the 
record background briefings, which Spender gave to the Australian and other 
press in which he sought to differentiate his plan from Jayawardene’s plan.69 
During and after the discussion of the recommendations on the penultimate 
and final days of the meeting, there had been a flood of press speculation 
and press comment on the import of the recommendations on the economic 
development in South and South-East Asia, together with competing claims 
by Ceylon and Australia to the credit of putting forward the proposal.70 
Subsequently, the Sydney Morning Herald under the heading, ‘Spender Plan 
for Asia: Decision at Colombo’, reported that the ‘Spender Plan for Asia’ gave 
the meeting a foundation on which to build a new practical program of aid.71 
However, Canadian and New Zealand accounts regarded Spender’s use of 
the press in Colombo as self-aggrandisement. For example, the Canadians 
reported that: ‘The Australian Delegation did not hesitate to let the press 
know that it was the Spender Plan for the economic development of South 
and Southeast Asia which saved the Conference from failure.72 The New 
Zealand Secretary of External Affairs also wrote that Spender was ‘as great 
an exhibitionist as Evatt and just as keen on press publicity’.73  
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The ‘Spender Plan’ designation gained early ascendency in British and 
United States diplomatic and media discourses on the Colombo Conference, 
largely as a result of Spender’s promotional activities, and British official 
support for Spender’s plan. For example, Commonwealth Relations 
Secretary Noel-Baker wrote to Spender in April 1950 stating that he was ‘a 
convinced supporter of the Spender Plan’ and would continue to do 
everything in his power to promote it at the London end74 and The Economist 
of 21 January 1950 wrote in a leading article:  
The Spender Plan, though its origins went far beyond a single man, was his 
in the sense that his initiative and drive brought it through the conference 
and his wise indiscretions brought it out into the open.75  
The Spender Plan descriptor, however, was finally laid to rest in London in 
September 1950. Spender, unavoidably, arrived late for the London 
Consultative meeting. On his arrival at the meeting, Gaitskell took him aside 
and explained that ministers in a private meeting before the first public 
session had been discussing the title of the report and had considered that 
the most appropriate title would be ‘The Colombo Plan for Cooperative 
Economic Development’ or the ‘Colombo Plan’ in short, and did he have any 
objection? Spender replied that he had none.76  
Second, Spender’s public information activities were designed to keep the 
Australian public informed of developments. During the course of the 
Colombo Conference, Spender had, as he mentioned in his memoir, kept the 
Australian press up to speed on daily developments at the meeting where he 
considered important Australian interests were at stake.77 Australian 
domestic public acceptance of the Spender’s initiative at Colombo was 
important in view of mounting press apprehension in Australia about 
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Australia developing close ties with countries in the region.78 In a series of 
radio broadcasts addressed to the Australian public during his overseas visit, 
Spender used the opportunity to inform his Australian audience that while the 
countries in the region were facing enormous difficulties as new nations, they 
were well disposed towards Australia, and Australia could not afford to be 
indifferent to their situation. Anything Australia could do to increase their 
political, social and economic stability through technical assistance, 
increased trade and other means would be important for Australia, and for 
Australia’s mode of life.79  
In his foreign policy speech to Parliament on 9 March 1950, Spender drew 
three lessons from his experience in Colombo and from subsequent 
discussions in the region:  
 the need for Australia to maintain stable and democratic governments 
in power in the region and increase the material welfare of their 
peoples, as the best defence for them and for Australia against the 
effective penetration of Communist imperialism;  
 the need for a satisfactory solution of the Japanese problem; and  
 the desirability of some form of regional pact for common defence.  
The specific proposals Australia had put forward at Colombo addressed the 
first of these concerns, and in this respect he made three points: first, the 
proposals could not be expected to achieve spectacular results in a short 
time; second, there was no intention to restrict the scheme to Commonwealth 
countries even though the British Commonwealth had suggested itself as the 
appropriate body to initiate the task of economic development in the South 
and South-East Asia region (but even then the solution to these problems 
required the active cooperation of the United States); and third, the aid that 
was envisaged should not be regarded as ‘handouts’ - one of the aims of the 
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scheme was to stimulate the productive capacity in the region from which 
Australia was well-positioned to benefit.80  
The third purpose of his public information activities can appropriately be 
described as an early example of ‘public diplomacy’ in that it focuses on the 
ways in which a country communicates with citizens in other societies:  
To be effective, public diplomacy must be seen as a two-way street. It 
involves not only shaping the message(s) that a country wishes to present 
abroad, but also analysing and understanding the ways that the message is 
interpreted by diverse societies and developing the tools of listening and 
conversation as well as the tools of persuasion.81  
One of Spender’s main purposes in making public the essential features of 
his plan was to ensure that the plan received a good reception in the United 
States, not only with the US Administration, but also with the American 
public: 
To have avoided any comment whatever would have resulted in false 
speculation which could well have prejudiced the reception of the Plan in the 
U.S.A., without whose support it would have failed to accomplish much. 
Public opinion in its favour was essential to obtain.82 
In his public diplomacy broadcasts to audiences in other countries, Spender 
emphasised the changes that had occurred in Australian foreign policy and 
sought to create a positive image of a new-look Australia. The messages 
were tailored for each audience, but using the theme of Australia’s role in 
establishing the Colombo Plan as a peg for each message. For example, in a 
broadcast prepared for the British Broadcasting Corporation, Spender 
affirmed the new Australian Government’s commitment to strengthening the 
association of the British Commonwealth (including Britain’s full economic 
recovery and its increasing prestige and influence in the world) as one of 
basic principles of the Government’s foreign policy - ‘a policy which springs 
not merely from the decisions of Governments, but from fundamental 
                                            
80 CPD, H of R, vol. 206, 9 March 1950, pp. 621‐636.  
81 USC Centre on Public Diplomacy, ‘What is public diplomacy?’ retrieved 11 September 2008, 
<http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/about/whatis.pd>. 
82 Spender, Exercises in diplomacy, p. 238‐9. 
83 
 
sentiments of kinship between our two peoples’. Spender emphasised that 
South and South-East Asia were a concern for the whole Commonwealth 
and that Commonwealth countries could provide a strong nucleus for 
cooperative effort in the region. 
Australia had already shown that it had accepted increasing responsibilities 
in the area through the leading part it had played in the Commonwealth war 
effort against Japan. At Colombo, Australia had accepted increasing 
obligations to aid the economic recovery of South-east Asia and had 
advanced proposals for continuing consultations among Commonwealth 
countries with a view to mobilising real efforts to check the spread of 
Communism through the area, providing the people with more secure living 
standards.83  
In his press statements and broadcasts in India, Spender stressed Australia’s 
regional interests and obligations both as a mature democracy and as an 
advanced economy, suggesting that Australia intended to build its reputation 
within the region by contributing in these domains. In a broadcast on All-India 
Radio on the occasion of the inauguration of the Indian Republic on 26 
January, he stated that Australia hoped to benefit culturally from closer 
familiarity with India, as it had in the past. Australia, on the other hand, had 
progressed economically, industrially and in the realm of social justice and 
had built up a reputation in these areas, with many other and older countries 
looking to Australia as an example. Australia was therefore in a good position 
to offer some important indirect reciprocal benefits, lending credibility to an 
essential aspect of public diplomacy.  
The limitations on Australia’s ambition to play a leadership role in the region 
began to appear during Spender’s visit to New Delhi. At Spender’s main 
press conference in New Delhi, after a few general questions about 
Australia’s relations with India, China and the Japanese Peace Treaty, the 
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Indian press homed in on Australian foreign and domestic policies. According 
to a report in the Hindustan Times, the ‘tough, blunt, remarkably outspoken’ 
Australian politician, in response to a barrage of questions, strongly defended 
the ‘White Australia’ policy, Australia’s intake of refugees, the increase in the 
price of the sale of Australian wheat to India, the Australian Government’s 
plan to abolish the Communist Party in Australia, and American aid to the 
region.84 Similarly, in relation to Indonesia, a country with which Australia 
believed that it had a special relationship, rifts began to appear as a result of 
Australian opposition to Indonesian policy on West Irian. By seeking to 
engage more closely in South and South-East Asia, Australia was drawing 
attention to the contradictions in its internal and foreign policies, which in turn 
impacted on its new foreign policy directions. 
The Consultative Committee Meeting, Sydney, May 1950 
The principal mandated task of the British Commonwealth Consultative 
Committee Meeting, Sydney, 14-19 May 1950, was to receive from 
participating governments an indication of the actions which they considered 
feasible in response to the recommendations of the Colombo Meeting, and to 
make recommendations to governments. Spender viewed his task in more 
action-orientated terms. For him, the meeting’s chief objective was ‘to 
formulate means to give effect to the Colombo recommendations’.85 The 
meeting was held at ministerial level. The Australian and New Zealand 
delegations were led by their respective foreign ministers, the UK by Lord 
Macdonald, their Postmaster General (the third highest ranking minister in 
the UK Treasury) assisted by UK Commissioner-General for South-East 
Asia, Malcolm MacDonald. The other delegations were led by ministers from 
various domestic economic portfolios. Among them, Ceylon’s Finance 
Minister Jayawardene alone had been present at Colombo. Spender’s duty 
as Chair of the meeting was to promote consultation and cooperation in the 
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Commonwealth and to facilitate a successful outcome of the meeting for the 
Commonwealth as a whole. His international standing and international 
reputation in these respects were also on trial. 
Australia’s reputation at the Colombo Conference as the initiator and 
champion of the ‘Spender Plan’ was a strong motivating factor in Australian 
preparations for the meeting. External Affairs officials, who began to prepare 
vigorously for the meeting after Spender’s return to Australia, worked on the 
assumption that as ‘author of the Colombo proposal, and as host 
Government to the meeting’, Australia would be expected to state what it was 
prepared to do in the area, lest it be embarrassed at the meeting.86 
Departmentally, Australia was taking a ‘realistic’ view about what the 
Commonwealth could achieve on its own without US participation.87 Further 
departmental research and analysis only confirmed earlier indications that 
the prospect of Australia making a major contribution to economic 
development in South and South-East Asia was limited.  
Largely with Indonesia in mind, Australia framed its ideas for the meeting in 
the two broad fields in which Australia believed that it, along with other 
Commonwealth countries, could take concrete action - namely technical 
assistance - and more generally, priority financial and economic aid. 
Australia presented these ideas to the meeting as ideas having general 
application. In particular, DEA officials prepared a detailed memorandum on 
technical assistance.88 They also prepared an annotated agenda for the 
meeting, which suggested that the Consultative Committee consider the 
creation of a Commonwealth Fund that would be available to provide 
assistance to South and South-East Asian countries in the forms of technical 
assistance, emergency relief supplies and credits for urgent import 
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requirements.89 However, in drawing up this agenda, External Affairs 
admitted that it necessarily looked to the UK (with its long established 
relations with the region) to provide information on urgent economic 
requirements. External Affairs felt handicapped by the lack of adequate 
information on the actual and immediate needs of countries with respect to 
technical assistance.90 These information gaps were major restraints on 
Australia pushing its proposals at the meeting in the face of strong 
opposition, or even threatening to go it alone with whom-so-ever was willing 
to join it. 
While Britain and Australia had worked closely at the Colombo meeting, 
Britain’s general approach to the Sydney meeting was diametrically opposite 
to Australia’s emphasis on urgent priority measures. This is largely reflected 
in the views of officials in the UK Treasury who had assumed carriage of the 
follow up to the Colombo recommendations during the UK February 1950 
general elections. In a memorandum to other Commonwealth Governments 
in March 1950, Britain proposed a ‘radical attack’ on the problem of 
development in the area. They proposed that the best way to tackle the 
problem was by means of the preparation of individual practical and realistic, 
long-term country plans that clearly identified needs and gaps. Britain also 
cautioned that the need for the sterling area to balance its dollar accounts 
and restore its sterling reserves should be the first charge on resources, 
especially as Marshall Aid was falling and would soon come to an end. In 
these circumstances, it was unlikely that Britain would be able to make a 
substantial contribution in either the short or longer term.91  
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Further, UK Treasury officials considered that the proposals that Australia 
submitted in its draft agenda were ill-digested and likely to cause difficulty at 
the meeting.92 While it is possible to detect in this attitude a British-colonial 
disposition to regard self-determined, dominion pursuit of national interests 
as rash or irresponsible (as they could only be carried out at the expense of 
the sterling balance), and based on specious arguments,93 the onus was 
nevertheless on Australia to argue and demonstrate the contestability - in 
Treasury parlance - of its proposals. A major problem for Australia in this 
regard was that while the British, Canadian, Indian and Ceylonese 
delegations were supported by high-level economic and financial advisors, 
the Australian delegation was largely confined to Department of External 
Affairs representatives, and as Macdonald observed: 
They were alone in this; in most Delegations the major weight was on the 
economic and financial side, and in every Delegation except that of Australia 
there was strong evidence that policies had been worked out reconciling the 
interests of all Departments.94  
India considered that the best contribution it could make to the problem of 
development in South and South-East Asia was to raise its own people’s 
standard of living. It was prepared to participate in any US assisted scheme, 
particularly in order to resume projects that were in abeyance, provided that 
no strings were attached and any regional arrangement did not work to 
India’s disadvantage. India, economically and administratively, was at the 
time, the most stable country in South and South-East Asia and could 
negotiate aid assistance with the US and international bodies on her own. 
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India was also, to some extent, prepared to assist other countries in the 
region.95  
According to a senior Ceylonese finance official, Ceylon had intended to go 
to Sydney with a well-developed program so that Finance Minister 
Jayawardene could win back some of the acclaim taken from him by popular 
identification of the Colombo Plan with Spender.96 Jayawardene had 
prepared a paper and plan of action for the meeting,97 which Macdonald 
described as ‘an admirable paper on development, closely akin to ours’.98 
New Zealand had expressed support for both Spender’s proposals for short 
term assistance and for the UK’s proposals for long-term planning, but 
indicated that New Zealand would not be in a position to make a substantial 
contribution.  
At some time in April or May 1950, as Lowe has written, Spender had 
decided that he would no longer allow British reservation and procrastination 
to divert him from seeking early and tangible outcomes for the Colombo 
Conference recommendations.99 Spender sought and gained Cabinet 
Committee agreement to negotiate within an overall limit of £13 million in 
1950-51 to ‘fund constructive plans for submission to the Consultative 
Committee’. The aim of deliberately increased commercial relations with 
each of the countries of South-East Asia was to gain financial assistance in 
cooperation with the United States and other countries, and technical 
assistance and other forms of assistance that would help to stabilise 
conditions in South-East Asia and promote Australian economic and security 
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interests.100 This was a major Cabinet coup for the External Affairs Minister, 
and he was well aware that if he did not spend the allocated funds, they 
would return to general revenue. Calls in the Australian press for urgent 
action to check communist advances in South-East Asia,101 and the 
uncertain passage in Parliament of the Government’s Anti-Communist Bill 
(and the hype associated with it)102 provided added domestic political 
imperatives. The stage was set for a clash between the Australian and British 
delegations. In the context of this impending stand-off, Canada’s role at the 
meeting would be important, for unlike the British delegation, the Canadian’s 
instructions allowed the delegation some leeway with regard to technical 
assistance. Canada was prepared to cooperate in any well-conceived plans 
for providing technical assistance over and above what the countries might 
legitimately be expected to receive through the United Nations.103 Spender, 
therefore, had a potential ally in Canada for his technical assistance 
proposals. However, this was not to be the case, largely owing to the 
Canadian delegation’s distrust of Spender.  
At Colombo, Canadian participation in the proposed Colombo Plan was 
welcome, but optional. At first, Canada had been equivocal about attending 
the Consultative Committee meeting in Sydney in other than an observer 
capacity but it had been encouraged by Spender’s initial letter of invitation. 
This letter assured Canada that its participation in the meeting did not imply 
any commitment of contribution. However, Canada felt that this trust had 
been rudely shattered by Spender’s circulation of his proposed agenda of 3 
May, which spoke of agreements, had little to say about long-term programs, 
and proposed a Commonwealth Fund and a Secretariat. Le Pan commented 
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that the reaction in Ottawa was one of ‘astonishment, incredulity, anger’.104 
Pearson sent a stern letter to Spender, which Spender responded to in an 
attempt to paper over the cracks. However, for Canada, the first crisis of the 
conference - lack of trust in the Chairman and his word, and hence his 
reputation - had occurred even before the conference began.105 The second 
crisis for Canada occurred just before the first plenary session and, again, 
trust in Spender was the issue. Spender had made it clear that he wanted the 
opening session to be open to the public and the press, to which other 
delegates gave their consent, but on the clear understanding that Spender 
circulated his draft speech beforehand, and that it should contain nothing 
controversial. However, when the Canadians received the draft speech they 
were outraged because it included all the Australian proposals Spender had 
included in his earlier proposed agenda, to which Pearson had objected. 
Commenting on the distrust that Spender had engendered at the meeting - 
and which had been increased by Spender’s rough and even brutal tactics - 
the Canadian delegation reported: ‘It sometimes seems as though the spirit 
of Dr. Evatt had passed by transmission to his successor’.106  
In the 1980s, Jervis raised the question whether reputations in international 
affairs attach to the decision-maker, the regime, or the country.107 Both in 
reputation theory108 and intuitively, reputations should not pass from one 
foreign minister to his successor, but clearly in Canadian perceptions of 
Australia in the period immediately after the end of the Second World War, 
they did. The effect of this transmission of a reputation for untrustworthiness 
from Evatt to Spender was to increase Spender’s transaction costs of doing 
successful business at the Sydney meeting. Consequently, it was only on the 
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very last day of the meeting, and in the last few minutes, that Canada 
announced that it would participate in the technical assistance scheme. 
Nevertheless, and despite Spender’s ‘rashness and recklessness’, 
‘intemperate statements’, ‘abuse of officials’, ‘failure to honour commitments’, 
‘brutal and eccentric tactics’, and the prevailing bedlam in Committee 
sessions, the Consultative Committee resulted in two main sets of 
recommendations. The first related to the procedures for drawing up a 
comprehensive plan for economic development in South and South-East 
Asia. Spender claimed that the meeting had little difficulty in arriving at 
agreed conclusions on long-term planning, but in reality, Australia contributed 
little to the discussion. Indeed, at the second plenary session on 15 May, 
Spender stated that while he accepted the need for long-term planning, he 
found the UK point of view disturbing, in that it implied a lack of any real 
attempt to carry out the Colombo decisions with any sense of urgency and 
would be coldly regarded in the United States. Macdonald responded that the 
United Kingdom was better informed about US policy and intentions than any 
other country in the world.109 In short, Britain was able to use its prestige in 
the Commonwealth, the large amount of its economic contributions to South-
East Asia since the War, its experience with economic development in the 
area since the War, its access to US thinking and the expertise of its officials, 
to shift attention away from short-term measures and win support for its plan 
for longer term aid. 
The second set of recommendations agreed at the meeting related to 
Australia’s proposals for a Commonwealth technical assistance scheme, to 
which the meeting added a Commonwealth bureau in Colombo to coordinate 
its work relating to the provision of technical personnel, trainees and 
technical education and equipment. Spender had proposed that Australia, 
together with Britain, share two-thirds of the costs of £Stg. 8 million to 
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establish the scheme, or £Stg. 2.6 million each with the final third made up 
from other Commonwealth country contributions. Spender originally 
presented the scheme as part of an Australian package deal for immediate 
action, which also included the establishment of a Commonwealth Fund of 
£Stg.15 million to finance, by revolving credits, priority supplies of agricultural 
equipment and materials, as well as urgently needed supplies such as 
medicines. Macdonald claimed that it was evident that little serious thought 
had been given to these proposals, which in his view were apparently 
designed for political and publicity purposes, rather than a workable course 
of action.110 When support from Britain and other delegations for the overall 
package was not forthcoming, Spender suspended the meeting so that 
delegates could seek authority for funding and wrote to Bevin to get the UK 
Government to countermand Macdonald’s instructions, threatening to inform 
the Australian Parliament that the meeting had broken down, to attribute 
blame, and to reveal the rift to the press.111  
Spender’s threat to attribute blame for the breakdown of the discussions 
caused the British Delegation to go into damage control and to prepare a 
draft detailed press release to counter these allegations. However, on the 
morning of 17 May, Spender withdrew his earlier package and substituted a 
proposal for a stand-alone technical assistance scheme, which, as it would 
be supplementary to the UN scheme, was more acceptable to the UK 
delegation. This commended itself to other delegations, and Macdonald 
announced that he would recommend its acceptance to his Government. He 
informed Whitehall that: ‘No other course was possible short of wrecking the 
Conference and finding ourselves in disagreement with every other 
delegation’. This was especially true as Ceylon and Pakistan had agreed to 
contribute, India would provide bilateral assistance, New Zealand intended to 
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recommend a contribution and Canada would most certainly also 
contribute.112 
Through brinkmanship, Spender had succeeded in getting the Australian 
proposals for technical assistance agreed at the meeting. This was to be 
Australia’s only substantial contribution to the outcome of the meeting. 
Spender was not so fortunate with his other proposals in his proposed 
Commonwealth Fund for Emergency Assistance. Canada, in particular, was 
opposed to any new Commonwealth machinery, and Britain strongly 
opposed the Australian proposals for priority economic requirements for a 
relief fund and for credits to non-Commonwealth countries in South-East 
Asia. Britain argued on the grounds that a strong case had not been made 
out, and that the proposals appeared to be a guise for Commonwealth 
assistance to Indonesia. Macdonald later informed Cabinet: 
Indeed, it appears that their real objective was to get Commonwealth cover 
for Australian credits to Indonesia, so that they could appear to their 
Parliament to be carrying out not merely Australian but Commonwealth 
policy. In the end, this problem of emergency action was postponed until 
September; it is not clear whether the Australians intend to give credit to 
Indonesia or not. It is unfortunate that the question whether a genuine case 
existed for emergency action was never really examined: a proper 
investigation was made impossible by the concentration of attention upon 
the unrealistic Australian proposals.113  
Overall, Spender’s reputation as a Commonwealth and world statesman 
suffered as a result of his handling of the meeting, particularly with Britain 
and the United States. The UK High Commissioner to Australia, Williams, 
reported to the UK Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (Noel-
Baker - one of Spender’s strongest supporters in London after the Colombo 
Conference) that: 
Less happily it must be added that Mr. Spender’s hopes that his reputation 
as an international statesman would be firmly established by the Sydney 
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meeting have been completely disappointed. It is to be expected that other 
Delegations will in reporting to their Governments not fail to comment not 
only on his arrogant and willful conduct and undignified withdrawals, but also 
on his patent failure in the ordinary duties of a chairman.114  
Le Pan claimed that he had never known a rougher conference than the first 
meeting of the Consultative Committee in Sydney and noted that ‘it was 
rough because Mr Spender made it that way’.115 In particular, Spender’s 
statement which he delivered in the first closed session of the meeting ‘was 
more intemperate than any I have ever heard except at conferences where 
the Soviets were present’.116 Macdonald reported to the British Cabinet that 
Spender had failed to discharge his ordinary duties as Chair, and that he 
seemed to confuse far too often the function of Chairman of the Conference 
with that of being Australian Delegate at the Conference. He went on to say 
that, as a result of his experience at the meeting, he could not recommend 
that any future Commonwealth meeting should take place in Australia under 
the aegis of the Department of External Affairs.117 
Adeleke claimed that Spender’s ‘cocksparrow diplomacy’ almost predicated a 
crisis in Commonwealth relations by offending Commonwealth relations and 
traditions, particularly through his use of tactics and means which did not fit 
the medium, and claimed that Spender’s actions and behaviour placed 
relations within the organisation in jeopardy.118 However, a New Zealand 
report on the meeting stated categorically that Commonwealth relations did 
not materially suffer from the Conference and that, while other donor 
countries were not prepared to be ‘the children to Australia’s Pied Piper, in 
fairness to the Australians it can be recorded here that they argued a difficult 
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case with great force and tenacity’.119 Bevin praised the work of Australia at 
the Colombo and Sydney conferences, describing the Sydney conference as 
‘virile’.120 
Oakman tends to agree with Adeleke that Spender’s conduct at the meeting 
was detrimental to a collaborative atmosphere, but states:  
 His greatest sin, however, was to have upset Washington, who thought 
Spender was ‘heavy-handed and tactless’, intent on establishing ‘a foreign 
policy independent, not only of the UK, but of the entire Commonwealth in 
those areas where it cannot obtain general agreement’. By casting aside the 
‘soft language of diplomacy’ (as Spender called it) he almost destroyed the 
collaborative atmosphere he thought so crucial to getting the United States 
involved. And at the conclusion of the meeting a solid commitment from the 
Americans remained outstanding.121  
Further, the meeting handed to Britain, rather than Australia, the task of 
taking the lead in advising the appropriate moment for a formal joint 
approach to the United States. 
A New Zealand report on the meeting provides a reasonably accurate, if at 
times somewhat biased, report card on Australia’s standing and reputation as 
demonstrated at the meeting:  
The Australians were determined to have a successful Conference, 
successful to them meaning acceptance of the Australian proposals. They 
worked hard and, with a losing hand, again and again tried to turn the 
Conference their way or to salvage something from the wreck of their plans. 
Right from the start they fed information to the press which drummed up a 
phoney crisis atmosphere, the intention apparently being to stampede other 
delegations into line or at least to brand publicly those responsible for an 
‘unsuccessful’ conference. Boiled down, the Australian case was almost as 
weak as their use of the Press would imply. They attempted to found an 
economic programme on a political argument and they failed when their 
proposals were subjected to practical criticism. Unfortunately for the 
Australians no one attempted to argue on the political aspect – that 
apparently was decided at Colombo… 
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Matched against the United Kingdom, Indian and Canadian delegations, the 
Australians had an appearance almost of immaturity manifested by lack of 
finesse, lack of tact and rigidity: on the other hand – and the Australians 
would probably be the last to admit this – they did have a successful 
Conference because they secured a technical assistance scheme in a 
positive form which was not thought desirable by the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and New Zealand at least.122 
Notwithstanding Washington’s displeasure at Spender’s tactics at the Sydney 
meeting, Washington’s unwillingness to commit to the ‘Spender Plan’ had a 
long history. The US had welcomed the initiative Australia had taken at 
Colombo and had hoped that the Consultative Committee meeting in Sydney 
would result in constructive planning to implement the general principles 
agreed at Colombo. It also expressed a willingness, as far as possible, to 
coordinate its own projects in the area with projects to be undertaken by the 
Commonwealth as a result of the Sydney meeting.123 While the US wished to 
see the Commonwealth take constructive steps of its own before committing 
itself, the Philippines, Indonesia and Indo-China were greater priority areas 
for US aid than the South and South-East Asian Commonwealth countries 
covered by the Colombo conference proposals. The US was also reluctant to 
tie aid with any easing of the British position on sterling balances, and it did 
not wish to receive to receive proposal from Commonwealth countries asking 
the US to meet a deficit in funding. However, after implications of Korean 
War in June 1950 for stability in South and South-East Asia began to be 
realised, Washington began to approach the Colombo proposals with a more 
open mind. During the Consultative Committee meeting in London in October 
1950, Colombo Plan delegates decided that external aid should be granted 
on a bilateral basis rather than being channelled through a central allocating 
agency. This apparently met one of the conditions for American involvement 
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in the Plan, and Washington subsequently gave Commonwealth initiative its 
support without specifying the nature of its contribution.124  
London Consultative Committee Meeting, 25 September ­ 6 October 
1950   
The main purpose of the meeting was to agree on a final report, based on 
country chapters outlining their individual country needs, agreed in Sydney, 
and written in such a way that it could be used as a prospectus to invite the 
United States to invest in the joint venture, without appearing to be a plea for 
help. The various stages of the meetings were well-planned. British Treasury 
officials prepared a synopsis of the final report which was sent to 
participating governments for comment; senior officials met before the 
meeting of ministers to resolve outstanding issues in the proposed draft; 
ministers met formally from 25-30 September as the Commonwealth 
Consultative Meeting on South and South-East Asia to examine and agree 
the Report, with final editing left in the hands of British (and Canadian) 
officials. The meeting also adopted the report of the Standing Committee at 
Colombo, including the proposed constitution for the Council for Technical 
Cooperation. The British Minister for Economic Affairs, Hugh Gaitskell, 
chaired the ministerial meeting, most of whose delegates had been present 
at either the Colombo or Sydney meetings, or both. Ministers interrupted their 
meeting on 2-3 October for discussions with representatives of non-
Commonwealth nations attending the Meeting as delegates or observers - 
the Indo-China states, Burma, Thailand and Indonesia. 
Immediately after the Sydney meeting, Spender took leave of absence, but  
in between the two meetings, according to his own account, he spoke at 
considerable length about the Plan to the press, both in the US and in the 
United Kingdom.125 In the lead up to the London meeting, he wrote to Bevin 
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to propose they make a joint approach to US Secretary of State Acheson in 
Washington in mid-September to obtain a clearer understanding of the 
probable US reaction before the meeting, but this meeting did not 
eventuate.126 In the event, Spender met with Thorpe (US Assistant Secretary 
for Economic Affairs) and a number of other officials, to outline the genesis of 
the ‘Spender Plan’ (as he continued to describe it) and the steps taken 
towards its fulfillment, emphasising the mutual aid character of the proposal 
and the need for South-East Asia non-Commonwealth countries to become 
members as soon as possible. Although US officials were non-committal, 
and indeed indicated a fear that without an expanded membership the ‘white 
nations’ might predominate,127 Spender later claimed that these discussions 
had been a small contributing factor to the subsequent US decision to 
become a member of the Consultative Committee.128  
Spender did not play a major role at the London meeting, and indeed had to 
leave at the end of the first week to return to the United Nations for an 
important vote on Korea. His, and the Australian delegation’s actions were 
directed to encouraging non-Commonwealth countries in South-East Asia to 
come in, which would enable the Commonwealth to pass to the Americans a 
report which at least contained some reference to the economic needs of 
South-East Asia and to prevent a situation in which the Americans were 
being asked to interest themselves solely in the economic development of 
the four British Commonwealth territories which traditionally the Americans 
regarded as a British concern alone.129 He also intervened in the discussions 
to raise the problem of the large proportion of the Indian and Pakistani 
budgets devoted to defence, and to chide the British that there was too much 
emphasis in the proposed program on assisting the UK sterling balance 
problem and not enough on the humanitarian approach; and even that the 
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limited UK Treasury approach indicated little interest in having South-East 
Asian governments associated with the scheme.130 Gaitskell later wrote in his 
diary of Spender that he was: 
…like a little terrier, self-important, talks a good deal, but on the whole quite 
sensibly - though sometimes before he has really thought things out. He has 
no inhibitions about raising awkward subjects and is what you would call 
fairly crude - but then so are most Australians.131  
The London Consultative Committee also confirmed that the carriage of the 
Colombo Plan and its implementation, including the timing, form and manner 
of an approach to the Americans, had passed from Australia to Britain.  
The Report of the Consultative Committee had estimated that the cost of 
implementing the various development programmes was £Stg.1,869 million, 
of which external finance in the order of £Stg.1,084 million would be 
necessary. British officials informed the Canadian, Indian and Australian 
delegations at the meeting that the release of sterling funds to India, Pakistan 
and Ceylon, and funding of its continuing programs in its Malay and 
Singapore dependencies, would be the UK’s main contribution to the Plan. 
The British Government subsequently announced in Parliament that the UK 
contribution was likely to be in the order of at least £Stg.300 million sterling 
over the six year period, 1951-57.  
In a change of tack, Spender wrote to Menzies in September before the 
London meeting, to inform him that while the programs advocated by 
Australia at Sydney were directed to meeting immediate priority 
requirements, he considered that the present programmes for long-term 
assistance, agreed at the Sydney meeting, might well prove to be the most 
effective in winning United States support,132 to which Menzies agreed.133 
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In the lead up to the London meeting, Spender continued to emphasise 
Australia’s potential leadership role in mobilising international economic 
assistance to South-East Asia. He told Menzies that he believed that an early 
indication of Australia’s willingness to contribute along the lines he suggested 
(£Stg.10 million in 1951/52) was essential ‘if we are to carry to success the 
initiative we have taken’ - noting that other countries such as Canada were 
wanting to take over the lead on the Australian proposals. He also advised: 
‘Having carried negotiations to this point it would be most embarrassing if 
Australia were not in a position to make a substantial contribution to the 
programme as now presented’.134 Spender believed that a forthcoming 
position by Australia on financing the Plan would regain the initiative for 
Australia lost at the Sydney meeting, and would revive Australia’s reputation 
established at Colombo as a ‘stalwart’ in championing the Colombo Plan. 
Menzies replied that he agreed with the political objectives of the 
Consultative Committee and that he believed that Australia should make 
some contribution within its means in spite of extreme budgetary difficulties, 
but after giving thought to the size of the contribution Australia might 
reasonably make, he concluded that Australia could not possibly contemplate 
a contribution over the next six years beyond a total of £Stg.20-25 million. It 
is not clear how Menzies, in consultation with the Treasurer, arrived at these 
figures, but they represented 50 per cent of Spender’s bid, and 
approximately 2 per cent of the total external finance required to finance the 
Plan. This figure is consistent with Australia’s assessed contribution at the 
time to the administration budgets of the United Nations and its development 
programmes. 
In his submission to Cabinet in December 1950 on Australia’s contribution to 
the Colombo Plan, Spender continued to press arguments based on 
Australia’s standing and obligations. He stated that when Australia had 
sponsored the proposal at the Colombo meeting, the Australian Delegation 
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had fully recognised its responsibilities towards, and interest in, the countries 
of the region: 
We must therefore show our sincerity to the peoples and Governments of 
the area, and we must demonstrate to the U.S.A our willingness to make 
some considerable contribution to assist in solving a problem which is of 
such special significance and importance to Australia, by undertaking to 
make available financial and economic aid for the Colombo Plan.135  
Spender argued that the Plan was intended to contribute to peace within the 
area and to Australia’s own security, and therefore needed to be paid for: 
It is my submission that, having regard to the magnitude of the plan, to 
Australia’s initiative and interest in it, to the world interest which the plan has 
created and the overriding necessity of committing the U.S.A. to this area of 
the world .. the total contribution for the six-year period should, I believe, be 
of the order of .. about £50-60 million sterling.136  
Spender also hinted that, by failing to contribute a reasonable share of the 
required financial and economic aid to the Colombo Plan, and failing to act 
quickly so that the US and the Commonwealth could carry South and South-
East Asia with them, Australia was in danger of reverting to deliberate 
isolation from the region and of being seen to concentrate internally on 
nation-building and population increase, losing the opportunity of using 
foreign policy effectively for Australia’s long-term defence. In other words, 
Australia’s international standing was in danger of reverting back to the 
situation prior to his statement in Parliament of 9 March 1950. However, in 
view of Menzies’s opinion, Spender had no option but to concede and 
recommend that Australia contribute £Stg.25 million for the six year period, 
including an initial contribution of £Stg.7 million in the first year. In a press 
release, dated 20 December 1950, he announced that this would be 
Australia’s contribution.137  
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A further consideration (listed in the Australian delegation’s brief for the 
February 1951 Consultative Committee Meeting in Colombo as a defensive 
talking point) was that the Australian contribution to the Colombo Plan 
represented an entirely new obligation on the part of the Australian 
Government.138 Other countries experienced the same dilemma. Escott Reid 
commented, with respect to Lester Pearson’s difficulties in getting Canadian 
Cabinet agreement for its contribution: 
 It was one of the most difficult problems he ever had because this was 
something completely new in Canadian history, and in the history of most 
Western countries, that you should enter an agreement to transfer money 
from your taxpayers to the government of another country to help it speed up 
its development. And the first twenty-five million dollars was the hardest.139  
The uncertainty of the amount the United States might contribute seems to 
have had a direct bearing on funding. As Le Pan pointed out (in respect to 
Canadian ministers’ deliberations on an appropriate Canadian contribution), 
Canadian ministers knew in February 1951 about the British contribution of 
£Stg. 300 million over the six year period and that this was to take the form of 
releases from sterling reserves and they were not happy about it. They also 
knew that the Australian contribution of £Stg. 25 million over the same period 
was rather less than they had anticipated, noting that dissatisfaction on those 
two scores would have been more easily dealt with if there had been more 
concrete evidence of American intentions.140 
Subsequent to the Australian announcement of its contribution, Gaitskell 
(now Chancellor of the Exchequer) approached Menzies at the 1951 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in London on the subject of the 
level of Australia’s contribution and pitched his argument in terms of 
Australian Commonwealth responsibilities and shared obligations.  
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He suggested that the Commonwealth together should aim to put up not less 
than half of the external finance required. This would demonstrate to the US 
Government that it was doing all that it could reasonably be expected to do to 
fend for itself, and thus substantially improve the atmosphere in which US 
assistance towards the plan would be considered. With a British contribution 
of about £300 million, this left a deficit of some £150 million to be shared 
between Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Gaitskell suggested that 
Australia consider doubling its announced contribution to something in the 
order of £Stg.50-60 million (as originally advocated by Spender).141 Menzies 
gave Gaitskell an interim response on 17 January and later replied that 
Australia had considered all factors, but had decided not to alter its previous 
decision. 
The Colombo Plan’s own reputation 
The Colombo Plan for the Cooperative Economic Development of South and 
South-East Asia was officially launched on 1 July 1951. Initially, aid flowed to 
the Commonwealth countries in the region but soon expanded to include 
other non-Commonwealth countries in the region, such as Indonesia and 
Thailand. By the end of its initial six years, the Plan comprised 21 permanent 
members (16 Asian and five Western), six donor countries and fifteen 
recipients in a region extending from Afghanistan to the Philippines.142 By the 
end of the following financial year (1958-59), it was estimated that countries 
in the scheme had received aid in the form of loans and grants, technical 
assistance and the supply of technical equipment and food grains worth 
approximately $6,000 million and some 18,500 traineeships and 10,000 
experts had been provided for the area. Australia’s contribution for the same 
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period amounted to more than Australian £30 million, of which nearly 80 per 
cent was in the form of direct grants for economic aid. Australia also provided 
over 2,600 traineeships, 1,300 correspondence courses and 818 experts 
through the Technical Assistance Scheme.143  
While the politico-economic strategy adopted at the Colombo Conference to 
meet the challenge of Communist subversion was both simplistic and 
inadequate, the Plan nevertheless was considered to have contributed in a 
modest way to the economic and social wellbeing of the region.144 Spender 
argued in 1969 that the importance of the Plan should be seen not so much 
in aggregate economic terms, but in its concept of partnership:  
 The reputation which the Plan has acquired and its unquestionable 
popularity is a consequence of the strong and continued emphasis, ever 
since it was first put forward at Colombo in January 1950, on the recipient 
country herself deciding what she wants and then ascertaining what other 
participating country or countries are able and ready to help.145  
Writing in 1958, Linebarger commented: 
In terms of its public opinion reception and the welcome which it receives, in 
many cases the Colombo Plan far surpasses anything which the United 
Nations has done or which the United States is likely to do. This arises in 
part from its Asian origin and in part the fact that, although modest, the pIan 
proceeds with great skill, diplomacy, and tact in offering its developmental 
facilities to the nations affected.146  
Williams added: 
In comparison with the continent’s heartbreaking poverty, its objectives were 
modest and its resources sadly inadequate. It was, however, an important 
monument to the new era that had just dawned in Asia… an era that had 
seen the emergence of new states. The Plan gave them a voice in the 
making of economic policy for their region. It also symbolised the beginning 
of economic co-operation among Asian countries and the end of economic 
exclusiveness that had been the hallmark of colonialism.147  
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Summary 
The case study on the Colombo Plan provides an opportunity to examine the 
importance of international standing and international reputation in the 
process of Australian adjustments in 1950 to major changes in its operating 
environment at a time when other countries were also adjusting to these 
same changes. In 1950, the centre of gravity in world affairs shifted from 
Europe to Asia, and the combined threats of communism, decolonisation and 
Asian poverty presented real challenges to Australia and its place in the 
region - and to the future of the British Commonwealth and the United States 
in the region. The Commonwealth Foreign Ministers’ Meeting scheduled to 
meet in Colombo in January, weeks after the Liberal Party gained power in 
the Australian general elections provided Spender, by accident, a chance in 
this first foray as the new Australian External Affairs Minister to address 
these interrelated issues and come up with a plan of action which would go 
some way to both help preserve the peace in the region and protect 
Australia’s way of life.  
Australia had good standing as a mature and stable democracy, a social 
state and an advanced economy with strengths in education, science, 
engineering and technology relevant to the region, and had shown a 
willingness to adjust to the new realities in the region. These were all seen as 
positives. On the negative side, Australia, on the eve of the Colombo 
Conference, was seen by its Commonwealth partners as a country having a 
reputation of being preoccupied with its own national development and which 
wished to be left to itself. This view was typified by Australia’s White Australia 
Policy and parsimonious attitude to British requests that it accept its fair 
share of responsibilities in the region, in defence and in regional cooperation 
and development.  
Spender sought to change both Australia’s foreign policy directions and 
Australian cultural attitudes towards the region. He claimed in his memoir 
that the Colombo Plan provided evidence of Australia’s maturity in foreign 
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affairs and of the role that Australia as a small nation could exercise in 
international affairs. At the time, there were seemingly irreconcilable 
differences in the future of international relations between Australia and 
Asian countries (as demonstrated by Australian policies and reputations with 
respect to decolonisation issues and Asian immigration). In that context, 
Australian officials considered economic and technical cooperation would 
serve Australian foreign policy objectives and help dissolve adverse attitudes 
by building bridges with Asia.148  
In relation to the Colombo Plan, Spender was a maker of history in the dual 
senses of being its instigator (even one of his severest critics acknowledged 
that without him there might well have been no Colombo Plan)149 and in 
writing a history of his own time, promulgating his own role in such a way as 
to disparage the claims of others.150 However, by viewing historical reality 
through the eyes of others, the study reveals that Ceylon and India played a 
major role in Colombo in helping to define the problem that needed to be 
addressed. Britain also played a major shaping and nudging role in 
developing the Australian initiative, particularly in the articulation and 
recognition of the Colombo Plan principles of mutual assistance and self-help 
on which the Colombo Plan was to stake out its own reputation as an aid 
organisation. The ‘Commonwealth’ aspect of the plan appealed to the 
Canadians,151 with Canada playing a major supporting role, particularly in its 
agreement to help fund the technical assistance arm, in the drafting of the 
Colombo Plan document, and by announcing early financial assistance at a 
substantially higher rate than Australia. The focus on international standing 
and reputation as seen through the regard of others has helped to bring 
these other contributions to light.  
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In years to come, Spender preciously safe-guarded his primary role in the 
establishment of the Colombo Plan. Parsons wrote that even years later, 
whenever he had a chance to mention ‘The Colombo Plan’ in a speech, Sir 
Percy had a Pavlovian-like compulsion to add, ‘or as it is sometimes known, 
The Spender Plan’.152 Nevertheless, Australia’s belief in its own reputation as 
author of the Colombo Plan was an important motivator for the development 
of proposals for the Sydney meeting, for the preparations for the London 
meeting and, as Lowe mentions, for Australia’s constructive involvement in 
the first meeting of the Colombo Plan Consultative Meeting in Colombo in 
February 1951.153 
The Colombo Conference in January 1950 provided an intensive course in 
the realities of present Commonwealth relations for the new Australian 
Minister of External Affairs.154 In the eyes of others, in respect to commitment 
to Commonwealth consultation and cooperation, Australia came to the 
Conference with a reputation as a ‘fair-weather’, but moved to the position as 
a ‘stalwart’ (largely as a result of its initiative and championship of the 
Colombo proposals, and its willingness to participate in a Commonwealth 
loan to Burma). Sadly, Australia tumbled down the reputational ladder at the 
Sydney meeting to the ‘lemon’ category as a result of Spender’s performance 
as Chair of the conference, but returned to the ‘fair-weather’ at the 
September meeting in London when overall funding was indicated. Had 
Cabinet approved Australian funding at the level Spender recommended, 
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153 Lowe writes: ‘At the meeting of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee, held in Colombo in 
February 1951, the Australian delegation maintained Australia’s reputation as one of the moving 
spirits behind the plan, striking a balance between cautiously encouraging the expansion of 
membership and pressing on with more definite financial commitments and creating permanent 
features such as scheduled meetings of ministers and officials’. ‘Introduction’, DFAT, Australia and 
the Colombo Plan 1949‐1957, Documents on Australian foreign policy, Australian Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 2004, p. xxxi. 
154 Telegram from the Canadian delegation, Colombo, 17 January 1950. 
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Australia would have climbed back higher on the reputation ladder to the 
‘stalwart’ rung.  
Spender’s manner at the Commonwealth meetings in 1950 attracted the 
nicknames of ‘butcher-bird’, ‘cocksparrow’, and ‘terrier’.155 These are more 
appropriately considered as labels or even personality characteristics than 
reputations, which, according to the working definitions adopted in this study, 
require judgement by an identifiable community, not a single individual, and 
are based on facts which are considered relevant by the community.  
Spender used press and radio broadcasting opportunities for self-promotion, 
public information and public diplomacy purposes. With respect to the latter, 
and using the ‘Spender Plan’ as a peg, he sought to portray a new image of 
Australia as a responsible member of the Commonwealth, a concerned 
friend and neighbour to Asian countries and as a country adapting from a 
period of isolationism to engagement with the region, in association, where 
necessary, with the United States.  
The idea of public information and public diplomacy as essential arms of 
reputation building can be seen in the beginnings of the Colombo Plan in the 
1950’s. These ideas were, in turn, to evolve into essential arms of Australia’s 
future cultural diplomacy in relation to Asia.156  
 
                                            
155 For references to these terms, see D Lowe, ‘Percy Spender and the Colombo Plan’; A Adeleke, 
‘Cocksparrow diplomacy’; P Williams (ed.), The Diary of Hugh Gaitskell. 
156 D Lowe, ‘Australia, New Zealand and cultural diplomacy in the Cold War: an unanticipated 
consequence of the Colombo Plan for aid to South and Southeast Asia’, unpublished paper, 2007. 
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CHAPTER 3.  CASE STUDY: AUSTRALIAN PEACE INITIATIVES ON 
CAMBODIA, 1983­1991  
 
Introduction 
From the late 1970s to the early 1990s, Cambodia was one of the most 
complicated and intractable conflicts in the world. The conflict was played out 
at three distinct levels:1 
 at the local level between the Cambodian political groups, who waged 
a war of attrition for well over a decade;  
 at the regional level, involving historic rivalries between China, 
Vietnam and Thailand over spheres of influence in Indo-China; and  
 at the international, major power level with the Soviet Union 
supporting Vietnam and the Vietnamese-installed communist Hun Sen 
Government in Cambodia - and China and the United States 
supporting the non-communist resistance groups of Prince Sihanouk 
and Son Sann.  
Progress towards a Cambodian settlement over the period of the case study 
resembled a broken line.2 At various turning points, leadership in the peace 
negotiations passed from, and at times reverted back to, the various 
interested parties, groups and sub-groups involved in the negotiations - such 
as the United Nations, the Association of South East Asian (ASEAN) 
Nations, Indonesia and its Jakarta Informal Meetings, France and the Paris 
International Conference on Cambodia, (PICC) member countries and the 
Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council. For each of these 
groups, it was no consolation that leadership passed to another group at any 
                                            
1 An assessment of the dynamics of the conflict is provided in G Evans, ‘Achieving peace in 
Cambodia’ in TLH McCormack et al. (eds), A century of war and peace: Asia‐Pacific perspectives on 
the century of the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2001, p. 236. 
2 EH Carr, What is history? (2nd edn), Penguin Group (Australia), Camberwell, Victoria, 2008, pp. 116‐
117.  
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particular time, and at times this clouded their views on the contribution of 
others and their standing in the negotiation process. Australia, too, was not 
immune from this condition of being dismissive of the contributions of others. 
While taking account of these biases, the aim of the case study, 
nevertheless, is to arrive at a considered assessment of Australia’s 
international standing and reputation in the search for a comprehensive 
settlement of the Cambodian conflict.  
While Australia’s diplomatic efforts in the search of a peaceful resolution for 
the Cambodian conflict spanned a decade, they fall into four main phases. 
The first phase encompasses the broad period from 1983 until the first Paris 
International Conference on Cambodia in 1989; the second phase covers the 
brief period, September 1989 to February 1990, and focuses on the 
Australian UN peace proposal; the third phase focuses on the development 
of the UN Permanent Five Framework Agreement in August 1990; while the 
fourth and final phase, which lasted a further year, focuses on nailing down 
the Agreement and the eventual success of the second Paris International 
Conference on Cambodia in September 1991. Evans and Grant noted the 
salience of the tragedy in Cambodia for Australian foreign diplomacy: 
The horror of Cambodia’s experience in the killing fields of the Khmer Rouge 
captured the attention, and emotions, of the world more than almost any 
other contemporary tragedy. Australia’s efforts to help achieve a durable 
peace for Cambodia have occupied more time and attention in our 
diplomacy than any other single issue in recent years. These efforts, 
moreover, have probably done more than anything else to establish and 
define the essential character of Australian foreign policy as it is now 
practiced. For all these reasons, the story of Australia’s involvement in the 
Cambodian problem is worth telling in some detail.3  
Evans, like Spender, was a maker of diplomatic history in the dual sense of 
being a successful foreign minister as well as a contemporary chronicler of 
his initiatives and experiences. Australian official and academic accounts of 
                                            
3 G Evans & B Grant, Australia's foreign relations: in the world of the 1990s, Melbourne University 
Press, Melbourne, 1995, p. 221. 
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Australia’s role in the political settlement of the Cambodian conflict rely 
heavily on Senator Evans’ own accounts of events in his speeches, 
statements in Parliament and in several articles and book chapters he wrote, 
and on the views of ministerial advisers and senior officers intimately 
involved in the process.4 In general, these accounts do not give adequate 
weight to the significance of the roles and contributions of others. 
Phase One: 1983­1989 
The Hayden years 
The Hawke Labor Government came into power in 1983 with a commitment 
to an independent Australian stance in foreign affairs, and a desire to 
promote Australia’s relations with the region. In relation to Indo-China, the 
1982 Labor Party Platform called on the new Government to resume bilateral 
aid and cultural exchanges with Vietnam (embargoed by the previous 
Government when Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia in 1978) and to 
‘make strenuous efforts to promote regional solutions to Indo-Chinese 
problems and, in the interests of peace and stability in the region, attempt to 
decrease the involvement of the superpowers’.5 These two issues became 
linked, as it quickly became clear to the Government, that in view of 
opposition expressed by the United States and ASEAN countries, if 
Australian bilateral aid to Vietnam were to be resumed, this could only occur 
in the context of a comprehensive Cambodian settlement.  
                                            
4 For example: G Evans, ‘Australia and Indo‐China: a case study in the evolution of Australian foreign 
policy’, the 1989 Beanland Lecture, Footscray Institute of Technology, Melbourne, 24 August 1989, 
retrieved 4 February 2009, <http://www.gevans.org>; M Costello, ‘Cambodia – A diplomatic 
memoir’, The Sydney Papers, Winter 1994, pp. 99‐109;  K Berry, Cambodia: from red to blue: 
Australia’s initiative for peace, Allen & Unwin in association with the Department of International 
Relations, Australian National University, Canberra, 1997; F Frost, ‘Labor and Cambodia’ in D Lee & C 
Waters (eds), Evatt to Evans: the Labor tradition in Australian foreign policy, Allen & Unwin in 
association with the Department of International Relations, Australian National University, Canberra, 
1997, pp. 196‐218; Gyngell & Wesley, Making Australian foreign policy, especially ‘Case Study: The 
Cambodia Peace Settlement’, pp. 51‐56. 
5 ALP National Secretariat, Australian Labor Party platform, constitution and rules as approved by the 
35th National Conference, Canberra, 1982, p. 84. 
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In 1983, Australia was a new player on the scene with respect to promoting 
regional solutions to Indo-Chinese problems. It had no existing mandate to 
promote peace in Cambodia as had the United Nations and Austria,6 and it 
had not been invited to play a role as mediator, as had other countries, such 
as India and Romania, at various times. It had to establish itself as a credible 
player on the issue. Building a reputation would require a long seasoning 
period7 with milestones only defined as Australia moved towards them, with 
their significance and validity only verifiable as they were obtained.8 In the 
process, Australia would be required by other regional players to pay an 
‘uncertainty premium’ to cover risks until its credibility could be established. 
As a new player, it could also be expected to work harder and longer than an 
already established player to establish its position.9 
Hawke’s views that Australia could and should offer to play a role as 
‘facilitator’, or ‘honest broker’, to promote dialogue between the Association 
of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Vietnam, provided the motivation 
for the Government’s initial engagement in seeking to resolve the Cambodian 
conflict. Hayden claimed in his autobiography that it was Hawke who 
proposed that Australia initiate dialogue on Cambodia with countries in the 
region.10 Hawke had campaigned in the 1983 general elections on the 
themes of leadership, building consensus and reconciliation, and, according 
to Hayden, believed that the same principles he had used to good effect in 
resolving domestic industrial disputes could be transferred to the ‘bigger 
campus’ of Cambodia.11 Hawke’s biographer Mills12 agrees that Hayden’s 
                                            
6 Austria, as chair of the 1981 United Nations International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK), had a 
continuing role to promote a peaceful and negotiated settlement of the ‘Cambodian problem’ on 
behalf of the United Nations. 
7 Tomz, Reputation and international cooperation.  
8 EH Carr, What is history? p. 119. 
9 Tomz, Reputation and international cooperation, p. 39. 
10 B Hayden, Hayden: an autobiography, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1996, pp. 379‐383.  
11 Ibid, p. 381.  
12 S Mills, The Hawke years: the story from the inside, Viking, Ringwood, Victoria, 1993, p. 182. 
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Peace Initiative, as it became known,13 started off as a Hawke idea to get the 
Government off the hook of its ALP party commitment to resume bilateral aid 
to Vietnam, and to begin the process of reaching a broader regional 
consensus. Hawke allowed Hayden to take carriage of the initiative, and 
offered him firm support in face of ASEAN and US criticism.14 There were 
inherent risks for Australian diplomacy, but according to Hayden, even the 
risk of total failure and being pilloried was no justification for ‘fudging the 
challenge’.15 
Nevertheless, Hayden faced a formidable task in initiating dialogue in 1983. 
The Cold War divisions showed no sign of abating. The ASEAN nations, 
supported by China and the United States, were determined to keep Vietnam 
isolated from the international community, following its invasion of Cambodia. 
Within Cambodia, warfare escalated to become more serious and bitter than 
in the previous four years of fighting, with both sides believing that the 
military and political situation had turned in its favour.16  
Hayden believed that Australia had a role to play on the issue and that it was 
in a unique position to do something about the problem, based on its 
perception of Australian even-handedness towards the Indo-China conflict, 
and its relationships with the various countries involved: 
We are an ally of the United States who yet have constructive and cordial 
relations with the Soviet Union and China. We are long-standing friends of 
the ASEAN countries and have now established good working relations with 
Vietnam.17 
In his first visit to ASEAN countries in April 1983, Hayden tackled them about 
normalising relations with Vietnam and taking new steps to resolve the 
                                            
13 For example, P O’Brien, ‘The making of Australia's Indochina policies under the Labor Government 
(1983‐1986): the politics of circumspection?’ Research Paper No. 39, Centre for the Study of 
Australian‐Asian Relations, Griffith University, Brisbane, 1987.  
14 Mills, The Hawke years, p. 182. 
15 Hayden, Hayden, p. 181. 
16 E Becker, ‘Kampuchea in 1983: further from peace’, Asian Survey, vol. 24, no. 1, January 1984, pp. 
37‐48. 
17 B Hayden, ‘Speech at graduation ceremony, School of Modern Asian Studies, Griffith University, 13 
April 1985’, AFAR, vol. 56, no. 4, 1985, pp. 293‐95, p. 294.  
114 
 
Cambodian issue. According to Parsons, who accompanied Hayden on the 
visit as the Foreign Affairs departmental representative, the ASEAN 
countries: 
  …listened politely and gave some encouragement to Hayden’s offer to act 
as an independent broker but had their reservations, if only because they 
were not sure about the new Australian Government or where its policies 
would lead.18  
At the Bangkok meetings in June 1983, Hayden outlined his views on 
normalisation of relations with Vietnam, which US Secretary of State Shultz 
described as ‘stupid’.19 As a result, the polite initial response from ASEAN 
and the US turned into a ‘grudging licence’. However, Hawke and Shultz 
reached an understanding on Australia’s mediator role at their meeting in 
Washington on 14 June. Hawke reiterated that Australia stood ready to act 
as a mediator in South-East Asia and would not resume aid to Vietnam in the 
absence of a comprehensive settlement. Shultz, for his part, expressed his 
hope that Australia would be able to play a leading role in efforts to persuade 
Vietnam to withdraw its forces from Cambodia.20  
The Australian initiative came under fire from the ASEAN nations in October 
1983, when Australia announced that it would no longer co-sponsor the 
annual ASEAN United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 
condemning the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia (on the basis, inter 
alia, that the resolution was too one-sidedly critical of Vietnam).21 Hayden 
omitted any reference in his UNGA speech to Vietnam’s invasion of 
Cambodia or to any condemnation of Vietnam’s continued occupation of 
Cambodia. Australia’s relations with ASEAN countries deteriorated rapidly, 
only to be salvaged by fence-mending efforts by Hawke and Hayden in 
                                            
18 A Parsons, South East Asian days, Griffith University, Brisbane, 1988, p. 163. 
19 D Snow, ‘Shultz, Hayden in sharp clash’, FR, 29 June 1983, p. 3. 
20 ‘Australia seeks peace role’, New York Times, 15 June 1983, p. A12. 
21 Evans later commented: ‘It took some time – probably not until Australia resumed its co‐
sponsorship of the ASEAN resolution in 1988 – before ASEAN accepted that Australia did not seek to 
erode the ASEAN position on Cambodia, that our involvement was legitimate, and that we were 
acting on assessments independently arrived at’. Evans, ‘Australia and Indo‐China: a case study in 
the evolution of Australian foreign policy’, p. 9.  
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November, when Australia received cautious agreement that it could 
continue to pursue its mediator role and search for a dialogue. Yet, as a 
result of these contretemps, it became clear that ASEAN and its strong 
supporters of its Indo-China positions (like China and the US) had become 
less inclined to welcome Australia’s role as mediator or facilitator in the 
conflict, and less likely to give weight to its views on the conflict. One 
contemporary US  scholarly report on Cambodia for the year 1983 stated:  
The newly elected Labor government of Australia offered to negotiate the 
issue, and its Foreign Minister visited Hanoi, but nothing came from the 
discussions.22 
O’Brien23 points out that one of the reasons for ASEAN’s lukewarm (and at 
times hostile) responses to Australian efforts to play the role as independent 
broker, derived from a perception that Australia was mounting a challenge to 
ASEAN’s primacy in Indo-China negotiations. ASEAN had built up its 
international standing and reputation as a regional organisation by keeping 
the Cambodian conflict on the international agenda through the 1981 
ASEAN-initiated, UN-sponsored International Conference on Kampuchea 
(ICK). It did so by structuring international debate on the issue in the United 
Nations on ASEAN’s terms, denying consolidation of the Vietnamese 
installed PRK regime in Cambodia, pursuing coercive diplomacy and by 
mobilising external support for the ASEAN strategy.24 According to Acharya, 
the Cambodian problem had initially helped to strengthen ASEAN’s unity and 
its international reputation.25 It was this issue of ASEAN international 
standing, status and solidarity, more than ASEAN views on foreign policy in 
relation to Indo-China as such (on which even the ASEAN members were 
                                            
22 Becker, ‘Kampuchea in 1983’, p. 46.  
23 O’Brien, ‘The making of Australia's Indochina policies’, p. 14. 
24 M Alagappa, ‘Regionalism and the quest for security: ASEAN and the Cambodian conflict’, Journal 
of International Affairs, vol. 4, no. 2, 1993, pp. 439‐467, retrieved 8 October 2009, Academic Search 
Premier database. 
25 A Acharya, P Lizée & S Peou, ‘Introduction’ in Cambodia – The 1989 Paris Peace Conference; 
background analysis and documents, Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University, 
Kraus International Publications, New York, 1991, p. xlvi. 
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divided),26 that seems to have provided the first major stumbling block to 
Australia’s ‘honest broker’ initiative.  
In the Cold War setting in which the Hayden initiative was launched, there 
were limitations to the extent to which Australia’s independence or even-
handedness were either possible or welcomed. Hayden’s credibility as a 
facilitator had already been called into question, as far as ASEAN and China 
were concerned, by his statements prior to and following his visit to Vietnam 
in 1983, and by his refusal to co-sponsor ASEAN’s annual UN resolution 
calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Cambodia in October 1983.27 
However, ASEAN concern reached a crisis point in March 1985 when 
Hayden met the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) Prime Minister Hun 
Sen, the head of a government that Australia, ASEAN, China and the US did 
not recognise, at an unscheduled meeting in Ho Chi Minh City. Indonesian 
Foreign Minister Mochtar claimed that the meeting ‘impinged on Hayden’s 
credibility’ and China claimed that Hayden had been used as a ‘catspaw to 
achieve Vietnam’s own criminal ends’.28 Hayden later claimed that it was 
worth putting up with the discomfiture which took place because the 
extensive discussions he had with Hun Sen about the prospects of political 
processes being put in place at the time were important contributions to the 
evolution of later developments.29 Costello also considered that Hayden’s 
meeting with Hun Sen was important in establishing Australia’s future 
credibility as a new independent actor on the scene:  
Yet, equally, if it had not been for that meeting between Hayden and Hun 
Sen in Ho Chi Minh City we would have had no standing. We would have 
                                            
26 Singapore led the charge for ASEAN on the outcome of Hayden’s discussions in Vietnam in 1983, 
Thailand on the UNGA resolution in 1983 and Indonesia on Hayden’s meeting with Hun Sen in 1985, 
with the other ASEAN countries offering either strong or lukewarm support. 
27 O’Brien, ‘The making of Australia's Indochina policies’, p. 9. 
28 I Davis, ‘China calls Hayden a cat’s paw for Hanoi’, The Age, 14 March 1985, p. 1. 
29 Hayden, ‘Kampuchea‐ Answer to Question in Parliament on 18 November 1987’, AFAR, vol. 58, no. 
10, 1987, p. 624. 
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been seen as another lackey of the United States. That is how most of the 
region saw us and, to a certain extent, still do.30  
The problems caused by Hayden’s visit to Vietnam in 1985 were eventually 
played down, but according to O’Brien, by this time, most of Australia’s 
initiatives with respect to Indochina had either failed or had been seriously 
compromised.31 In 1986, Hayden called for an international crimes tribunal to 
try Pol Pot and his senior associates and to determine acceptable leaders, 
but ASEAN countries did not warm to the suggestion. By December 1987, 
Hayden conceded that Australia had made its contribution to the search for a 
peaceful settlement as other regional countries, Indonesia in particular, 
gradually sought to play a more active diplomatic role through the Jakarta 
Informal Meetings (JIM) process, which Hayden welcomed and said he 
would support. Hayden promised that Australia would nevertheless continue 
to play an active and constructive role in the area.32 
Former Liberal Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, and member of 
Spender’s old seat of Warringah, Mackellar criticised Hayden in the 
Australian Parliament for his Cambodian initiatives, claiming that they hurt 
ASEAN’s international reputation, diminished ASEAN’s international position 
and produced uncertainty about Australia as a reliable friend and ally. 
MacKellar also accused Hayden of bending over backwards to please 
Vietnam, with the result that the cost to Australia’s international reputation in 
the international community was seen to be reaching unacceptable 
proportions.33  
                                            
30 Comments in response to a question after a presentation to the Australian Institute for 
International Affairs Secretaries’, Series, 8 November 2006, retrieved, 14 October 2009, 
<http://epress.anu.edu.au/anzsog/steady_hands/mobile_devices/ch05s02.html>.  
31 O’Brien, ‘The making of Australia's Indochina policies’, p. 18. 
32 B Hayden, ‘Kampuchea: Answer to Question in Parliament’, AFAR, vol. 58, no. 10, 18 November 
1987, p. 624. 
33 Mackellar, ‘Association of South East Asian Nations ‐Discussion of matter of public Importance’, 
CPD, H of R, vol. 133, 11 October 1983, p. 1543‐ 1551; and ‘Foreign Policy – Discussion of matter of 
public importance’, CPD, H of R, vol. 133, 9 November 1983, p. 2493‐2502. 
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Hayden did not appear to be frayed by these accusations. He took the 
philosophical view that:  
We find some consolation that on the big issues of principle, while short-term 
popularity may have eluded us, the tide of history sways strongly in our 
support.34  
In other words, he held the belief that history would decide the correctness of 
his approach and his reputation with regard to mediating in the Indo-China 
conflict. 
Australian provision of refugee, relief, rehabilitation and development aid to 
Indo-China (and indications of increased aid, particularly for Vietnam) was an 
important arm of the Hawke Government’s strategy to gain acceptance in the 
region as a concerned partner and to play a role in the search for dialogue in 
Cambodia. It was also an area where Australia had some competitive 
advantage in potential influence in the region, since its economy in the 1980s 
was larger than that of the combined ASEAN member countries. Australia’s 
initial explorations were aimed at resuming bilateral aid to Vietnam and to 
assist in winning Vietnam’s trust as well as being designed for humanitarian 
purposes. When its attempts proved unsuccessful, Australia, following a 
policy review in 1983, took the option of channeling humanitarian assistance 
to Vietnam and Cambodia through multilateral agencies and through non-
government organisations. Its aid program to Cambodia soon became one of 
the largest in the country. Between 1980 and 1986, Australia provided an 
average of $2.8m each year for relief and rehabilitation work for refugees 
inside Cambodia and on the Cambodia border with Thailand. Also, since 
1975, Australia had been one of the major countries for the resettlement of 
Indo-Chinese refugees, and the main country on a per-capita basis. 
In 1987, O’Brien claimed that from a ‘managing by objectives’ perspective, 
Australian foreign policy objectives to bring about a peaceful solution to the 
                                            
34 B Hayden, ‘The Australian Government’s foreign policy philosophy’. Edited transcript of a speech 
to the Australian Joint Services College, 10 April 1984, AFAR, vol. 55, no. 4, 1984, pp. 305–312, p. 
305. 
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Cambodia problem had not been met and that, of all Australia’s Indo-China 
policies under the Labor Government, only humanitarian assistance to the 
various countries in the region could be considered to have been 
successful.35 From broader and outsider perspective, Hervouet argued that 
all the three unsuccessful attempts at mediation between 1983 and 1989 
(those by Japan, Australia and Indonesia) failed for similar reasons.36 First, 
the timing of the initiatives was not propitious; second, at the time of the 
initiatives, the main players for various reasons seemed satisfied with the 
status quo; third, none of the interventions took sufficient account of the 
principal ‘dyad’ - of China and Vietnam - in the conflict. In all three cases, 
Hervouet claimed, China never asked for any help, and the positive signals 
from Vietnam, provided by Nguyen Co Thach, were seen as an exercise in 
manipulation of a third party.37 
The path to the 1989 Paris International Conference on Cambodia 
When Senator Evans took over from Hayden as Foreign Minister in 
December 1988, he claimed that Australian efforts over the previous five 
years had not been in vain and had helped to stake out a position for 
Australia as a concerned and involved player in the region on the Cambodia 
problem:  
The achievement of the Hayden years, notwithstanding the problems it 
provoked with ASEAN, was to have Australia accepted by the international 
community, including ASEAN, as a responsible and knowledgeable voice on 
the issue of a Cambodian settlement. Our views at this time were not 
necessarily welcomed by all the parties, but they were given weight and 
taken into account. Australia had shown that good relations with ASEAN can 
survive differences of views on an important issue. Australia did not, at the 
end of the day, achieve any major breakthrough or substantive shift in the 
position of the majors. This was hardly surprising given that Australia is not, 
and cannot be in this context, a central player. But during the early years of 
                                            
35 O’Brien, op. cit., p. 21. 
36 G Hervouet, ‘The Cambodian conflict: the difficulties of intervention and compromise’, 
International Journal, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 258‐291, especially pp. 277‐284., retrieved 14 December 
2009, JSTOR database. 
37 Ibid., p. 284. 
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the Hawke Government, Australia did make a very real contribution to the 
quality and level of debate on Cambodia, and to imparting a sense of 
urgency to the effort to find a solution.38  
On becoming Foreign Minister, Evans sought to rebuild Australia’s standing 
with ASEAN with respect to Indo-China, a situation that was helped in 1988 
when Australia resumed its co-sponsorship of the annual ASEAN UNGA 
resolution on Cambodia. An explicitly common position was forged at the 
ASEAN post-ministerial conference in Brunei in July, and by August 1989 
Evans felt he could safely say that ASEAN- Australian disagreements over 
Indo-China ‘are now behind us’.39  
Having already, on assuming office, redefined Australia’s national interests in 
terms of its political or strategic interests, economic and trade interests, and 
a national interest in being seen to be a good international citizen, Evans set 
out to define Australia’s desired outcomes of the Cambodian conflict in these 
terms. For, example, it was in Australia’s security interests to see a 
comprehensive settlement in Cambodia. The commercial opportunities that 
could open up in Indo-China (and elsewhere in Asia) were important for 
Australia, whose economic future depended on becoming an outward-
looking, internationally competitive economy. Australia also had a 
humanitarian interest in seeing a lasting peace established in Indo-China, 
and offered emergency and humanitarian aid to help to address the problems 
that had been the core of the flow of refugees from the area. With regard to 
Australia’s ability to influence these outcomes, and the reputational capital in 
terms of ‘respect’ that it could draw on, Evans stated: 
Defining the Australian interests which would be served by a Cambodian 
settlement is one thing. Influencing an outcome which advances these 
interests is here, as always, quite another. To be realistic we must concede 
that our influence is limited and that Australia is not one of the major players 
on Cambodia. This, however, does not mean that Australia can aspire to be 
nothing more than an interested bystander. In multilateral efforts of the sort 
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39 Ibid., p. 11. 
121 
 
involved in a Cambodian settlement there is a role for Australia. We are 
respected for our general knowledge of the region, the active attempts we 
have made in the past to break the logjam in Cambodia (or at least move it a 
little further downstream), for the constructive and thoughtful role we have 
played through our aid program, and above all for the disproportionately 
large burden we have already shouldered in relation to Indo-Chinese 
refugees.40  
The real test of the importance of the international community’s acceptance 
of Australia as a responsible and knowledgeable voice, and its various 
contributions to finding a solution to the Cambodia conflict, would come in 
1989 when France and Indonesia, the conveners of a proposed international 
conference in Paris to be held later that year, began to draw up a short list of 
participants. Australia feared that it might be considered as a mere 
‘interested bystander’, and grew concerned that decisions might be taken at 
the conference affecting its interests without it having an opportunity to 
participate. 
After a decade of intransigence and stalemate, the Cambodian peace 
process, in the first quarter of 1989, according to one contemporary scholar, 
‘again saw a flurry of renewed possibilities as governments and individuals 
scrambled to secure a ride on what appeared at times to be a fast train to 
resolution of the war’.41  
This scramble also included a push by ASEAN member countries and other 
countries to secure an economic foothold to penetrate the Indo-China market 
following a Cambodian settlement, as illustrated by the Thai Prime Minister’s 
much-reported statement about turning Indo-China from a battlefield to a 
market place.42 Major events in this period included developments towards 
Sino-Soviet rapprochement, meetings between the Kampuchean Prime 
Minister Hun Sen and Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the visit of the Thai Foreign 
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Minister to Vietnam in early January and the visit of PRK Prime Minister Hun 
Sen to Thailand later in the month, the opening of dialogue between Vietnam 
and China following the visit of the Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister to 
Beijing for talks on Cambodia in mid-January and the Indonesian-sponsored 
‘proximity talks’ involving the Hun Sen Government and the Cambodian 
resistance factions.  
On 6 January 1989, Vietnam offered to withdraw its troops from Cambodia 
by September that year, if a political solution could be reached. It also 
seemed to accept the idea of an international peace-keeping monitoring 
force to monitor the withdrawal of its troops. On 5 April, it announced that it 
would withdraw all its troops by the end of September 1989, whether or not a 
political solution eventuated, thus placing additional urgency on finding a 
comprehensive solution. The next day, Prince Sihanouk announced that he 
had sent a personal message to French President Mitterrand, requesting him 
to convene an international conference on a suitable date, with the aim of 
facilitating and hastening a just resolution of the Cambodian crisis,43 to which 
France responded positively.44 As a result of these developments, the setting 
for a resolution of the Cambodian conflict shifted from a regional to an 
international setting. However, Australia’s participation in the proposed 
international conference was by no means a foregone conclusion.  
Prince Sihanouk had previously indicated support for Australian participation 
in an international conference on Cambodia, and confirmed this with Evans 
during Evans’ visit to Beijing in January 1989. Australia placed considerable 
weight on this outcome with respect to its Indo-China policy objectives and its 
standing in the international community in relation to the Cambodian conflict. 
During his first visit to the Asia region as Foreign Minister in January 1989, 
Evans lobbied his Asian counterparts on the question of Australian 
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participation at the conference. In Hanoi, Evans, with the Prime Minister’s 
support, announced that Australia stood ready to consider any requests that 
might be made for it to participate in some appropriate control mechanism to 
monitor the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and to prevent outside 
interference in Cambodian affairs. At the same time, the Australian Minister 
for Defence began consideration of possible logistic implications if Australia 
were invited to participate in such a mechanism.45 Prime Minister Hawke 
raised the issue of Australian participation in the conference on Cambodia 
during his visit to Asia of 29 January-13 February and in a statement to 
Parliament on 2 March 1989, he referred to Thai appreciation of the efforts 
Australia had made since 1983 to build a reputation as a concerned and 
credible player on Cambodia. 
It is a measure of Australia's standing in the region and of the work of my 
Government since 1983 that Thailand wants Australia to participate in any 
international conference that might develop from the current process. I told 
Prime Minister Chatichai that Australia was prepared to play an active and 
constructive role in an international conference, if that was the wish of the 
parties more directly involved in the resolution of the conflict. As I indicated 
in Bangkok, it is too early yet to be definite about an Australian role in any 
international control mechanism, as the detail of such a mechanism is still 
unknown.46  
When Sihanouk sent a personal message to Mitterrand in April, requesting 
that he convene an international conference on Cambodia in Paris, he 
included Australia in his suggested list of countries.47 In addition to the Indo-
China parties, Sihanouk’s suggested guest list included France, the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, China, the US, the UK, the Soviet 
Union, the six ASEAN states, Japan, India, Australia and New Zealand. He 
mentioned that the list was not exhaustive.48  
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However, by the end of April, Australia had not received an invitation from 
the French Government to attend the proposed conference, although other 
governments had been approached and some had even begun discussing 
their potential roles among themselves.49 French-Australian relations were 
cordial at the time following their close co-operation on the Antarctic Minerals 
Treaty, so there was no reason to fear French opposition to Australia’s 
candidature on political grounds. But Evans began to fear that six years of 
Australian diplomatic, ministerial and prime-ministerial engagement on 
Cambodia could come to nothing. He commissioned a senior DFAT officer to 
prepare a comprehensive brief which would establish Australia’s claims for 
participation in the international conference. Evans also instructed the 
Australian Ambassador in Jakarta, Philip Flood, to reiterate Australia’s wish 
to be involved in the conference with Sihanouk during Sihanouk’s meeting 
with Hun Sen in Jakarta at the beginning of May.50 Evans subsequently 
reported to Parliament on 4 May that Sihanouk had confirmed his support for 
Australian participation.51 
Hun Sen commented on the question of Australia’s participation in the 
international conference in an exchange of views with the (Malaysian) 
Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) in Phnom Penh on 15 
May 1989, following his discussions with Prince Sihanouk in Jakarta earlier in 
May: 
We have proposed the participants to the conference as follows: the six 
ASEAN countries, Laos and Vietnam, the five permanent members of the 
United Nations Security Council (USA, China, France, UK and the USSR), 
the chairmen of the 6th, 7th and 8th Non-aligned Summits, the United Nations 
Secretary-General and also a number of other countries which contribute to 
the settlement of the problem of Cambodia. Prince Sihanouk proposed to 
                                            
49 RH Solomon, Exiting Indochina: US leadership of the Cambodia settlement & normalization with 
Vietnam, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C., 2000, pp. 19‐20. Solomon 
mentions that French officials had approached him in early April to gain US support and involvement 
in the proposed international conference. See also Le Monde, 8 April 1989, p. 8. 
50 H Patz, ‘Die Kambodscha‐Politik der Australischen Labor‐Regierung 1983‐1991: success against the 
odds’, Unpublished PHD thesis, University of Hamburg, 2001, pp. 237‐238. 
51 Evans, ‘Questions Without Notice – Cambodia’, CPD, Senate, vol. S133, 4 May 1989, p. 1798. 
125 
 
add Australia, New Zealand and Japan - I believe this is not a problem; we 
can include them. We have a few worries with regard to Japan but we do not 
want to exclude them, because in the international conference or in any 
meeting, we should not create a confrontational atmosphere. Japan has 
been on one side, it is difficult if one country is [on] one side. So even in a 
football match, you must get a neutral referee. Then the question was asked, 
why [do] we allow the ASEAN countries to take part? Well, the ASEAN 
countries are in the region. The ASEAN countries recognised the CGDK but 
we admit that the ASEAN countries are in the region and can take part in the 
solution. China has been opposing us but China is acceptable because 
China is a member of the United Nations Security Council. Japan is not a 
country in our region and is not a member of the United Nations Security 
Council. But I think Japan could take part.52  
This passage is interesting for a number of reasons. First, Australia was not 
included in the first cut of the participants proposed jointly by Sihanouk and 
Hun Sen, but Sihanouk had proposed adding Australia to the joint list 
(presumably on his own account and possibly also as a result of Australian 
representations in Jakarta). Second, Hun Sen did not believe that Australia’s 
participation would be a problem, presumably because, in the context of his 
remarks, he did not consider that Australia had been ‘on one side’. However, 
Hun Sen did not regard Australia as being a country ‘in the region’ with an 
inherent claim to be included in the discussion of regional affairs, despite its 
‘honest broker’ and other efforts since 1983 to engage in the region. 
In an interview with the author, French Foreign Minister Dumas stated that 
France wanted to make the invitation list as wide as possible, and recalled 
that Australia came under consideration because it had an important role to 
play in relation to refugees and rehabilitation.53 Evans picked up on this point 
of future roles as significant criteria for determining the short list of 
candidates when he stated at the Paris Conference:  
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The significance of this conference, and the hope of this conference, lies in 
the way it has brought all the players together, each with their own 
responsibilities and each with their own crucial role to play.54  
Evans’ comment suggests that the good reputation that Australia had 
established by accepting Indo-Chinese refugees since 1975, particularly 
under the former Fraser Government,55 was particularly important 
reputational capital,56 which Australia was able to draw on to gain a seat at 
the 1989 Paris conference. Since the fall of Saigon in 1975, Australia had 
accepted almost 120,000 Indo-Chinese refugees, which on a per capita 
basis, represented the highest ratio of all resettlement countries. This 
reputation, based on past actions over a number of years, also established a 
role for Australia at the conference as co-chair of the working group on 
reconstruction and resettlement.  
Australia’s case for a seat at the conference promoted Australia as an 
interested and concerned country, which was willing to work constructively 
for a settlement in Cambodia and play its part. This approach was helped by 
the fact that the problem of Indo-Chinese refugees was a top-of-mind issue in 
1989 and a major topic in the regional press.57 Since 1976, more than two 
million Indo-Chinese people left their homelands, and the flow showed no 
sign of abating. However, in 1988 the process of resettlement slowed and 
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first asylum countries, including Hong Kong, began to show frustration with 
existing policies of automatic asylum.  
Following the UN High Commissioner for Refugees’ discussions in the 
region, the UN sponsored a 60 nation conference in Geneva (13-14 June) 
which Australia attended. While Evans joined with ASEAN countries and 
Britain at the conference in advocating mandatory repatriation of ‘economic 
refugees’, Australia was one of few countries to continue to accept 
Vietnamese migrants under its Vietnam migration program at existing levels. 
This gained it some credit, since it was known that the maintenance of the 
intake policy at existing levels was at some political cost in view of the 
immigration debate in Australia at the time. At the Geneva conference, 
French delegated Minister for Foreign Affairs Mme. Edwige Avice formally 
announced the date of the Paris conference on Cambodia, the final invitees 
(including Australia) and the proposed conference working groups, including 
a working group focusing on the problem of refugees and reconstruction.58 
Mme. Avice’s announcement appears to confirm that French thinking on the 
conference participants, and their proposed roles at the conference, had 
proceeded in tandem.  
The Paris International Conference on Cambodia and the Australian peace 
proposal  
The Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC), 30 July - 30 August 
1989, can perhaps best be described as a dirigist multilateral conference 
directed by its co-chairs, the French and Indonesian Foreign Ministers, with 
the French Foreign Minister and French officials taking the upper hand.59 An 
unusual feature of the conference was that it was not preceded by a 
preparatory meeting of senior officials. Instead, the PICC began with a short 
meeting at which the participating ministers made their general statements, 
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adopted rules of procedure and an agreed work schedule. After their 
departure, the conference continued its work in four committees - on the 
subjects of the modalities of a ceasefire and an international control 
commission to monitor the ceasefire; international guarantees; rehabilitation 
and reconstruction; and an ad-hoc committee, comprising the four 
Cambodian parties and the co-chairs, which focused on questions of national 
reconciliation and the structure of an interim authority to organise elections.  
Lead-up meetings between Sihanouk and Hun Sen were inconclusive and 
the four Cambodian groups could neither agree among themselves on the 
nature of the problem nor on power-sharing arrangements, with the 
consequence that a fundamental prerequisite for the success of the 
conference was missing.60 Some participants, nevertheless, thought that it 
had a 50 percent chance of achieving a breakthrough.61 Sturkey observed 
that France, as the host country, and many others hoped that the permanent 
members of the UN Security Council and the participation of a group of 
interested countries would demonstrate the strength of international concern 
to resolve the conflict and help to induce the Cambodian factions to reach 
some accommodation.62  
Given the nature of the conference, and heated debates between the 
Cambodian factions, there was not a great deal of scope for Australian ideas 
or initiatives to be put forward. In his opening address, Evans did not 
highlight previous Australian efforts to promote mediation on Cambodia or 
Australia’s acceptance by, and credibility with, all major players - a factor 
which had been a feature of previous Australian foreign policy belief. Only 
one country (Russia) mentioned Australia as having been important in the 
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Paris Conference pre-negotiation phase: Soviet Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze stated that ‘questions of Cambodian settlement have always 
been present on the agenda of our talks with the United States of America, 
Britain, Japan, Australia and many other countries’.63 Evans supported the 
ASEAN position on seeking an accommodation between all four Cambodian 
groups, while claiming that Australia would not support any settlement that 
facilitated the return of Pol Pot or his close associates to any positions of 
authority in Cambodia. With regard to Australia’s contribution to the peace 
effort, Evans confined himself to suggesting that Australia and other 
concerned countries could play a supportive role in underpinning the 
agreements made by the Cambodian parties: 
The more general role, which all external participants at this Conference 
could and should play, is to contribute to the setting in place of arrangements 
to underpin the agreements which the Cambodian groups themselves will 
need to make. These arrangements should cover international guarantees 
for a neutral, independent and non-aligned Cambodia; practical 
arrangements for an international control mechanism; the resettlement of 
displaced persons; and international co-ordination of reconstruction 
assistance. Australia will itself certainly work constructively for agreement in 
all these areas.64  
In terms of concrete action, Evans repeated his earlier offer that Australia 
was willing to consider, if asked, to participate in an appropriate international 
control mechanism and, more immediately, to participate in a preliminary 
reconnaissance mission, as suggested the previous day by the UN 
Secretary-General.65  
Australia fulfilled the role assigned to it by the conference as co-chair with 
Japan on the committee on reconstruction and repatriation. The committee 
produced the only formally agreed document at the conference, outlining the 
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broad principles relating to the objectives, timeframe and coordination of an 
international effort for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia. 
However, the third committee was considered to have had the easiest task.66 
Australia and Japan were less successful with their other task of defining the 
conditions that would enable refugees and displaced persons to return home, 
which was held up over the question of Vietnamese ‘settlers’. At the resumed 
ministerial session at the end of August, Evans proposed a number of 
confidence building measures and a special working group to be convened 
after the conference, but his proposal did not attract the necessary universal 
support for it to be adopted.  
Australia’s participation in the conference was significant in relation to 
subsequent developments in one further important respect. Participation in 
the conference gave Australia an international locus standi as one of a small 
group of countries involved in the search for a Cambodian settlement , which 
included the major powers, all the relevant regional countries and the internal 
Cambodia parties. It also gave Australia the right to consult and be 
consulted, access to conference documents and deliberations, and a number 
of both official and informal contacts without which it would have been 
difficult to pursue its later initiatives.  
In his statement to Parliament on 24 November 1989, Evans indicated that 
the Paris Conference came very close to succeeding. In particular, a 
comprehensive settlement has been mapped out involving - in broad terms – 
a cease-fire, the monitored withdrawal of all Vietnamese forces, the 
cessation of external support, the creation of a transitional administration and 
the holding of free elections. These actions were all to be completed under 
the supervision of an international control mechanism.67 These elements of a 
comprehensive settlement and the deliberations and documents of the 
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conference would provide building blocks for subsequent initiatives, including 
Australia’s.  
Phase Two: The Australian Peace Proposal 
The political situation 
After the failure of the 1989 PICC to reach agreement on a comprehensive 
settlement for Cambodia, events moved quickly. Vietnam withdrew its troops 
from Cambodia on 26 September but without the UN supervision, control and 
verification deemed necessary at the PICC for international acceptance. 
Without the presence of Vietnamese troops, the Khmer Rouge militia made 
local gains inside Cambodia in a test of strength with the Phnom Penh 
government, but in the (northern) autumn, the balance of internal forces did 
not give a clear advantage to either side.68 The Khmer Rouge advances 
inside Cambodia provoked an alarmist campaign in the western media that 
the Khmer Rouge would once again resume power in the country,69 leading 
to pressures on governments, including Australia, to isolate the Khmer 
Rouge by recognising the Hun Sen ‘de facto’ government in Cambodia.70 In 
November, the United Nations General Assembly stated that it was greatly 
disturbed about the continuing fighting and instability in Cambodia, and 
reiterated its support for a just, lasting and comprehensive political settlement 
as elaborated at the PICC.71 
The PICC co-Presidents decided to let the matter rest for the time being and 
to recommence consultation with participants within six months with a view to 
reconvening the Conference. This created a hiatus in the negotiations which 
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provided an opportunity for countries like Thailand, Japan and Australia to 
play a role of proactive diplomacy in the peace process. Thai Prime Minister 
Chatichai attempted to broker a ceasefire among the Khmer factions prior to 
the announced withdrawal of Vietnamese troops but to no avail. Japan 
pondered the next steps that needed to be taken and whether it could make 
some diplomatic contribution to the peace-making process itself, as a major 
by-product of its participation at the Conference, and prompted by a growing 
awareness among Japanese people that Japan should make a greater 
contribution to the international community.72  
The Australian idea 
The opportunity for Australia to make a mark on the international stage in 
relation to the search for a Cambodia settlement came by chance in 
discussions between Evans and US Congressman Stephen Solarz in New 
York on 6 October 1989, when Solarz raised with Evans the idea of a UN 
neutral administration in Cambodia to break the diplomatic logjam and as a 
means of preventing the Khmer Rouge from returning to power. These 
discussions, which Evans acknowledged on many occasions, were crucial in 
shaping his thinking: 
It follows the discussion that we had right at the outset of this whole exercise 
in 1989 when he [Solarz] put to me the idea in outline of the UN peace plan. 
I thought then that it had the potential to produce a settlement, said so to 
him, and he said to me that if you can make this work, if you can actually 
help produce a settlement, that will be worthy of a Nobel Prize and I’d be 
delighted to nominate you.73  
The meeting between Evans and Solarz demonstrated the serendipitous 
nature of international diplomacy breakthroughs. As Evans later put it: 
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You’re only given an opportunity in this life to make an impact in a larger-
scale environment very rarely and it’s a matter of grabbing the opportunity 
for the finite time it’s available.74  
The development and announcement of the Australian initiative on Cambodia 
has been told and retold on a number of occasions and is relayed here in 
summary form.75  
Following his discussion with Solarz, Evans directed his department to 
examine the justification and possible role of a UN interim authority in 
Cambodia.76 On 24 November 1989, Evans announced the Australian idea of 
a UN transitional authority to break the impasse in the Cambodian 
negotiations in the Australian Senate.77 In essence he proposed a UN 
transitional administration along the lines of the UN administration in Namibia 
to side-step the power-sharing issue which had bedeviled the Paris 
Conference. The UN administration would also mean that no Cambodian 
party would be in a position to decide the country’s destiny pending free and 
fair elections organised by the UN. As a corollary, and in order for the UN to 
play the role envisaged for it, the Cambodian seat at the UN would need to 
be declared vacant, or occupied by the interim authority, until the elections 
determined a legitimate government in Cambodia. The proposal also 
addressed concerns about the Khmer Rouge being in a position of 
transitional authority, which so many people had found abhorrent for obvious 
reasons, given the regime’s appalling record.78  
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The immediate regional and international reaction to Evans’ statement on 24 
November ranged from great enthusiasm to simply ignoring it.79 Sihanouk 
endorsed the idea, saying that the plan represented his ‘correct ideas at the 
global level’.80 Thai reactions were divided, reflecting policy differences 
between the prime minister and foreign minister advisers. Hun Sen stated 
that his government regarded the UN administration in Namibia as a useful 
precedent. The US Administration was annoyed that Evans’ Cambodia 
initiative, premised on a lead UN role with a substantial US financial 
commitment, had been launched without prior consultation with itself, the 
United Nations or other members of the UNSC.81 Le Monde reported the 
Australian announcement briefly in a roundup of recent initiatives on 
Cambodia.82 The Khmer Rouge chose to ignore the statement; and there 
was no reaction at all from Beijing.83 
The initial reactions from senior UN officials were more guarded. UN 
Assistant Secretary-General Annabi commented: 
The idea had been suggested by Sihanouk, back in 1981. He said ‘This is 
nothing new, why is everybody [talking about it]; I suggested this back in 
1981’. It had been put by this guy, who was a congressman for New York, 
Solarz. He came to the Secretary -General - I was in that meeting - and 
suggested this idea of an interim administration. But what made the 
difference was that for the first time, this idea was put forward by a foreign 
minister, a man who was a responsible member of the government who was 
playing an important role in all this. That gave it a lot of publicity, but it was 
clear that it was a non-starter. 
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…In our discussion (with all the parties) we said, ‘Your idea of an interim 
administration is a non-starter but the concept of what we called ‘an 
enhanced role for the United Nations’ may provide something that is 
acceptable to everybody, in between, that is acceptable to everybody and 
more realistic’.84   
With Evans’ approval, DFAT Deputy-Secretary Costello made a quick visit to 
Hanoi in December 1990 for preliminary soundings on the Australian idea, 
which he followed up with that which Evans described as a ‘remarkable feat 
of diplomatic endurance’ in conducting 30 meetings in 13 countries over 21 
days in December 1989 - January 1990, covering meetings with both 
regional and major power interlocutors.85 Costello’s round of discussions 
received widespread coverage in the regional and international press,86 and 
in particular, recognition for its contribution to reviving the Paris Conference 
Cambodian peace process. The New York Times, for example, reported that:  
The catalyst for the new flurry of diplomacy is an Australian proposal that the 
warring Cambodian factions allow the United Nations to administer the 
country for at least a year with the presence of a strong international 
peacekeeping force and control mechanism to monitor a cease-fire in 
place.87 
Apart from being a catalyst for heightened diplomatic activity on Cambodia, 
the Australian proposal had an important impact on international agenda-
setting in the January – February 1990 period. Australia’s profile on the 
Cambodian settlement had never been higher. For example, a French 
Government spokesman was reported as saying that representatives of the 
five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council would give 
special attention to the Australian plan for an enhanced role for the UN in 
Cambodia at their first meeting in Paris, 15-16 January 1990, convened to 
arrive at agreed principles in working for a resolution of the Cambodian 
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problem.88 Further, progress towards a UN-sponsored solution of the 
Cambodian problem was the principal focus of a US Senate Hearing on 
‘Prospects for Peace in Cambodia’ on 28 February 1990, which the 
Chairman noted had begun recently ‘under the good auspices of the 
Australians’.89 In the Hearing, US Senators referred to Australia on 13 
separate occasions and Australia received only five fewer citations in the 
Hearing than the USSR, and eight more than France.90 Beer and Boynton 
commented:  
In the world of the conversation, however, the national actors are not 
weighted by material resources. Minor powers have major roles, major 
powers appear as supporting players.91 
The Australian proposal appeared to have gained the support of the 
permanent members of the UNSC, other than China, for an enhanced UN 
role as a means of overcoming the diplomatic impasse.92 China’s position, 
however, was important for any UN involvement in the Cambodian 
settlement, since, according to a senior UN official, the UN Secretary-
General was a conservative man, and the UN would not commit without 
absolute assurances of full cooperation from China: ‘Even an abstention by 
China in the Security Council won’t be enough’, he said, ‘We need a positive 
vote from China’.93 
Costello attributed the success of his diplomatic shuttle to a number of 
factors. His mission had demonstrated that it had clear strategic goals, 
tactical flexibility when needed, openness and trust in negotiations, 
persistence and endurance. The Labor Government had gained credibility 
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with Hun Sen, Vietnam and others; and Australia was not seen as a threat to 
anyone involved in the conflict or as having a particular vested interest.94 He 
also suggested that his mission in selling the Australian idea was helped 
considerably by the reputation Australia had accrued through thirty years of 
‘extremely good diplomacy’ in the region: 
You don’t do something like this off the top of your head; you don’t do 
something like this even after six months work; you do something like this 
because you build up over ten, twenty, thirty years, assets, credibility, 
knowledge and abilities in the region, and that is what had happened. Our 
embassies throughout the region, in the United States, in Europe - Paris and 
London particularly - all played an absolutely vital role in guiding me and 
directing me in what I did, and in selling our ideas. They knew exactly the 
people I needed to talk to, they knew what their interests were, what their 
political situation was. They made it relatively easy for me because I could 
draw on thirty years, forty years, of extremely good diplomacy throughout the 
region.95  
Gyngell and Wesley purported to see in Costello’s ‘buccaneering’ efforts to 
explain, elaborate and develop the Australian idea, a distinctive tone of 
Australian diplomacy, which, in their view, encompassed ‘irrepressive 
activism, self-confidence, doggedness, and a looseness - even an element of 
tinkering - in foreign policy-making’.96 Others, such as US Assistant 
Secretary of State Solomon viewed the Australian way of negotiating in the 
Cambodian settlement in a different light: 
The Australians play their politics much like they play rugby, with rough-and-
tumble scrums and a good deal of open-field running. This was the character 
of our relationship with the government in Canberra as the Cambodia 
negotiations advanced.97  
Both Evans and Costello believed that Australia was the right country to be 
given the task of developing and carrying the initiative. Evans told Solarz that 
Australia, with the benefit of its middle power status and the fact that it was 
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clearly not supporting any of the factions, might be well placed to sound out 
others on the idea.98 Costello stated:  
Australia was the right country, if I may say. We were no threat to anyone 
involved in this; we were not seen as having a particular vested interest; and 
we had credibility. Credibility because we are of a reasonable size; credibility 
with Hun Sen and with Vietnam … and we had credibility with others. We 
had not resumed aid to Vietnam during that ten years, and we had not done 
so specifically to preserve our credibility with those who didn’t want us to 
resume aid so that we could play a part in Cambodia. We had remained 
“anti” the Vietnamese invasion; we had not withdrawn our condemnation of 
that. So we had credibility. 99 
Solarz needed a Foreign Minister with some stature and reputation in the 
region to promote his idea and work out the details. Evans and Australia in 
the 1990s provided an ideal combination of personal activism and drive and 
middle power status to carry the initiative. As Evans’ biographer noted: 
Australia’s contribution to the settlement in Cambodia in l991 is the best 
example of the coming together of Evans’ own personal political style and 
the role he carved out for Australia as an activist middle power in the Asia-
Pacific region. It had the element of coalition-building which Evans believed 
to be characteristic of middle-power diplomacy. It was a major issue in 
South-East Asia, and it was a demonstration of Australia meeting the 
conditions Evans believed were necessary for middle powers to be effective: 
the identification of an opportunity; enough physical capacity to follow an 
issue through; a degree of intellectual imagination and creativity; and 
credibility. It was also an example of Evans taking someone else’s idea and 
applying his energy and intellect to giving it substance and form and seeing it 
through to fruition.100  
These views about Evans’ capabilities for the task were echoed by 
representatives of other countries involved in the search for a settlement. In 
interview, Dumas, for example, told the author: ‘You had a good Foreign 
Minister, with whom I had a good relationship’.101 And Solomon stated in 
interview: 
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So you had many levels of activity, and here’s where the leadership and the 
activeness of then Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, had a significant impact, 
in activating several levels of that process, and I think it’s fair to say, Gareth 
Evans helped to energise and provide some structure to the process … 
So, Australia was a very important voice, it was very active with again, 
Gareth Evans - how can I put it - making sure that DFAT was very active 
with playing within this process.102 
However, in another interview, one Permanent Five member country 
representative stated: 
I think that on Cambodia, first of all Australia made a useful contribution to 
the eventual solution on Cambodia. There were times when Australia 
thought it was going to deliver that solution itself; that was never on the 
cards and in the end it really became a matter for the P5 members of the 
Security Council, but nevertheless that is an issue where I think that the 
intellectual contribution was very strong.103  
The Australian ‘Red Book’ 
As a direct result of Costello’s discussions and some preliminary ground 
work in DFAT, the Australian ‘idea’ became a fully-fledged Australian plan.104 
Australian work on the plan received added impetus when Indonesian 
Foreign Minister Alatas decided in February 1990 that the time was 
opportune to convene a further informal meeting on Cambodia in Jakarta at 
the end of the month. He invited the four Cambodian parties, Vietnam and 
Laos, the ASEAN countries, France (as co-president of the PICC) and 
Australia, Canada, India and the UN as resource delegations. Australia, 
according to Berry, had been invited to attend the meeting in recognition of 
the contribution it was making to the peace process.105 Indonesia’s invitation 
also reflected Indonesia’s closer bilateral relations with Australia at the time, 
Alatas’ close personal relationship with Evans, and his belief that the 
Australian proposal offered an improved chance of making further progress 
towards a comprehensive solution to the Cambodian conflict.  
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Consequently, a departmental task force reporting directly to Evans 
expeditiously produced a 155-page brief of working papers for the meeting. 
These were subsequently published in a book entitled an ‘Australian Peace 
Proposal’, which was often referred to in discussions as the Australian ‘Red 
Book’ because of the colour of its cover.106 The ‘Red Book’ was both 
comprehensive and detailed. It comprised an introduction and summary, six 
working papers with annexes addressing such subjects as the structure of 
government, civil administration, electoral organisation, and security in the 
transition period; guarantees for a sovereign, independent and neutral 
Cambodia, and reconstruction; and a number of supplementary papers with 
suggestions relating to a draft UN mandate, the framework of a negotiating 
text, timetable, and resource requirements. According to one observer 
present in Jakarta for the ICM, ‘Canberra had done its homework’.107 
In his Cambodia from red to blue: Australia’s initiative for peace, Berry made 
significant claims about the seminal nature of the ‘Red Book’, and to 
Australia’s reputation as a respected negotiating partner, by producing a high 
quality product with limited resources in a limited time frame:  
Indeed, while the eventual Paris Agreements were considerably less detailed 
than the Australian proposals, … there is virtually no element of the 
Agreements that cannot be traced to the Red Book. These efforts justifiably 
earned Australia - a middle-sized power with a public service small by 
comparison to many of the others involved in the Paris Conference - a 
reputation as a respected partner with the necessary commitment to put its’ 
limited resources to full use in pursuing a selected target.108  
An examination of this claim would require a great deal of content analysis 
and textual exegesis, with anticipated diminishing returns about the origins of 
‘new ideas’ in the Cambodian peace process. In his Exiting IndoChina, 
Solomon wrote: 
                                            
106 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Cambodia: an Australian peace proposal: working 
papers prepared for the Informal Meeting on Cambodia Jakarta, 26‐28 February 1990, Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 1990. 
107 Hass, Genocide by proxy,  p. 221. 
108 Berry, Cambodia: from red to blue, p. 76. 
141 
 
In the fall of 1989, as we were laying the groundwork for the Secretary of 
State to launch the Perm Five effort, Foreign Minister Evans’s ministry was 
preparing what came to be called ‘the Red Book’. The volume, which pulled 
together much of the discussion at the Paris Conference, was a 
compendium of issues and possible solutions that had to be dealt with in 
constructing an UN-administered settlement of the Cambodian conflict.109  
Above all, there is the (international trade related) question relating to ‘rules 
of origin’. Solomon recalled: 
I think it’s fair to say Gareth Evans helped to energise and provide some 
structure to the process … Gareth Evans had his staff correlate many of the 
ideas that had been put forward in what he called his Red Book, and there 
was a question of, you know, was that an Australian product or was it a 
product that came out of the international conference - was it sort of a 
mix?110  
A reading of the ‘Red Book’ reveals that it drew on a number of sources, 
such as the report of an Australian technical mission which visited Cambodia 
in the first half of February, the UN’s experience in peacekeeping and 
supervising elections in Namibia (in which Australia was involved), Paris 
Conference documents and the broader corpus of peace settlement 
documentation, not necessarily confined to Cambodia. Further, as a senior 
UN official claimed, the UN prepared a raft of relevant background papers for 
the 1989 Paris Conference and wrote the annexes to the agreement, all of 
which would have been available to the Australian delegation: 
What they (scholars) don’t see is, that not only all the basic papers at the 
beginning of 1989 were ours, they were all written by us, and all very well 
received, and then the actual agreement - and the French said, ‘We don’t 
know how we should go about supervising the cease fire and this and that - 
you just tell us’. We wrote the annexes for them, all the annexes.111  
More importantly for international diplomacy on Cambodia, however, there is 
the question how and in what way the material and options outlined in the 
‘Red Book’ contributed to solving the riddle of a lasting comprehensive 
settlement for Cambodia. Evans himself acknowledged that, while the two 
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central themes of the Australian initiative - an enhanced role for the UN and 
the tackling of the UN seat issue - were not especially new, the significance 
of the Australian proposal and its ability to break the diplomatic ice lay in its 
packaging, its timing and in the energy and professionalism with which it was 
pursued.112 Berry touched on this point when he stated that the most 
important impact of the ‘Red Book’ was to show the many other participants 
in the search for a settlement in Cambodia that it was plausible ‘to reduce the 
complexities of the Cambodian problem to a workable solution (given the 
requisite political will)’.113 This was the challenge that Solarz had put to 
Evans, and which the Australian proposal was designed to meet; and, as 
Gyngell and Wesley pointed out: ‘Perhaps other countries could have 
provided a similar intellectual foundation for UN involvement, but none did 
so’.114  
The Jakarta Informal Meeting on Cambodia (IMC), February 1990 
The Jakarta IMC, 26-28 February 1990, provided the first opportunity to road 
test the Australia proposal. Alatas proposed that the meeting use the central 
idea of the Australian proposal, outlining an enhanced UN role in Cambodia 
as a basis of discussion at the IMC, with the IMC itself being an initial first 
step leading to the convening of a full-fledged, formal Paris Conference. 
Australian officials believed that the timing of the IMC was propitious for the 
Australian proposal, and that the ideas contained in the six working papers 
Australia had prepared for the meeting could be worked into a proposal for all 
sides to consider endorsing at the talks.115  
In his introductory address to the Jakarta Meeting, Evans stated: 
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What we have sought to do is play the role, as it were, [of] mapmaker to 
identify the places we would all like to get to, and to find way[s] of getting 
there that have not previously been fully explored.116  
According to Berry’s account of the meeting, Evans played a much larger 
role than his announced ‘map-maker’ or ‘resource person’. Evans arrived in 
Jakarta three full days before the meeting was due to start, in order to have 
intensive consultations with Alatas and to have bilateral meetings with the 
Cambodian factional leaders. During the meeting, Australian and Indonesian 
officials worked closely in drafting a ‘non-paper’ entitled ‘Possible Points of 
Common Understanding’. Evans pushed strenuously for acceptance of the 
role of the UN in the transitional arrangements and had substantive 
discussions, including discussions on drafting points, with Vietnam’s Foreign 
Minister Thach, and three of the Cambodian leaders. However, he and the 
Australian delegation were less successful in engaging the Khmer Rouge in 
discussions.117  
The meeting failed to arrive at an agreed statement, with the main sticking 
points being very much the same as those which had stymied the Paris 
Conference – the genocide issue, put by Vietnam, and the power-sharing 
issue, put by the Khmer Rouge.118 At the end of the last closed session, 
Alatas criticised both the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese for fighting over 
words and harping on the arguments of the past, while one senior Asian 
diplomat was reported as saying that: ‘Both sides made difficulties over non-
essential aspects of the text in order to avoid having to openly disagree on 
the essential point - UN involvement in civil administration’.119  Evans’ 
disappointment after having put so much effort into trying to achieve success 
at the meeting was palpable. The IMC took place during the 1990 general 
elections campaign in Australia and Evans would clearly have liked to have 
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had a successful outcome before the end of his first period in office to 
announce to the Australian voters. He was accused by some participants in 
corridor discussions of attempting to use the blunt style of Australian politics 
in the Asian forum.120 Also in keeping with his (character) reputation for 
irascibility, he showed his exasperation by blaming the Khmer Rouge (but not 
the Vietnamese) for their wrecking role at the meeting over peripheral 
matters and, after months of playing a key role in the Cambodian peace 
process, he reportedly told the press: ‘There is a limit to my masochism’.121 
However, he later confirmed in a letter to Solarz that he saw a continuing role 
for Australia in the Cambodian negotiations, and that it would be both 
irresolute and irresponsible for Australia to give up just yet.122 This letter, 
however, was written two months later, on 11 May 1990. 
At the Jakarta IMC, Australia appears to have cemented its relations with 
Indonesia and the ASEAN countries over Cambodia. Berry stated that 
ASEAN delegations were uniformly supportive of the Australian positions; 
and at a meeting with President Suharto after the meeting, the Indonesian 
President expressed his appreciation of Australian efforts to help resolve the 
Cambodia conflict.123 However, Suharto also said publicly that the matter 
should be left alone for several months, and in a sense, as Berry reported: 
‘Foreign Minister Alatas had put his status and reputation within Indonesia on 
the line by pursuing the Cambodian peace process’.124 French senior official 
Martin, who deputised for Dumas after his departure, signaled a change of 
venue and settings for the negotiations, when he announced at the 
conclusion of the meeting that the permanent members of the UNSC would 
be meeting later in the month and again in April to take the process further. 
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Phase Three: The Permanent Five Framework Agreement 
Consultative meetings 
After the collapse of the Jakarta IMC, the burden of finding a solution shifted 
to the efforts of the UN Permanent Five. When the 1989 Paris Conference 
failed to reach an agreement, US Secretary of State Baker proposed that 
efforts be made to reach a solution under the auspices of the UN Permanent 
Five, an initiative he claimed culminated in the 1991 Paris Peace 
Agreement.125 The Permanent Five held six consultative meetings, 
alternating between Paris and New York, between January and August 1990. 
At their first meeting in Paris, 16-17 January 1990, they agreed that they 
would be guided by sixteen principles in working to resolve the Cambodian 
problem, which from an Australian interest and perspective, included an 
enhanced UN role and recognition that a Supreme National Council might be 
the repository of Cambodian sovereignty during the transition process, but 
the communiqué made no mention of the Australian idea as a source of 
inspiration.126  
The third meeting, held in Paris, 12-13 March, took place soon after the 
Jakarta IMC. Australian diplomats had lobbied hard after the IMC meeting in 
the Permanent Five capitals to ensure that the peace process build on the 
positive aspects of the Jakarta meeting, and that progress be made at the 
next Permanent Five meeting, lest the negative media coverage of the 
Jakarta meeting, and lack of progress at the Permanent Five Meeting lead to 
a strong public perception that the process was at a standstill.127 Their efforts 
were rewarded with the inclusion of the following paragraph in the 
communiqué of the meeting: 
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Although no text was formally adopted in Jakarta, the Five noted that in the 
course of the meeting, common understanding was reached among all 
concerned, notably the Cambodian parties, on the need for the United 
Nations to have an enhanced role in dealing with the various aspects of the 
Cambodian settlement process and for the establishment of a Supreme 
National Council. 128 
The Five agreed on principles guiding the organisation of the elections and 
on the role of the Supreme National Council, drawing in part on the 
Australian Red Book.129 They agreed that the UN should form a transitional 
authority for the settlement process, but the scope of its mandate was left 
undefined.130 The communiqué also mentioned that the Five consulted again 
with representatives of a number other countries also actively engaged in the 
search for a peaceful settlement in Cambodia, and they signaled their 
intention to maintain contact with the UN Secretary-General’s Task Force on 
Cambodia, and would continue their consultations with other interested 
parties. 
Despite their expressed intentions to continue their consultations with other 
interested parties, the Five began to close ranks at their fourth meeting in 
New York on 25 May when they focused on five preconditions for UN 
involvement in Cambodia (UN control over the ceasefire, end to foreign 
military aid, free and fair elections under UN auspices, respect for human 
rights and guarantees for Cambodian independence and unity), which they 
presented as a ‘take it or leave it’ statement of the minimum requirements for 
UN involvement.131  The growing Permanent Five consensus and authority in 
the negotiation process marked a change in opportunities for Australia (and 
Japan and other countries, such as Thailand) to influence the outcome of the 
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discussions. The Permanent Five began to construct a delicately balanced 
house of cards. It was clear they were wary of this collapsing through new 
ideas and new initiatives from any sources outside the Permanent Five 
consultations.132 Evans acknowledged later that:  
 Necessarily, our role during this period has been supportive and back-room 
in character, rather than politically centre-stage, but it has been no less 
substantial and constructive for that, and has been widely acknowledged as 
such.133  
He also asserted that Australia continued to exert an influence through the 
force of its ideas:  
Moreover, the concepts and suggestions in the Australian Working Papers 
began to permeate international thinking, and found expression in papers 
developed by the Permanent Five over the course of six major consultative 
meetings on Cambodia they held between January and August this year.134  
US Permanent Five negotiator Solomon put it another way: ‘As the 
Permanent Five consensus on a framework agreement grew, Evans’ effort 
naturally merged with it’.135  
Evans also took every opportunity in his media statements on the outcomes 
of the Permanent Five consultations to remind his domestic audience of the 
continued importance of the Australian contribution by stating that the 
relevant communiqué either ‘picks up the major theme of the Australian 
proposal and, although understandably unspecific, contains everything we 
could reasonably have hoped for at this stage’,136 or the communiqué agrees 
‘several key basic ideas put forward by Australia in the Red Book Working 
Papers’137 or, more generally, ‘it endorses a number of key Australian ideas’. 
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The real breakthrough in the P-5 negotiations in 1990 came after Baker’s 
shock announcement in Paris on 18 July that the US would withdraw its 
support for the resistance parties CGDK coalition to occupy Cambodia’s UN 
seat if the CGDK included members of the Khmer Rouge, and said that the 
US would open a dialogue with the Vietnamese Government to permit free 
elections in Cambodia and even establish contact with Hun Sen. The 
decision caused consternation among ASEAN countries, who had been the 
main backers of the resistance coalition, on the eve of their annual ministerial 
meeting in Jakarta,138 but according to the Far Eastern Economic Review:  
 Although the timing of this policy shift … makes it appear essentially a 
tactical ploy to head off a confrontation with the US Congress, it has set in 
motion a process that is likely to generate new momentum to solve the 
Cambodian problem and produce long-term consequences for US policy in 
Asia.139  
As Solomon stated at the next Permanent Five session in New York, the final 
elements of a settlement framework quickly fell into place.140  
On 28 August 1990, the Permanent Five publicly announced their agreement 
on a framework for an UN-centred, comprehensive, political settlement of the 
Cambodian conflict. The decision reflected newly-found compromise and 
collaboration in the United Nations Security Council following their decision 
earlier in the month to demand the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. 
The agreement comprised five sections which the Permanent Five members 
described as ‘the indispensible requirements’ for a peaceful settlement in 
Cambodia. These requirements covered transitional arrangements regarding 
the administration of Cambodia during a pre-election period (including the 
formation of a Supreme National Council); military arrangements during the 
transitional period; United Nations-supervised elections; human rights 
guarantees; and international guarantees regarding the neutrality of a 
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restructured Cambodia.141 The agreement still required acceptance by the 
four political factions in Cambodia. The Permanent Five urged them to 
accept the framework in its entirety as the basis for settling the Cambodian 
conflict and to meet to form the Supreme National Council, at the same time 
seeking maximum self-restraint in order to facilitate the achievement and 
implementation of the settlement.  
Australia’s reaction to the Five Power agreement was muted when compared 
with the fulsome responses of some other countries.142 Australia welcomed 
the document as a major contribution to the peace process143 (not ‘an historic 
event’, or a ‘major breakthrough’ or as the ‘first real step in the Cambodian 
peace process’ as reported in the US and French press)144 with Evans 
adding somewhat gratuitously: ‘While there were naturally areas where we 
wanted to see further elaboration, we considered it to represent a skillful and 
judicious balance of the various interests involved’.145  
The Permanent Five framework document required the endorsement of the 
Cambodian factions, who, at their meeting in Jakarta on 9-10 September, 
agreed the framework document in its entirety and also agreed the 
composition of the Supreme National Council. Evans chose to celebrate this 
event, rather than the Permanent Five agreement in August, as the 
significant milestone in 1990. He described the outcome of the Jakarta 
meeting as representing ‘an enormous breakthrough - unquestionably the 
most important breakthrough - in the whole grueling peace process to 
date’.146 In so doing, he used the occasion to pay tribute to Indonesia and 
Foreign Minister Alatas for their courage, determination and perseverance 
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against numerous setbacks over the past two years including unsuccessful 
meetings of one kind or another, particularly in Indonesia. In an obvious 
predilection towards regional solutions, as distinct from ‘major power’ 
solutions to regional problems, he said in his media statement: 
While long and difficult negotiations on matters of detail still lay ahead, he 
was confident that if the Cambodian parties and other participants continued 
to show the political will demonstrated at Jakarta, then a comprehensive 
settlement, which would end the human suffering of the Cambodian people 
once and for all, was now well and truly in sight by the end of the year.147 
While a number of important steps remained to tie down the Permanent Five 
framework agreement and the negotiation process would continue for 
another year, in Australian Labor Party historiography, ‘the deal was actually 
done in September 1990’.148 
Phase Four: The final stage of the negotiations 
The final phase of Australian involvement in the Cambodian peace 
negotiations - from acceptance of the Permanent Five Framework 
Agreement in September 1990 to the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 
September 1991 - was characterised by continued Australian activism but 
within narrower windows of opportunity, and diminishing returns. There were 
several reasons for this. First, as Solomon claimed, with the success in 
building the Framework Agreement, the Permanent Five had acquired a 
certain measure of paternity and vested interest in the UN settlement plan 
envisaged in the Agreement, which they were reluctant to see changed:  
The Perm Five effort had acquired a momentum and authority that proved 
difficult for governments with other ideas and other interests either to resist 
or to subvert. My instructions were to work along with these other interests 
but also to protect our investment in the advancing Security Council effort.149  
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Second, China, having agreed at the July 1990 Permanent Five meeting to 
cease arm shipments to the Khmer Rouge,150 took the firm position that the 
Permanent Five represented the will of the international community, and that 
all views had been taken into account in the drafting of the Permanent Five 
text, and as a result ‘not a word could be changed’.151 Third, there were 
grounds around the end of 1990 for fearing that the window of opportunity for 
a comprehensive settlement might start to close, since other issues such as 
the Gulf War were clamouring for attention of the Permanent Five and the 
UN Security Council, who along with other key players did not have infinite 
reservoirs of commitment or patience.152 In summary, it was not the time for 
new ideas or to suggest substantial changes to the text of the Framework 
Agreement. 
The United Nations Security Council endorsed the Permanent Five 
framework for a comprehensive settlement of the Cambodian conflict on 20 
September 1990 and encouraged the continuing efforts of the Permanent 
Five in this regard.153 The preamble to the decision also took note and 
showed appreciation for the efforts of the co-presidents of the Paris 
Conference on Cambodia, and those of the ASEAN nations and other 
countries involved in promoting the search for a comprehensive settlement, 
but did not specifically mention Australian efforts in these tributes. Berry 
claimed that France was unilaterally opposed to any reference to Australia’s 
role in the peace process in the resolution,154 and that the other members of 
the UNSC also did not seem to be in favour of including a reference to 
Australia, if this meant challenging France’s views as co-President.  
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Evans had wanted the UNSC decision to refer to military self-restraint and to 
a UN good offices role in this regard, but the Permanent Five considered that 
such a reference was untimely, preferring the resolution to limit itself to only 
those issues covered in the framework document.155 In a similar manner, the 
United Nations General Assembly, while noting the contributions of the 
Jakarta JIM meetings and the Paris Conference on Cambodia (but not those 
of any specific country), urged cooperation among the Cambodian leaders, 
and called on the co-presidents of the PICC to intensify their efforts and to 
draw up a detailed plan of implementation in accordance with the framework 
for a comprehensive political settlement.156  
Australia had greater success in having an input into the negotiation process 
at the Working Group meeting in Jakarta on 9-10 November, which met to 
continue the work begun by the Permanent Five in New York in October and, 
specifically, to prepare the body of a settlement agreement, based on the 
framework document. However, Australia’s involvement at the meeting had 
to overcome a major hurdle. According to Berry, France had argued against 
Australian participation in the Jakarta meeting at the New York meeting and 
this quickly became a threshold question which caused considerable angst 
for Australia.157 However, on this occasion, Britain and the United States 
supported Australia’s participation, and the question was resolved by 
including all the chairs of the PICC working groups. Australia had prepared a 
single negotiating text for the meeting. This was substantially drawn on at the 
meeting and eventually merged into a co-chairmen’s composite text. Berry 
commented from a DFAT international lawyer’s perspective: 
From a national point of view, there was also a degree of pleasure that the 
meeting resulted in widespread recognition of Australia’s work in preparing 
the SNT, and that much of it would be reflected in the final comprehensive 
settlement.158 
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According to Berry, the assessment of the outcome of the Jakarta meeting 
was very much in the eye of the beholder. Alatas called it a major 
breakthrough, while the media treated the meeting as a failure.159 The 
following week, the leader of the federal opposition in the Australian 
Parliament addressed a question without notice to the Prime Minister, 
drawing attention to the recent upsurge in military activity by the Khmer 
Rouge and claiming that the current peace plan failed to provide any 
guarantees that Pol Pot would not return to a position of power in Cambodia. 
This provoked Hawke, in his reply in the Australian Parliament, to make the 
following reputational claims for Australia in relation to the Cambodian peace 
settlement: 
The facts in regard to Cambodia and the position of this Government are 
such that I think even the Leader of the Opposition would by now understand 
that there is virtually a universal recognition that no government has done 
more to advance the cause of an equitable, sustainable, peaceful resolution 
of the tragedy in Cambodia than has the Australian Government. That is 
recognised in the United Nations: it is recognised supremely by the fact that 
the Permanent Five have embraced the book provided by the Australian 
Government as the very basis upon which the Permanent Five of the 
Security Council have advanced the cause of peaceful resolution in that 
country. 
 
The reputation of this country has been very substantially enhanced by the 
initiative led by Senator Evans, our Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
pursued at the level of officials by Mr. Michael Costello…Under the 
leadership of Evans and Costello, Australia has supremely taken the lead in 
providing for the United Nations, the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and all other interested groups the basis for providing 
peace in Cambodia. 
 
As recently as last weekend in Jakarta, in the most recent discussions on 
this issue, again, those involved in dealing with this issue returned to the 
Australian plan as the basis for the resolution of this crisis … 
 
The thinking and the formulation of Australia has been embraced by the 
Permanent Five, ASEAN and all those directly concerned because it is 
understood that the Australian plan is directed towards ensuring, as far as is 
humanly possible, that that sort of outcome [the return to power of the Khmer 
Rouge] does not eventuate. 
 
                                            
159 Ibid. 
154 
 
If there is one area in the conduct of foreign affairs in which Opposition 
members, in terms of their record, should be quiet, it is this area, because 
their record in regard to Indo China is one of abysmal failure, both in 
government and in opposition. They should be totally silent in this area. If 
they had any skerrick of decency and understood what the Permanent Five, 
ASEAN and the rest of the world understood, they should be sharing a 
sense of pride that it is this country which is leading the world on this issue, 
under the leadership of the Foreign Minister and through the work of the very 
efficient officials of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Instead of 
this irrelevant sniping, they should be sharing the sense of pride that it is 
Australia leading the world in trying to bring this tragedy to an end.160 
Hawke’s reply is quoted in some detail because it illustrates a number of 
salient aspects of international reputation, as viewed by the Australian 
Government, in relation to Australia’s involvement in the Cambodian peace 
settlement. Hawke’s statement addressed the question of ‘reputation for 
what?’ namely, the assertion that Australian had taken the lead in providing 
the basis for peace in Cambodia upon which the Permanent Five had 
advanced the cause of a peaceful resolution which excluded the return of the 
Khmer Rouge to a position of power in Cambodia. Hawke’s reply also 
addresses the question, ‘reputation with whom?’ He claimed that Australia 
had achieved ‘virtually a universal recognition’ for its role. He claimed there 
was specific recognition by the United Nations and, in particular, the 
Permanent Five, ASEAN and all those directly concerned that no 
government had done more to advance the cause of an equitable, 
sustainable, peaceful resolution of the tragedy in Cambodia than the 
Australian Government. In addition, Hawke’s response contrasted the Labor 
Government’s efforts to reach a settlement with the Opposition’s record on 
Indo-China, including responsibility for Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam 
War. In doing so, he demonstrated the importance of international reputation 
for domestic political rhetorical purposes. Finally, the Prime Minister linked 
reputation to ‘a sense of pride’ that Australia had been leading the world in 
trying to bring the Cambodian tragedy to an end.  
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One year on from Evans’ statement in Parliament on 24 November 1989, in 
which he launched Australia’s peace initiative, Evans made a major 
statement in Parliament reviewing progress. The statement served three 
purposes. First, ‘to put on record, so far as it is now possible, the full extent 
of Australia’s involvement in these diplomatic efforts’;161 second, to answer 
his critics that there was ‘something fundamentally flawed’ about the 
Australian peace plan in relation to the role envisaged for the Khmer Rouge 
in the settlement; and third, to caution that, while a workable, comprehensive 
settlement was closer than it had ever been, there were grounds for fearing 
that the window of opportunity may well start to close around the end of the 
year, since other issues such as the Gulf War were clamouring for attention 
of the Permanent Five.162  
Evans’ statement concluded with relatively modest reputational claims in 
relation to Australian leadership in diplomatic problem-solving of the 
Cambodian problem, Australia’s regional standing and the Labor 
Government’s foreign policy resolve: 
We are further reinforced in our commitment by the knowledge that 
Australia’s diplomatic contribution to the solution of this deep-seated and 
complex problem has been welcomed and encouraged by the key 
international players in the negotiating process and all Cambodian parties 
except the Khmer Rouge. Just as importantly, Indonesia and other regional 
partners have welcomed the contribution we have made towards resolving 
an issue which has obstructed the harmonious development of relations in 
our region for over a decade.  
Given all that has been achieved so far in the Cambodian peace process, 
and given the importance of the issues at stake - partly in terms of our own 
regional standing, but more importantly for the long-suffering Cambodian 
people - we do not intend to walk away from the effort to achieve a 
comprehensive settlement as long as there remains some reasonable 
prospect of success. While we may eventually have to consider other 
options if others allow the window of opportunity to once again slam shut, to 
do so now would be to demonstrate a lack of that nerve and stamina in 
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foreign policy which is increasingly necessary in the ever-more fluid and 
uncertain international environment we now face.163  
While Australia believed that by the end of 1990 all the necessary 
foundations had been laid, the process of bedding down the draft 
comprehensive agreement would take a further year. In the first six months 
of 1991, the process seemed likely to stall completely, accompanied by 
outbursts of low key fighting inside Cambodia during the dry season.164 With 
the world’s attention (and particularly the United Nations Security Council’s 
attention) focused on the Gulf War and, in the face of the Permanent Five’s 
determination to safeguard their carefully balanced agreement, Australian 
diplomatic efforts to improve settlement provisions struggled to attract 
attention. Australia became increasingly alienated from the Permanent Five 
negotiation settlement process.  
There was a perception in DFAT of an imbalance in the weight accorded to 
the competing interests of China on the one hand and Cambodia and 
Vietnam on the other, with Permanent Five texts in favour of the former. As a 
result, Australia submitted a number of suggested drafting changes to the 
comprehensive settlement produced after the Jakarta meeting, but these 
suggestions were virtually ignored and rejected on the grounds that they 
would involve an extensive rewrite of the existing documents.165 In January 
1991, Australia made representations in the PICC capitals, calling for an 
early resumption of the PICC process in an effort to countermand the 
Permanent Five’s influence and as a wider avenue for asserting Australian 
influence - in Berry’s words, by ‘playing the role of a gadfly’.166  
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On the crucial question of army demobilisation, Australia favoured some form 
of review mechanism for each phase. To leave out such a provision might 
imply that the United Nations could use force to implement a next phase over 
the objections of one or more faction. Australia used its standing as a 
potential UNTAC troop contributor, advocating a belief in the centrality of its 
role in the whole peace process, combined with a threat that it might not sign 
the eventual treaty. This was an outright attempt to influence others to follow 
suit, but on this issue it had to accept that the UN would have the final say in 
what was workable, and the UN remained convinced of the need for total 
demobilisation.167 Further, during this period, Australia, despite its claims to 
be impartial, appeared to tilt towards the Hun Sen and Vietnamese position 
(for example, on army demobilisation, weapons custody and direct 
references to genocide in the accords).168  
In June 1991, a rush of events injected immense new life into the settlement 
process.169 These events, over which Australia exerted no direct influence, 
included secret negotiations between China and Vietnam between June and 
September 1991, US - Vietnamese in-principle agreement on a ‘road map’ 
for normalisation of relations, Sihanouk’s decision to re-engage actively in 
the peace process, a rapprochement and a further round of Sihanouk-Hun 
Sen discussions, and a highly successful meeting of the Supreme National 
Council in Pattaya, Thailand, 24-26 June. The Council meeting brokered a 
series of agreements between the four Cambodian parties under the PICC 
co-president auspices.170 At this meeting, the Cambodian parties reiterated 
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director in the French ministry of foreign affairs, played a crucial role as ‘counsellor’ in the successful 
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their support for the Permanent Five framework and for the reconvening of 
the Paris Conference. Following a meeting between Sihanouk and Dumas in 
Paris on 9 September, the two agreed that, in view of the decisive progress 
that had been made over the past three months, the Paris Conference on 
Cambodia would be reconvened as soon as possible. The Ministerial 
meeting was held on 21-23 October 1991 and the Agreements on a 
Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict were signed 
at the final meeting, on 23 October 1991.  
At the final session of the resumed Paris Conference, Dumas, in his opening 
address,171 paid tribute to all the countries that had contributed to the 
success of the negotiations, which he described as a shared success (un 
succès partagé). He said Indonesia was the first country to recognise the 
importance of dialogue and had laid the foundations for future dialogue. 
France shared the same conviction and had joined Indonesia in its efforts, 
praising Alatas for his patience, courtesy, flexibility and reason. Other Asian 
countries had supported the negotiation process in their time (en leur temps). 
Thailand assured continuity of the dialogue and contributed by keeping world 
attention focused on the Cambodian drama. Japan provided similar support 
and furthermore had promised to participate actively in Cambodia’s 
reconstruction. Vietnam and China had shown willingness to compromise, 
and had played a positive role during the last stage of the negotiations. On 
Australia’s contribution, Dumas said: 
Indeed, no one will forget that the agreement which we are going to sign 
shortly owes much to the initiative which she was able to bring to bear at the 
moment when hope was weakening. It is thanks to this veritable second 
wind that the five members of the Security Council [sic] and the Secretary-
                                                                                                                           
negotiations between the Cambodian parties at Pattaya, which were conducted in French. ‘Un rôle 
substantiel pour la France’, Le Monde, 2 September 1991, p. 6. It was an opportunity for direct 
influence over the negotiations at a crucial stage, not available to Australia. 
171 ‘Conférence de Paris sur le Cambodge: Discours de M. Roland Dumas, ministre d’Etat, ministre 
des Affaires étrangères, Paris, 23 October 1991’, retrieved, 17 May 2010, 
<http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr>. 
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General of the United Nations were able to return to the task from a new 
starting point.172  
Turning to the UN, he said that the Permanent Five and the UN Secretary-
General in their turn worked relentlessly, bringing determination, imagination 
and patience to their task. Finally, Dumas praised the good will and spirit of 
the Cambodian leaders demonstrated in the previous few months, and 
especially the eminent role played by Prince Sihanouk. 
Co-President Alatas, while first of all paying tribute to the efforts of Indonesia 
and the ASEAN counties in his opening statement, noted that the 
Agreements 
…resulted from the combined initiatives, ideas and efforts contributed by 
many sides, both by the countries of Southeast Asia and the Asia Pacific 
region as well as by the five permanent members of the UN Security 
Council, who by their achievement of an agreed framework for a 
comprehensive settlement in August last year, provided a major 
breakthrough in the ongoing peace process. However, foremost tribute 
should rightly be paid to the Cambodian leaders themselves.173 
In its own official account of the negotiation process, the United Nations 
document that published the Accords also emphasised the notion of a 
‘shared success’. In relation to Australia’s contribution it noted: 
In the course of their deliberations, the Five considered an Australian 
proposal to enhance the role of the United Nations in the settlement process, 
and took account of the discussions among the Cambodian parties, including 
those at an Informal Meeting on Cambodia in Jakarta in February 1990, and, 
in June, at a meeting held in Tokyo. Throughout the process, the Five 
maintained regular contacts with the Secretary-General. They welcomed his 
decision to establish a Secretariat task force to facilitate contingency 
planning for an eventual United Nations operation in Cambodia.174  
In his statement at the Conference, Evans noted that ‘success has many 
fathers’. He highlighted the contributions of the ASEAN dialogues led by 
Indonesia, the driving force of the Permanent Five, the work of many other 
                                            
172 English translation of Dumas’ remarks in Berry, Cambodia: from red to blue, p. 203. 
173 Ali Alatas, A voice for a just peace: a collection of speeches by Ali Alatas, Jakarta, PT Gramedia 
Pustaka Utama, 2001, p. 296. 
174 United Nations, ‘Background note on the negotiation process’, Agreements on a comprehensive 
settlement of the Cambodia conflict, Paris 23 October 1991, United Nations, New York, p. v. 
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countries and the work of the Cambodian parties themselves before referring 
to Australia’s own contribution: 
So Australia is privileged and delighted to be here to sign these documents 
today, not least because their substance is very close to that which we first 
proposed in late 1989 and early 1990, and because we were able to play 
some useful part in the complex negotiating process.175  
In terms of Australia’s international obligations arising from the accords, 
Evans promised to provide ‘all the support and assistance we can’.176  
The metaphor of the ‘father’ of the accords gained some currency in relation 
to Australia’s role, especially after Cambodian leader Hun Sen stated during 
an official visit to Australia (26-31 October) immediately following the Paris 
Conference that: ‘Right now there are a lot of fathers. But let me tell you the 
real father is Gareth Evans’.177 
In Parliament, Hawke referred to Hun Sen’s ‘unqualified and richly deserved 
compliment’, congratulated Evans for his remarkable achievement, and 
stated (to the interjection of Opposition members) that: ‘His nomination for 
the Nobel Peace Prize is simply a fitting recognition of that achievement’.178 
The Australian press, too, were ecstatic about the outcome of the Paris 
Conference, and about Australia’s positive role in the peace process: 
The peace agreement signed in Paris would not have come about without 
the Australian initiative and the sustained diplomatic campaign Australia 
waged on its behalf. As such it is a unique episode in Australia’s diplomatic 
history.179 
However, in the context of the complex Cambodian peace process 
negotiations, the metaphor of ‘father’ is an imprecise and misleading one. 
French Foreign Minister Dumas, for example, when asked a question 
                                            
175 Evans, ‘Peace in Cambodia’. Address by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade on the signing 
of agreements on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian conflict, Paris, 23 October 
1991, The Monthly Record, October 1991, p. 631. 
176 Ibid., p. 633. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Hawke, ‘Questions without Notice ‐ Cambodia’, CPD, H of R, vol. 180, 5 November 1991, p. 2279. 
179 G Sheridan, ‘Midwife to a fragile Cambodian peace’, The Australian, 30 October 1991, p. 13. 
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whether he acknowledged the Paris accords as his own child, replied: ‘It 
would be an exaggeration to say that, or rather I should say, it would be 
necessary to have a paternity test’.180 
In the same interview, Dumas described his own role as a cheville 
ouvrière,181 literally the pole bolt of a coach, but figuratively the king pin or 
lynch pin which was indispensible for the whole operation. More 
fundamentally, by convening the PICC, France had invested considerable 
prestige in the PICC process and its own role in that process. Dumas later 
described his involvement in the negotiations of the Cambodian peace 
settlement of his most important diplomatic success as Foreign Minister, 
since, in his words, he had started from scratch and had brought the 
negotiations to a successful conclusion.182 Dumas was the first Foreign 
Minister to be invited by Sihanouk to visit Cambodia after the Paris 
agreements (in his role as co-president of the PICC), where, in Phnom Penh, 
Sihanouk thanked France for bringing peace to Cambodia and told Dumas: 
‘You are my President’.183 Thus, from the Cambodian leaders’ points of view, 
while Hun Sen praised Australia and Evans for being the ‘father’ of the 
Cambodian settlements, Sihanouk thanked France and Dumas in similar 
vein. Even on the question of allocating praise then, the Cambodian leaders 
could not agree among themselves. 
Summary  
From 1983-1989, Australian initiatives aimed at promoting dialogue on 
Cambodia were an essential element of the Hawke Labor Government’s 
                                            
180 ‘Interview accordée par M. Roland Dumas, Ministre des Affaires étrangères à France Inter, Paris, 
25 October 1991’, retrieved 17 May 2010, < http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr>.  
181 Ibid. 
182 ‘Par exemple, ma plus grande réussite diplomatique a été la Conférence de Paris sur le Cambodge 
parce que je I’ai prise de zéro et I’ai amené à la réussite’. Interview de Roland Dumas par Sylvie 
Audibert, June 2008, retrieved 15 February 2010, < http://www.lsefrance.org/index.php 
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183 J MacCartney, ‘Prince Sihanouk thanks France for Cambodia peace role’, Reuters News, 22 
November 1991, retrieved 22 September 2009, 
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policy to promote Australia’s relations with the region. In pursuit of this 
objective, Australia sought to gain a reputation, and be accepted in the 
region, as a concerned partner with a role to play in the search for a 
settlement of the Cambodian conflict. The experience of the Hayden years 
1983-1988, supports Tomz’s contention that the reputations of new players 
on the scene initially have to undergo a ‘seasoning process’, and new 
reputations take many years to build. An essential element in the building of 
an Australian reputation as a concerned partner was the changing nature of 
regional views about Australia’s disposition to be an accepted participant in 
the peace process. Australian commitment to the peace process over a long 
period of time, despite setbacks, and Australian support to the countries 
involved in the conflict, directly and indirectly, though humanitarian aid and 
refugee aid and resettlement, were important elements in forming regional 
views about Australia’s growing reputation in the region with regard to the 
Cambodian conflict. 
Australia’s locus standi on Cambodia, internationally, was put to the test in 
1989 when France, as host of the first Paris Conference on Cambodia, in 
consultation with Indonesia, Prince Sihanouk, Hun Sen and others, drew up 
a short-list for countries to be invited to the conference: in this case, 
Australia’s reputation as a recipient country for Indo-Chinese refugees and its 
possible role in rehabilitation after the end of the conflict appears to have 
weighed more heavily in the minds of its hosts than its previous mediation 
activities in relation to Cambodia. 
Evans’ Cambodia peace initiative was one of the most ambitious, risky, multi-
faceted, complex, intricate and demanding diplomatic endeavours ever 
undertaken by Australia. Australia contributed ideas, concepts, a map and 
detailed planning suggestions, draft negotiating texts and diplomatic 
expertise and drive in getting its United Nations peace plan proposal on the 
international agenda. Australia’s initiative was acknowledged by other 
participants in the Paris International Conference on Cambodia group as 
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having provided a second breath to the peace process when other efforts 
were flagging, and providing the basis for breaking the logjam in the peace 
process. 
After the failure of the Jakarta meeting in February 1990, which provided the 
first opportunity to road test the ideas and concepts in the Australian ‘Red 
Book’ and develop a regional solution to the problem, the Permanent Five 
members of the United Nations Security Council assumed carriage of the 
negotiations. Australia continued to plug away as an objective generator of 
ideas and detailed proposals and a facilitator of dialogue, based on its belief 
in Australia’s central role in the peace process, its access to all the parties 
and its even-handedness, but with diminishing returns as the Permanent Five 
became resistant to new ideas which could subvert the process or upset the 
delicate balance of interests achieved in their negotiations. During this 
period, Australia achieved a reputation as a ‘gadfly’ or one of a number of 
‘cats which needed to be herded’184 in order to keep the P5 process on track. 
Hawke claimed in 1990 that no government had done more than the 
Australian Government to advance the cause of an equitable, sustainable, 
peaceful resolution of the tragedy in Cambodia. Australia’s international 
reputation had, as a result, been enhanced and this was a source of national 
pride. This claim underlines the inter-relationship between international 
standing, reputation, esteem and national pride; and in this sense, Hawke 
also suggests that reputations do matter. 
However, the general consensus at the resumed Paris Conference in 1991 
was that the Paris accords were a ‘shared success’ to which many other 
countries, in their own way and in their own time, also contributed. While a 
decreased involvement of major powers in the region had been a key initial 
Australian foreign policy goal, this was an issue which was resolved among 
the major powers themselves, with the US taking a leading role. The process 
                                            
184 Solomon, Exiting Indochina, pp. 49‐57. 
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involved secret negotiations between China and Vietnam in 1991 and 
bilateral negotiations between the US and Vietnam in the context of 
normalising their relations. At the local level of the Cambodian political 
parties, the major breakthroughs in 1987, 1989 and 1991 came largely 
through face-to-face dialogues and understandings between Prince Sihanouk 
and Hun Sen, which France, Thailand, and Japan did more to foster than 
Australia. This is an aspect of the peace negotiations that is not 
comprehensively covered in the literature on the Paris Peace Conference 
negotiations, but was important for their eventual outcome, as Hun Sen said 
in an interview with Le Monde in November 1991, after the signing of the 
Paris accords: 
Since our first meeting in 1987, we established personal ties of trust even if 
we did not achieve a lot at the time. The situation came to maturity in June 
1991. Our mutual understanding, since that date, has been the catalyst and 
the dynamic for all of the solutions. Without that understanding, nothing 
would have been realised.185  
DFAT professionalism and performance, which Evans claimed had been a 
feature of the Australian initiative, were also a feature of other major 
Australian initiatives at the time, such as on Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC), Antarctica, chemical weapons and the Cairns Group 
and helped to get them launched, with the result that, as Evans claimed in 
1990, ‘today Australia cuts quite a significant and respected figure on the 
international, and especially the Asia Pacific, regional stage’.186  
 
                                            
185 J C Pomonti, ‘Un entretien avec le premier ministre cambodgien’, Le Monde, 20 November, 1991, 
p. 8. ‘Depuis notre première rencontre en 1987, nous avons établi des liens personnels de confiance, 
même si nous n’avons pas réalisé grand‐chose à l’époche. La situation est venue à maturité en juin 
1991. Notre compréhension mutuelle a été, depuis cette date, le catalyseur, la dynamique de toutes 
les solutions. Sans cette compréhension, rien n’auriat pu se réaliser’. Author’s translation. 
186 Evans, ‘Address to the Sydney Institute, 13 March 1990’, p. 148. 
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CHAPTER 4.  CASE STUDY: AUSTRALIA AND THE FOUNDATION 
OF THE ASIA­PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION FORUM (APEC) 
Introduction 
 Australia’s diplomacy in relation to the formation of APEC has been billed as 
Australia’s most important foreign policy victory for over a decade.1 The case 
study provides an opportunity to examine Australian foreign policy leadership 
in building and participating in new regional architecture and in response to 
an economic threat (and opportunity) associated with the economic 
ascendency of regional economies, which threatened to lock Australia out of 
its markets. According to Walker, ‘fear of military vulnerability had been 
replaced by our economic vulnerability’.2 Australia’s APEC initiative and the 
flanking policy of ‘enmeshment’ in Asia built on earlier successes of 
engagement with Asia, including in particular, the Colombo Plan. The case 
study covers the period from the Australian proposal and its establishment in 
1989 to the second APEC leaders’ meeting in Bogor, Indonesia in 1994 (by 
which time the leaders’ meetings could be said to have become 
institutionalised).  
This case study focuses on the roles played by Prime Ministers Hawke and 
Keating. Hawke and Keating were, respectively, the driving forces behind the 
launch of the APEC idea in 1989 and the suggestion and lobbying for the 
APEC leaders’ summits. As the Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans 
acknowledged:  
In recent times, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation proposal and the 
campaign to ban mining and oil drilling in Antarctica are two important and 
high-profile examples of foreign policy initiatives in which the Prime Minister 
was unequivocally the prime mover, with the portfolio Ministers playing a 
subsequent implementation role.3  
                                            
1 Sydney Morning Herald, quoted in R Woolcott, The hot seat, p. 241. 
2 D Walker, ‘Australia as Asia’ in W Hudson & G Bolton (eds), Creating Australia: changing Australian 
history, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1997, pp. 131‐141, p. 135. 
3 Evans & Grant, Australia’s foreign relations: in the world of the 1990s, p. 47. 
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The focus on national leaders, rather than primarily on foreign ministers and 
their departments in the formulation of foreign policy, also draws attention to 
the importance of summitry (i.e., the APEC leaders’ meetings) in the 
development of APEC. However, summit meetings, as Reynolds points out, 
have their own dynamics, promoted by the epic nature of these meetings.4 
As the case study shows, summits can play an important role in helping to 
define identity for the region and its participants (including Australia) and in 
contributing to both symbolic as well as substantive outcomes for regional 
institutional development. They also present reputational advantages and 
dangers for summiteers. 
Former Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Secretary 
Richard Woolcott described the Australian contribution to the creation of 
APEC as its most important foreign policy initiative since the Colombo Plan 
and the ANZUS Treaty were developed in the 1950s.5 In this context, APEC, 
at Australia’s instigation, was to become the pre-eminent economic forum in 
our region, enhancing Australia’s standing and influence.6  
The Hawke initiative 
The call for a regional approach 
The literature on Asia-Pacific regional institution building and the formation of 
APEC gives credit to Hawke for his leadership in calling, in 1989, for regional 
co-operation when the time was ripe for such a regional initiative. In his 
speech to Korean business associations in Seoul on 31 January 1989, 
Hawke stated: 
                                            
4 D Reynolds, Summits, p. 5‐6.  
5 R Woolcott, The hot seat, p. 234. 
6 Ibid., p. 242. 
167 
 
I believe the time has come for us substantially to increase our efforts 
towards building regional co-operation and seriously to investigate what 
areas it might focus on and what forms it might take.7  
He added: 
What we are seeking to develop is a capacity for analysis and consultation 
on economic and social issues, not as an academic exercise but to help 
inform policy development by our respective governments.8 
 
Hawke said that he saw merit in the OECD model (albeit provided in a 
different context) and foreshadowed a regional Ministerial meeting by the end 
of the year to investigate this question.  
Ideas of regional co-operation, such as those promulgated within the Pacific 
Economic Co-operation Conference (PECC) network, or proposed by former 
Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone, former US Secretary of State George 
Shultz and US Senator Bill Bradley, had been circulating for some time 
before Hawke’s proposal, leading to a growing consensus in late 1988 and 
early 1989 that institutionalising regional economic co-operation at the inter-
governmental level was ‘an idea whose time had come’. However, the idea 
required regional leadership of some stature and drive to pick up the ball and 
run with it. In the context of other contemporary ideas about Asia-Pacific 
regional co-operation, Australian academic and former head of the Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs Stuart Harris summed up the significance of 
the Hawke contribution in the following way: 
Ultimately, Hawke’s ‘initiative’ in respect of APEC was not of an institutional 
development, moving beyond existing processes …It was a political question 
of judging the feasibility, including timing, in the light of regional caution, and 
moving forward on that. That was the Hawke contribution.9  
Japanese journalist Funabashi added: 
                                            
7 B Hawke, Speech by the Prime Minister, Luncheon of Korean Business Associations, ‘Regional Co‐
operation: Challenges for Korea and Australia’, Korea, 31 January 1989, reprinted as ‘Challenges for 
Korea and Australia’ in The Monthly Record, vol. 60, no. 1, January 1989, pp. 5‐7, p. 6. 
8 Ibid. 
9 S Harris, ‘Ellis Krauss on APEC origins’, Pacific Review, vol. 13, no. 3, 2000, pp. 521‐523, p. 523. 
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Yet it is no secret that Hawke was the father of APEC. If the most critical 
element of politics is a sense of timing, Hawke obviously had it. When he 
proposed APEC in 1989, the region was primed.10  
In 2000, ten years after APEC’s establishment, Krauss11 challenged the 
‘inherited view’ or ‘mythologised historical view’ on APEC’s formation and the 
centrality of Australia’s role.12 In the mythologised account, Hawke took the 
initiative in Seoul in 1989, calling for a forum to discuss furthering regional 
co-operation, after which Australian garnered support for the initiative 
through high-level diplomacy. This led to Australia hosting the inaugural 
APEC ministerial meeting later in the same year in Canberra. Krauss 
acknowledges Australia’s essential leadership in the foundation process, but 
drawing on his own research and that of Funabashi13 and Terada,14 argues 
that Japan played a much more central role in the foundation of APEC than 
previously acknowledged. He also gives credit to positive US thinking at the 
time about the importance of regional institutional building in the Asia-Pacific 
region.  
In support for their claims for greater recognition for Japan’s pivotal role in 
the formation of APEC, Krauss, Funabashi and Terada submit as evidence 
an internal study conducted by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI) in 1988 - a year before Hawke’s announcement - which 
Prime Minister Takeshita had commissioned following his visit to Washington 
earlier in the year. The MITI report, according to Krauss, ‘envisions APEC in 
the form it eventually developed: an open, regional forum of economies with 
                                            
10 Y Funabashi, Asia Pacific fusion: Japan’s role in APEC, Institute for International Economics, 
Washington DC, 1995, p. 48. 
11 ES Krauss, ‘Japan, the US, and the emergence of multilateralism in Asia’, Pacific Review, vol. 13, no. 
3, 2000, pp. 473‐494. 
12 For example: ‘When the United States to some extent dropped the ball on regional leadership as 
the Cold War was ending Australia produced the blueprint for and founded the Asia Pacific Economic 
Co‐operation (APEC) forum’. G Sheridan, Tigers: leaders of the new Asia‐Pacific, Allen & Unwin, St. 
Leonards, 1997, p. xvi‐xvii. 
13 Funabashi, Asia Pacific fusion. 
14 For example: T Terada, ‘The genesis of APEC: Australia‐Japan political initiatives’, Australia‐Pacific 
Economic Paper, Japan Research Centre, The Australian National University, Canberra, 2004, 
retrieved via Demetrius at the Australian National University, 8 July 2010, 
<http://hdl.handle.net/1885/40456> . 
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government participation cooperating to achieve more integrated and 
balanced growth with a gradualist and consensual approach respectful of the 
region’s diversity’.15  
The report was sent to MITI’s counterparts in twelve countries, including 
Australia, which expressed an interest; and its ideas were advanced in 
official contacts between the two countries and other Asian nations. 
However, as Harris comments, it was not clear at the time that the MITI 
report envisioned APEC in the form it developed, and the issue was clouded 
by bureaucratic rivalry between MITI and the Gaimusho, the Japanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which presented problems for the Australian 
Government in knowing what Japan was proposing officially.16  
Nevertheless, Japan tried to interest Australia in taking the lead on the 
promotion of regional co-operation. MITI Vice-Minister for International Affairs 
Muraoka reportedly told Australian Special Minister for Trade Negotiations 
Duffy in Montreal in December 1988 that Japan was interested in a regional 
initiative and was even willing to give Australia full credit for the initiative.17 In 
his Seoul speech, Hawke mentioned that senior Australian Ministers had had 
‘constructive talks’ on the issue of regional co-operation with the Japanese 
leadership earlier in the week. He also mentioned that Japan and Australia 
had undertaken a joint study of the potential regional impact of the 1992 
integration of Europe and the recent North American Free Trade Agreement, 
and that he would be discussing with Japanese Prime Minister Takeshita 
how best to familiarise other countries in the region with its findings. 
However, no causal link has been established yet between the MITI study, 
Japanese approaches to Australian Ministers, bilateral ministerial 
discussions between Japan and Australia on regional issues, and the form of 
Hawke’s announcement in Seoul. Indeed, Hawke’s staffers closely involved 
                                            
15 Krauss, ‘Japan, the US, and the emergence of multilateralism in Asia’, p. 477. 
16 Harris, ‘Ellis Krauss on APEC origins’, p. 522. 
17 Terada, ‘The genesis of APEC’, p. 17.  
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in the drafting of Hawke’s speech firmly denied that the plan was given to 
Australia by Japanese bureaucrats.18  
In one sense, Australia assumed leadership of the push for greater regional 
co-operation in 1989 by default. Japan, which had been active in promoting 
the idea, was reluctant to take the lead. The Gaimusho feared that Japanese 
activism on regional collaboration (given the legacy of Japanese wartime 
involvement in Asia) would damage Japan’s image in the region. This issue 
became even more of a restraining factor following the death of Emperor 
Hirohito in January 1989 and the ensuing controversy over his war role. In 
relation to Japan’s support for Australia’s own leadership role in regional co-
operation building, Japan did not consider Australia as a threat. It considered 
that Australia was, like Japan, a principal industrialised democracy in the 
Asia-Pacific region that had worked closely with Japan on regional economic 
matters. However, Japan noted that Australia was interested in broadening 
its ties with the Asia-Pacific region.19 Australia’s international standing and 
reputation as an informed and constructive dialogue partner on regional 
economic matters, as perceived by Japan, were therefore important 
considerations underlying Japanese support for Australia taking the initiative.  
Hawke, as Strauss pointed out, ‘had his own motivations, views and goals for 
pushing a regional forum in 1989’.20 In his memoirs, Hawke described his 
initiative on APEC as being of the same conceptual thrust as the Australian 
initiative in 1986 that to convene the Cairns Group of free traders in 
agriculture. The Cairns Group aimed at bringing, ’by force of argument and 
coalition building’, a more open multilateral trading environment21 and 
brought together two of Hawke’s fundamental and inter-related themes of a 
free international trading environment and Australia’s greater enmeshment 
                                            
18 G Sheridan, ‘How Hawke’s idea took off, Weekend Australian, 6‐7 January 1994, Focus, pp. 17‐18. 
19 Funabashi, Asia Pacific fusion, particularly p. 66.   
20 Krauss, ‘Japan, the US, and the emergence of multilateralism in Asia’, p. 479. 
21 B Hawke, The Hawke memoirs, Port Melbourne, Mandarin, 1996, p. 233. 
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with the region.22 Hawke also stated in his memoirs that his Government, 
from 1983 onwards, was guided by a perception of Australia’s place in the 
world and its capacity to secure its national interest objectives, which later 
was formulated in Garnaut’s Australia and the North East Asian ascendancy: 
As a nation of substantial but limited weight, we have relevance to 
international discussions affecting our future, but not the capacity to secure 
objectives through the exercise of national power. As a ‘middle power’ we 
must rely on persuading other countries, and influential groups within these 
countries, that it is in their own interest to move in directions that are 
consistent with our own interests.23 
However, Hawke’s speech writer Mills claimed that Hawke had a starker view 
of Australia’s place in the world than is encapsulated in the reference to 
Australia as ‘a nation of substantial but limited weight’ and as a ‘middle 
power’: 
In pursuing these priorities, Hawke had a realistic sense of what Australia, 
and the Australian Prime Minister, could actually get done. He harked back 
repeatedly to ‘the basic fact’: Australia’s population of 17 million in a world of 
5.5 billion. That expressed for Hawke the constraints on Australia’s political 
and economic influence in the world. But from that starting point, Hawke 
pushed Australia’s influence as far as he could.24 
Enmeshment, in Hawke’s view, required a new mind set and radical change 
in Australian attitudes, and was intractably linked with ideas about Australia’s 
future status, esteem, and place in the world. 
Enmeshment with Asia was not just words. It was a whole new mind set, a 
different way of thinking about the region and about ourselves. Enmeshment 
meant change, radical change. It was a case of change or be left behind, 
with our living standards declining, our economy and way of life stagnant, 
our citizens envious and, in the long term, left to become the poor white 
trash of Asia.25  
Through ‘enmeshment’, as Hawke explained to delegates at the first APEC 
ministerial meeting held in Canberra in November 1989, Australia was 
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seeking to cast off one reputation – for economic and cultural insularity - for 
an alternative one, which was in the process of being developed through his 
Government’s policy of ‘enmeshment’ with the region: 
With our historical roots in Europe, and our reputation - let me concede it 
was sometimes in decades past a well-earned reputation - for economic and 
cultural insularity, Australia has not been seen by some in the region as an 
integral part of the region. Indeed sometimes Australians haven't seen 
themselves in that light either. 
 
But those days are gone - gone forever. Increasingly our domestic attitudes - 
and certainly, at the level of my Government, our domestic and foreign policy 
making - recognise the truth that our future is thoroughly interwoven with that 
of the Asia Pacific region.26 
 
In the 1980s’ North-East Asia (comprising, for the purposes of this study, 
Japan, China - including Taiwan and Hong Kong - and South Korea) 
emerged as one of the three main centres of world production, trade and 
savings. Australia’s proximity to the region and the complementarities of the 
Australian economy with the North-East Asian economies in terms of trade in 
goods and services and capital required for Australian investment offered a 
means of moderating Australia’s sense of isolation. As Garnaut, the author of 
a 1989 report to the Prime Minister on Australia and North-East Asia, stated: 
The emergence of East Asia as a major centre of world economic activity 
has greatly moderated Australia’s relative isolation, which had been an 
enduring feature of earlier Australian development. This moderation 
continues as the economic dynamism of North-East Asia induces 
accelerated growth in Australia’s immediate neighbourhood, South-East 
Asia.27  
However, Garnaut nominated Australian protectionism as the main 
reputational baggage for developing Australian economic relations with the 
region: 
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For the first seven decades of the Federation a fearful, defensive Australia 
built walls to protect itself against the challenge of the outside world and 
found that it had protected itself against the recognition and utilisation of 
opportunity. The tide has turned through the 1980s, although we carry still 
most of the dead weight of a protectionist past.28  
Garnaut’s view resonated in Australia’s region. In a joint interview with Bob 
Hawke for the Singapore Broadcasting Corporation in 1987, Singapore Prime 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew stated: 
But to play your part in Asia, in the Pacific, you have got to be part of the 
economic mainstream. You can’t have protective walls.29 
 
In 1988, eight of Australia’s top ten export markets were in the Asia-Pacific 
region, thus illustrating Australia’s interdependence with the region. However, 
Australia’s share of North-East Asian trade had been declining, more or less 
in line with the decline in its share of world trade,30 and there was no 
inevitability of Australian success in its future economic relations with the 
region. Australia’s future success, according to Garnaut, depended on it 
accelerating the progress that had already been achieved by the government 
in domestic economic reform in order to build a ‘flexible, internationally-
orientated economy that is capable of grasping the opportunities that will 
emerge in the decades ahead’.31 He added:  
Of greatest direct relevance are the needs to press ahead with trade 
liberalisation, towards the abolition of all official restrictions in trade imposed 
at Australia’s borders by the end of the century; to maintain a strong 
economic orientation in a non-discriminatory immigration program on the 
current scale; and to continue with liberal, non-discriminatory policies on 
direct foreign investment.32  
More generally, Garnaut reported that Australia’s central economic interests 
in relation to North-East Asia lay in the continuation of internationally-
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orientated growth in the area; in the maintenance of non-discriminatory 
access to trading opportunities that emerge from that growth; and that this 
should be the focus of Australia’s economic diplomacy in relation to the 
region.  
In Hawke’s speech in Seoul, and in his subsequent speech to combined 
business committees in Bangkok three days later,33 international trade 
problems were uppermost in his mind. In Seoul, Hawke drew attention to the 
serious cracks that were beginning to appear in the international trading 
system as a result of bilateral trade pressures, associated with significant 
trade imbalances between a number of regional countries and the United 
States (e.g., Japan),34 the formation of bilateral or regional trading 
arrangements (e.g., the recent US/Canada Free Trade Agreement, the 
anticipated establishment of a European single market in 1992) and 
fundamental tensions within the GATT international trading system which 
were reflected in the impasse at the recent GATT interim review meeting in 
Montreal over trade in agriculture and services. Hawke called on regional 
economies to liberalise their own markets and investigate the scope for 
further dismantling trade barriers in the region, and to work together to save 
the GATT system warning that, if the current Uruguay round of discussions 
failed, the underlining tensions could corrode the open and non-
discriminatory international trading system that it represented. As a sign of 
the urgency with which he viewed regional and international trade concerns 
and the implications for Australia, his speech is peppered with phrases 
implying responsibility and obligation, for example:  
We must work together to save the GATT system. The region’s role will be 
critical given its strong growth, reliance on trade and growing world 
importance and responsibility.  
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and 
Equally we believe the newly industrialising countries have a responsibility to 
liberalise their own markets to reflect their phenomenal growth in trade and 
investment.35 
In calling on all regional countries to recognise their responsibilities to 
liberalise their own markets, to support the GATT system, and to identify 
common broad economic interests for possible policy coordination, Hawke 
acknowledged that Australia’s credibility, and hence reputation in the region 
as a free-trader and a liberalised economy was crucial. In his memoirs, he 
wrote that he was able to call for joint action in his address in Korea from a 
position of strength since, as he told the meeting: 
In Australia, we have implemented a range of reforms to liberalise our 
economy. We are intent on continuing this process and the reforms to date 
are already providing new opportunities for countries such as Korea.  
We have floated the Australian dollar, deregulated our financial markets, 
liberalised our foreign investment policy, cut the rate of company taxation, 
reduced by a third the level of tariff protection afforded to Australian 
manufacturing industry, and made our primary industries more responsive to 
changes in the international market place.36  
During his visit to Asia in January – February 1989, Hawke took every 
opportunity to explore Australian trade and investment opportunities in the 
countries he visited. He emphasised the commercial opportunities offered by 
an increasingly ‘diversified, productive, efficient and competitive Australia’ 
and through its growing enmeshment in the region. However, Australia’s 
growing standing (both in the region and outside) as a ‘well-regarded 
competitor’37 encompassed many individual reputations. During the visit, 
Hawke stressed Australia’s acknowledged reputation as a reliable and 
competitive supplier of raw materials, its growing expertise in 
communications and the reputation for excellence it was developing in such 
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areas as the building of roads and ports and in power-generation schemes.38 
For example, Australia’s involvement in the design and construction of a 
bridge across the Mekong River, linking Thailand and Laos, would bring the 
benefits of economic development, but also substantially lift Australia’s profile 
in the region.  
However, in 1989, Australia’s export performance came under a sustained 
attack in the Australian financial press for failing to grasp opportunities in the 
region, for lagging behind the rest of the world in not increasing its ratio of 
exports to GNP, for lacking an export culture, for not appreciating the Asian 
way of doing business, for devoting only a small proportion of overseas 
investment in Asia and even then limiting these investments to countries 
where English was the language of business.39 Dramatic changes in 
Australian business attitudes and behaviour would be required to take full 
advantage of the Hawke Government’s foreign and economic policy of 
enmeshment.  
Implementation of the Hawke initiative 
Woolcott claimed that the first APEC ministerial meeting in Canberra in 
November 1989 was ‘a foreign and trade policy achievement for Australia of 
great potential importance’ and that: 
 How this happened, how the raw concept advanced by Bob Hawke in 
January 1989 was developed into the first APEC Ministerial Meeting only 
nine months later, is a piece of recent Australian diplomatic history that is 
likely to be of interest to students of the processes by which a policy idea 
can, as Lee Kuan Yew put it, be brought to fruition.40  
However, while acknowledging Woolcott’s own central role in bringing the 
original Hawke idea into fruition, this case study views his role within the 
context of the roles played by various other actors, and focuses on those 
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aspects of international standing and reputation that were important in 
achieving the result. These actors and their roles are discussed in the order 
that they appeared on the scene. 
Bob Hawke 
Hawke’s reference in his Seoul speech to the desirability of the region 
furthering the idea of regional cooperation through the establishment of an 
OECD-type regional body received prominent coverage in the Australian and 
regional press41 but caused a great deal of consternation in the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade.42 In Bangkok, three days later, in his speech to 
combined business committees, Hawke repeated his suggestion that the 
region look closely at the OECD model.43 He raised the OECD idea later in 
the month, in a satellite television appearance at the PacRim ’89 conference 
in Hong Kong, where his initiative was well received by the Asian delegates, 
particularly the South Korean and Thai business discussion leaders, who 
said they shared Hawke’s call for a Pacific Rim economic grouping and 
welcomed Australian leadership on the matter.44  
In his message to the conference, Hawke restated his belief that ‘some sort 
of consultative mechanism on the OECD model’ would bring both internal 
benefits for the countries involved and for the region as a whole if it entailed 
greater flows of information on directions in member countries; would allow 
for better policy making in the individual countries; and maximise 
opportunities for the region as a whole. However, while Hawke seemed to be 
clear in his own mind of the benefits of an OECD-type model, the initial 
response from the Australian bureaucracy, according to Mills, was 
characterised by ‘foot dragging’, ‘hand wringing’ and ‘head shaking’ that was 
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‘a marvel to see’.45 According to Mills, there was deep unease in the DFAT 
bureaucracy about Hawke even mentioning an ‘Asian OECD’, spanning large 
countries like Japan and Pacific micro-states like Tuvalu, and about Hawke 
seeking to force the pace.46  
Eventually, the OECD idea was subsumed on the agenda for a regional 
ministerial meeting, and OECD-style economic cooperation became one of 
the three bands or streams of APEC activity agreed at the meeting. Hawke 
did not mention his preference for an OECD model in his address to 
delegates at the first ministerial meeting in November, and in deference to 
the ASEAN position, said that he did not wish to see the meeting result in the 
creation of a ‘vast, expensive or cumbersome bureaucracy’, or the 
duplication of existing organisations such as ASEAN. Instead, he expressed 
a preference for a ‘small, high-calibre group of officials, seconded from our 
governments’ to prepare the groundwork for forthcoming meetings and follow 
up on issues, which would also draw on available analytical resources in the 
region. 
The way heads of government view each other is considered to be an 
important element in nation state relations.47 Hawke placed importance on 
personal relations at the head of government / head of state level in 
international relations.48 He wrote in his memoirs that he had discussed his 
ideas on APEC with President Roh Tae Woo the day before his speech in 
Seoul and received enthusiastic support from him. Accordingly, he believed 
that he could speak with more confidence when announcing his proposal the 
following day. The importance of good personal relations and, in particular, 
the reputational attributes of friendship and trust, is evident in the following 
passage in his memoirs about his relationship with Roh: 
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Roh gave immediate and effusive support to APEC, going out of his way to 
make it clear that he wanted to be seen to be identified with it. The fact that I 
had warm and friendly relations with President Roh was significant. We liked 
and trusted one another. .. When I outlined the APEC concept to Roh it was 
to a man who was prepared out of friendship and trust to discuss seriously 
any proposal I raised with him. It was yet another example of the importance 
of personal relations in the conduct of international affairs.49  
Mills commented that Hawke’s diplomacy was essentially personal 
diplomacy. He elaborated on this by saying that Hawke ‘was after leaders 
who mattered in countries that mattered’, and that ‘he worked hard to grab 
their attention and win their trust’.50 Further, he had the knack of reading the 
people he was dealing with, and this skill became central to his style 
abroad.51 Financial Review journalist Kitney, who travelled with Hawke on his 
Asian trip, commented that it was clear from observing Hawke in the 
company of the political leaders in the four countries he visited that he had 
developed a real passion for international affairs and a conviction that he 
could play a significant role as one of the longer standing leaders, who had 
developed excellent personal relations with most of the key players on the 
global stage. Kitney added that:  
 You get the feeling that Mr. Hawke sees himself as an emerging statesman 
who can have influence beyond that which a leader of a middle ranking 
power like Australia would normally have.52  
Kitney implied that ‘statesmanship’ was an important source of influence 
impacting on a country’s international standing and reputation. 
On his return to Canberra, Hawke wrote personally to each of the regional 
heads of government outlining his ideas and seeking their reactions. He also 
announced the appointment of Woolcott, Secretary of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade and a former Ambassador to Indonesia and the 
Philippines and High Commissioner to Singapore and Malaysia, as his 
personal envoy to visit each of the likely participants to win support at the 
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highest levels for the APEC concept.53 South Korea, Singapore and 
Thailand, countries with whose leaders Hawke had established good 
personal relations and/or had discussed his idea, were the most enthusiastic 
and prompt in their responses.54 However, at the other end of the scale, New 
Zealand, Indonesia and Malaysia, countries with whose leaders Hawke had 
no great personal rapport, were either slow to react or cautious, indicating 
the limitations in relying on personal relations at the head of government 
level alone for influence in the conduct of international relations. The New 
Zealand Government had been ‘miffed’ that a proposal of such far-reaching 
implications for it and the region and for New Zealand’s relations with 
Australia had been announced without any prior consultations with them, but 
nevertheless agreed to welcome the proposal and be supportive. Suharto 
was attracted to the proposal but was cautious, while Mahathir ‘took note’ of 
the proposal. Mahathir feared that ASEAN would disappear in a larger and 
more powerful APEC group, and that the US would dominate any APEC 
mechanism that might be established. He also questioned the concept of an 
emerging community of the Asia-Pacific, both as an homogenous community 
and because the ‘abrasiveness of those of European origin is incompatible 
with Asians’.55 Mahathir included Australia in the countries that were of 
largely European origin, having thereby an affinity with the US and the 
European colonialists, and association with their dominance. 
Hawke did not mention the US as a possible participant in the new regional 
body proposed in his Seoul speech and, much to the chagrin of the US 
Administration, he did not consult them beforehand about the initiative. The 
Hawke initiative raised concerns in the US Administration on two main 
grounds. First, the new Bush Government was in the process of thinking 
strategically about Asia’s role in the global context, both economically and 
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strategically in the immediate post-Cold War era, and the Hawke idea of 
regional institution-building was out in front of where they were at the time. 
Second, the US was generally supportive of the idea of APEC (provided it did 
not develop into a regional trading bloc), but the initial Hawke proposal did 
not have the US involved ‘so we had enough influence to see that it didn’t 
evolve very far that way’.56 On the other hand, Japan supported US 
involvement in a new Asia-Pacific regional body, and made its views known 
in the region. For example, during Japanese Prime Minister Takeshita’s visit 
to Thailand in April, Takeshita told the Thai Premier that the United States 
and Canada should participate in the proposed regional body.57  
In his memoirs, Hawke claimed that while there had been some suggestions 
that he had been so incensed with US attitudes on bilateral trade with 
Australia that he was inclined to leave the US out of the new regional body, 
this was never in his mind.58 The issue was finally resolved during Hawke’s 
visit to Washington in June, when Hawke declared a moratorium on 
Australian criticism of the US for failing to acknowledge that its trade 
subsidies were hurting Australia. At the same time, he received an assurance 
that the US was willing to join the proposed Asia-Pacific economic group.59 In 
a speech to the Asia Society in New York City on 26 June, attended by 
Japanese Foreign Minister Mitsuzuka, Secretary of State James Baker 
stated that the need for a new mechanism for multilateral cooperation among 
the nations of the Pacific Rim was ‘an idea whose time had come’. He paid 
tribute to the suggestions by ‘many distinguished statesmen and influential 
organisations’, mentioning specifically both Hawke and MITI (during the time 
Mitsuzuka headed it). Stating that US involvement in the creation of a new 
institution would signal US full and ongoing relationship in the region, he said 
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he would explore the possibilities of such a mechanism during his 
forthcoming visit to Asia, and with Hawke later that week.60 
Japan  
Well before Woolcott began his visit to Asia on 3 April to gain support for the 
Hawke initiative, Japan was already active in the field. In February, MITI’s 
Director for International Economy visited senior officials in trade and 
industry departments in each ASEAN country to sound out their reactions to 
the Hawke initiative and to explain MITI’s ideas. MITI officials felt at the time 
that Australia would not be able to sway some cautious South-East Asian 
policy-makers, and therefore, MITI could make a real difference.61 This round 
of visits was a prelude to a higher level visit of MITI Vice-Minister Muraoka 
the following month. A particular purpose of Muraoka’s discussions was to 
sound out and seek to convince his counterparts of the importance of 
including the United States – which had not been included in Australia’s 
original list of likely participants – in any proposed new regional body. While 
most officials that Muraoka met (particularly in ASEAN) expressed hesitancy 
about US membership, Muraoka responded that it would be better to combat 
and contain US unilateral actions by including the United States in the forum, 
and claimed that ASEAN nations accepted this rationale.62  
Since the word ‘APEC’, which first appeared on Hawke’s formal invitation to 
the members, had yet to be coined, Muraoka, according to Funabashi, 
explained the MITI proposal in his meetings with top officials, while Woolcott 
in the following month described the Australian one. It was not until April 
when Muraoka and Woolcott met in Tokyo, that the two versions were finally 
merged.63 While Evans later described Australia’s role in the establishment of 
APEC as a ‘useful study of Australian leadership in coalition-building’, he 
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also acknowledged that: ‘Japan has been - while not taking a leadership role 
- strongly supportive of the development of the APEC process’.64 However, 
when regional leaders met in 1989 to discuss the idea of the 
institutionalisation of regional cooperation, they inevitably referred to ‘the 
Australian plan’ in their discussions.65  
The Woolcott visits 
While both Japan and Australian senior officials were involved in consensus-
building on the issue of regional cooperation (sparked by Hawke’s initiative), 
and Japan’s efforts could be seen as lending support to the Australian 
initiative, Woolcott’s mandate as the Prime Minister’s special envoy was 
more results-orientated: he sought to win support at the highest levels for the 
APEC concept. His specific tasks were to visit each of the likely participants 
to elaborate on the proposal; to dispel concerns, particularly among ASEAN 
countries that APEC would usurp ASEAN’s leading role on regional 
economic issues in Southeast Asia and result in a new large and costly 
regional bureaucracy; to obtain regional agreement on an initial ministerial 
meeting later in the same year and an ongoing process to sustain 
momentum; and to reach a consensus on the desirability of including the 
United States, Canada and the Three Chinas.66  
Woolcott argues in his memoirs that his role (and that of his Minister and 
Department) in taking ‘the raw concept advanced by Bob Hawke in January 
1989’, and ‘developing the concept of a forum for Asia-Pacific economic 
cooperation and in bringing it to life’, demonstrated an Australian capacity, 
and hence reputation, for innovative and constructive diplomacy in the Asia 
Pacific region: 
The building of support for the APEC concept offers a practical example of 
effective diplomacy. It involved identifying all the possible obstacles in the 
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countries concerned, especially in Japan, China, the United States and 
Malaysia, each of which had different reservations. It was then necessary to 
devise persuasive strategies in order to negotiate a way through these 
obstacles.67 
Apart from his own deft footwork in finding a path through obstacles and his 
capacity to sell ideas, Woolcott’s account of his first visit (to ASEAN 
countries) illustrates the importance of the diplomatic reputational capital he 
commanded, in terms of respect and trust of his enormous web of regional 
friendships and contact.68 He was able to draw on this reputation to achieve 
Australian objectives. For example, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas 
had been helpful to Woolcott in pointing out some political constraints in 
Indonesia’s position, and Mahathir, with whom Woolcott had discussed 
Antarctica in 1986, made time to meet with him even though he had only just 
returned to work after a serious illness.69 Woolcott’s task of selling the APEC 
idea was also made easier by the previous consensus-building activities at 
the non-government level, by the activities of regional intellectuals, 
businessmen and non-government organisations with unofficial links (as in 
the case of PECC) with policy makers. Nevertheless, Woolcott was 
unsuccessful in his attempts to seek a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister 
Takeshita, owing to ongoing rivalry between MITI and the Gaimusho, with the 
latter suspected of intervening to prevent Woolcott from meeting the 
Japanese Prime Minister.70 
On the third leg of his personal envoy mission in May, Woolcott visited China, 
Hong Kong, Washington and Canada. Despite some progress made in his 
discussion with Chinese leaders on the modalities of including the Three 
Chinas in the regional organisation, Woolcott’s visit and its outcomes were 
overshadowed by student demonstrations, China’s declaration of martial law, 
and subsequent international outrage over the Tiananmen Square 
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massacres, which put the question of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong 
membership on hold until the third APEC ministerial meeting in Seoul in 
1991. In Washington, Woolcott claimed that Secretary Baker ‘accepted’ his 
arguments that an APEC forum would have more chance of success if it was 
‘promoted by a country like Australia, which was neither a major power nor 
economically dominant’71 (i.e., neither the US nor Japan). This seems to 
suggest US endorsement of Australia’s role as a middle power in the creation 
of APEC. However, while both Japan and the US were willing to let Australia 
have the credit of having the carriage of the initiative, both Japan and the US 
had their own ‘major power’ interests in supporting the initiative which related 
to their own rethinking of their regional and global sources of influence and 
their relations with each other. Each, in Krauss’s analysis, perceived the 
other as a ‘Gulliver’72 needing to be tied down more firmly in a regional 
arrangement to mitigate current and future trade friction and to promote 
regional responsibilities. 
Foreign Minister 
The ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference in Brunei in July was the 
penultimate stage in the development of the APEC initiative in 1989. The 
Australian proposal was on the agenda of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
held in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, 3-4 July 1989, where ASEAN Ministers 
were expected to give a formal response to Hawke’s proposal.73  However, 
the ASEAN meeting had weightier issues of its own to consider, such as 
maintaining solidarity on the ASEAN position on the Cambodian peace 
process to take to the forthcoming Paris International Conference on 
Cambodia, and supporting the consensus on the problem of Indo-Chinese 
asylum seekers (reached at the recent International Conference on Indo-
Chinese Refugees in Geneva) convened at ASEAN’s initiative. The joint 
communiqué of the meeting simply ‘noted the recent trends and 
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developments in the Asia-Pacific region and in particular the proposals made 
by some of the Dialogue Countries for enhanced economic cooperation’.74  
However, at the post-ministerial meeting with the Foreign Ministers of 
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the US and the European Union 
held on 6-8 July, the ASEAN states agreed to attend an initial exploratory 
meeting in Canberra in November to discuss the proposal. Woolcott claimed 
that Evans sealed the arrangement with participating Ministers;75 however, 
Japan also played an important role at the meeting, which officials described 
as being ‘supportive, constructive and not at all aggressive’76 Evans’ 
understanding of, and support for, the ASEAN search for a comprehensive, 
just and durable solution to the Cambodia conflict, and his forthright and 
compassionate position on Indo-Chinese refugees at the Geneva 
Conference, indicated that Australia could be a reliable and trusted partner 
for ASEAN; that it did not wish to see ASEAN’s leadership role on joint 
regional issues of concern undermined; and that Australia could be relied 
upon to work closely with ASEAN in the realisation of the APEC initiative.  
The first APEC Ministerial Meeting, Canberra 
Australia’s hosted the first APEC Ministerial Meeting in Canberra on  
6-7 November 1989. The meeting aimed to discuss ways to advance the 
process of economic cooperation in the region and enabled Australia to take 
diplomatic credit for the initiative, highlighting Australia’s role in nurturing the 
initiative. Hawke used the occasion of his speech at a welcoming dinner for 
delegates77 to revisit the origins and strategic intent of his proposal and to 
underline the support the initiative had received at head of government level. 
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He emphasised that he did not want to see the meeting ‘impinge on the 
enormous contribution that has been made over the years to regional political 
cooperation and consultation by ASEAN’ and he urged delegates to think 
through the issues related to the potential participation of the People's 
Republic of China, and the economies of Hong Kong and Taiwan.  
Hawke also used the occasion of hosting this most important and historic 
meeting to carry a vital message to his fellow Australians that ‘the 
transformation underway in the Asia Pacific region is of critical importance to 
the way we go about life in this country and to the expectations Australians 
can entertain for the future’. He further noted that the fact that eight of 
Australia’s top ten export markets the previous year were in the Asia Pacific 
provided as good an example of Australia’s regional interdependence as any 
economy in the region.78 
At their first meeting, Ministers rejected the idea that APEC should be 
directed to the formation of a trading bloc, and expressed their support for an 
open multilateral trading system. They reaffirmed their commitment to open 
markets and to expand trade, and agreed to consult together to promote a 
positive conclusion of the Uruguay Round. They also agreed a statement of 
principles of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, which was included in the 
Chairman’s (Evans’) concluding statement from the Chair. However, they 
failed to reach agreement on APEC’s future structure or on a detailed work 
program. They asked senior officials to begin work on a number of possible 
topics for regional economic cooperation, and agree to two further 
meetings.79  
A former New Zealand diplomat to Australia recounts his impressions of the 
dramatic turnaround in Australia’s standing in the region, which the 
                                            
78 Ibid. 
79 APEC, ‘First APEC Ministerial Meeting, Canberra, Australia, 6‐7 November: Joint Statement’, 
retrieved 30 August 2010, 
<http://www.apec.org/apec/ministerial_statements/annual_ministerial/1989.1st.apec.mini>         
188 
 
government’s initiative on APEC, and other regional initiatives, helped to 
bring about: 
I arrived there in April 1986 and it was literally the week if not the day that 
Keating made his banana republic speech. And so it was like a sort of a 
wake-up call to Australia; if we don’t watch out, we’re going to be sliding 
down a slippery slope and so on and so forth. At the end of it, the very end of 
my time, which was basically effectively the end of 1989, was when the first 
APEC meeting was held in pouring rain in Canberra. [it was] a really striking 
testimony, I still think, to the vigour of Australian diplomacy. … there was a 
sort of, my goodness, where are we going? And then a sense … well, let’s 
pick ourselves up and make sure that we are helping shape events. And 
APEC, the Cambodia stuff, and the chemical weapons - which was another 
initiative around that time - were three very remarkable efforts by Australia, 
not just to be in the world but to actually shape it. And I think they were 
successful.80 
For its first two years, APEC made moderate progress. Funabashi described 
the Canberra, and the subsequent July 1990 Singapore Ministerial meetings, 
as APEC’s ‘warm-up’ phase, where the events were scarcely noticed and 
accomplished little substantively.81 Yet, he conceded, these meetings 
marked the first time official representatives from around the Asia Pacific sat 
down in a single forum, albeit a ‘non-forum forum’, as participants described 
it at the time. According to a senior DFAT official, drawing on ASEAN and 
PECC precedents, APEC (at the ministerial and officials level) developed a 
workable process of consultation and cooperation aimed at building a sense 
of trust and shared perceptions at the political level which could lead to an 
increasing sense of cohesion and consonance in decision-making. 82 By the 
time of the Seoul meeting in 1991, persistent Korean diplomacy, particularly 
by Korean Minister for Foreign Affairs Lee See-Young, had been rewarded 
with the inclusion of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong at the meeting; and for 
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the first time APEC began to catch real attention around the globe. 83 The 
Seoul Declaration also outlined three principal tasks for APEC: strengthening 
the open multilateral trading system; achieving free and open trade and 
investment in the Asia Pacific by a process of facilitation and liberalisation; 
and intensifying development cooperation in the region. These subsequently 
became known as ‘the three pillars’ of APEC.84 
Keating and the APEC Leaders’ Meetings 
The APEC leaders’ meetings have been heralded as an important 
development in providing leadership of APEC,85 the most significant 
development in accelerating APEC’s development, 86 and marking a 
‘significant structural change - and power shift in the process of Australian 
policy making in the 1990’s’.87 In terms of the impacts of their summitry, the 
APEC leaders’ meetings were considered to have had a symbolic role in 
focusing attention on the Asia-Pacific as a region, both for foreign policy 
priority setting purposes and for increased public awareness. For the first few 
years at least, they demonstrated substantive outcomes.88  
The idea of regular meetings of Asia-Pacific leaders, as Gyngell and Wesley 
point out, originated in the Australian bureaucracy.89 The head of the 
international division in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
(PM&C), Allan Gyngell, suggested the idea on two principal grounds. First, 
he raised the idea of regional leaders’ meetings as a way of addressing the 
growing concern in Australia in the early 1990’s that the United States was 
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losing interest in East Asia, and that there was no formal mechanism in the 
region, as distinct from other regions, through which leaders of the region, 
including the United States, could meet together on a regular basis to 
discuss matters of mutual concern. Second, Gyngell was attracted to the 
idea that the meetings would provide a corrective to the program of the Prime 
Minister’s commitments to attend heads of government meetings - focused at 
the time on the Commonwealth and South Pacific Forum meetings - by 
serving to focus the Prime Minister’s energy and time on the region 
concerned with Australia’s main foreign policy and trade priorities.90 In its first 
iteration, the idea of a meeting of Asia-Pacific leaders was not exclusively 
linked with APEC and could just as easily been built on the ASEAN post-
ministerial committee meetings framework. PM&C incorporated the 
suggestion in Hawke’s brief for President Bush’s visit to Australia in 
December 1991; but before Bush’s arrival, Paul Keating has replaced Hawke 
as Prime Minister. 
Keating’s ideas on foreign economic policy were similar to those of his 
predecessor. He continued to emphasise the linkages between Australia’s 
domestic and foreign economic policies, the importance of pursuing greater 
integration of the Australian economy in the fast-growing Asia-Pacific region, 
indicated support for the GATT international trading system and for 
multilateral institutional structures, and sought to improve Australia’s trade 
performance by making Australian business more competitive, export-
orientated and less reliant on protection.91 However, within this broad 
consensus, there were important differences, which were reflected in Hawke 
and Keating’s respective approaches towards APEC. Keating placed more 
emphasis than Hawke on the ‘big picture’ strategic factors. He saw a need to 
avert US isolationist tendencies and secure US ongoing strategic 
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engagement in the region. He sought regular dialogue between APEC 
leaders, which in time would include political as well as economic dialogue, 
and he stressed the importance of recognising Indonesia’s (and particularly 
President Suharto’s) role in promoting regional stability. By the time Keating 
became Prime Minister, APEC, in his view, had become ‘a familiar, useful, 
but not yet particularly high-profile, part of the regional scene. Its principal 
virtue was that it had defined its own constituency. But, in its present form, it 
would not have been able to fulfil the hopes I had for it’.92  
After he became Prime Minister, APEC became somewhat of a grand 
obsession for Keating.93 There were a number of reasons for this. In terms of 
pursuing Australia’s national interests, Keating was convinced that APEC 
would help to underwrite Australia’s future by setting the region on the path 
of liberalised trade and regional security; failure on Australia’s part to take full 
advantage of this historic opportunity would be a dereliction of duty, by both 
government and business. Australian involvement in APEC was also 
important for Australia’s international standing and national identity formation. 
In his first foreign policy speech, Keating referred to ‘our destiny as a nation 
in Asia and the Pacific’ and Australia’s ‘rightful presence in the region’.94 
Australian international standing was linked in his mind with Australian 
republicanism, Aboriginal reconciliation and multiculturalism. In terms of 
Australian foreign policy making, APEC provided the opportunity for Australia 
to become an architect of policy in the region and an opportunity to define its 
own trade and strategic environment.95  Keating’s speech writer, Don 
Watson, commented that the possibility of engineering a new set of 
relationships for Australia and a whole new regional environment for the 
Twenty-first Century constituted an irresistible challenge for Keating and that 
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it promised adventure of a kind that he could no longer find in domestic 
politics.96  However, for it to achieve Keating’s vision and attain its full 
potential, APEC needed to change into a more political and powerful 
organisation, represented at head-of-government level. 
Keating held the view that only the involvement of heads of government 
would provide the locomotive to drive a more ambitious APEC agenda. There 
were compelling strategic reasons for such a gathering and that, left to its 
own devices, the official machinery of APEC ‘would not move beyond 
agreements based on the lowest common denominator’. 97 His principal 
adviser on international relations added: 
His concept of the role of a political leader was that you were there to get 
things done and change things, you weren’t there to manage the world, if 
you wanted someone to manage the world, officials were better at it than 
politicians.98 
Keating floated the idea of restructuring APEC with President Bush during 
the latter’s official visit to Australia in December 1991.99 Bush listened with 
interest to the proposal and while, non-committal, did not rule it out; but he 
made it clear that it was up to Australia to deliver on the idea if it wished to 
pursue it.100 Keating felt sufficiently emboldened by the discussion to write to 
the leaders of Japan, Korea, China and Korea to sound them out on the idea. 
Following this first round of consultations, he floated the idea publicly in his 
first foreign policy speech on 1 April 1992: 
Another way of promoting cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region would be to 
establish a process of periodic heads-of-government meetings, say every 
two or three years. 
 
The absence of such a process is conspicuous in a region whose weight in 
global affairs is steadily increasing. 
 
Various formulas for participation are possible, but I personally would find 
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most attractive a mechanism based on APEC membership, because it 
embraces the most important economic linkages throughout East Asia and 
across the Pacific. 
 
I discussed this general idea with President Bush when he visited Australia. I 
hope to pursue it as opportunity allows with other Asia-Pacific leaders.101 
In his 1992 foreign policy speech, Keating mentioned several factors relating 
to Australia’s international standing and credibility which would influence 
Australia’s ability to contribute to regional political affairs, generally, and 
which would be important for taking APEC to its next stage.102 These 
included: Australia’s economic weight (Australia’s GNP was the third in the 
West Pacific and equal to the combined GNP of all the ASEAN countries); 
Australia’s growing engagement in, and interdependence with, the region 
(which was increasing each year in proportion with the rest of the world); 
Australia’s advantageous political position of having no historical or 
fundamental conflict with any country in the region; Australia’s well-
developed foreign policy expertise in government and academia; Australia’s 
recent involvement in finding solutions to regional issues, such as Cambodia 
and through the regional security dialogue; and Australia’s successful 
experiment in multiculturalism, which, combined with increasing immigration 
from Asia, had stimulated Australian awareness of Asian societies and 
improved standing in the region. In addition, the fact that Australia had taken 
a leading role in the establishment of APEC at the ministerial level in 1989 
‘meant that we had standing to develop it further’.103 
In 1992, in a sudden burst of diplomacy, Australia set out to sell the idea to 
its fellow APEC members. The initial replies were positive but guarded.104 In 
the end, little came of these efforts in the absence of a firm US commitment. 
This situation changed dramatically in November that year when Clinton was 
elected US President on the campaign theme, ‘it’s the economy stupid’. The 
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US was scheduled to have the Chair of the APEC Ministerial Meeting in 1993 
and Clinton was keen to emphasise the links between foreign and trade 
policies. Keating seized on this opportunity. He wrote a congratulatory letter 
to Clinton, suggesting that he take up the idea of an APEC leaders’ meeting, 
and hold the inaugural leaders’ meeting in the US in conjunction with the 
planned APEC Ministerial Meeting in 1993.105 The fact that Bush had not 
signed onto Keating’s earlier suggestion for an APEC leaders’ meeting 
turned out to be fortuitous, because it meant that it was an initiative which 
Clinton could develop as his own.106 US officials took their own soundings on 
the likely reactions to the proposaI and, in June 1993, Clinton wrote to 
Keating advising him that he intended to invite APEC members to an informal 
leaders meeting in Seattle in November that year following the planned 
APEC ministerial meeting. Keating replied on 1 July, expressing his personal 
support, recounting his conversations with regional leaders and offering to 
push as hard as he could.107 He was happy to let Clinton have ownership of 
the process in order to launch the idea, since an invitation from the US 
President to attend an informal Asia-Pacific leaders meeting would be hard to 
refuse. 
Keating saw his own role in promoting the APEC leaders’ meeting as one of 
providing leadership from within the region, with all the risks that this 
entailed. His own account of his involvement in the building of APEC in 
Engagement is replete with the words or phrases normally associated with 
leadership, such as ‘ambitious, ‘drive’, ‘determination’, ‘seizing opportunities’ 
‘pushing hard’, and ‘getting the politics right’. From July to November 1993, 
Keating engaged in a series of high-level representations to encourage his 
APEC colleagues to attend the first leaders’ meeting and to make it a 
success. He wrote to Suharto to urge him to respond positively to Clinton’s 
invitation and expressed his support for Indonesia as hosts for the second 
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leaders’ meeting in Jakarta the following year. In a visit to Washington in 
September, Keating urged Clinton to recognise the importance of Indonesia 
in the face of Congressional pressures on matters of preferential trade 
arrangements and human rights issues, including East Timor. He sought an 
assurance from Clinton that, if the leaders agreed to meet in Jakarta in the 
next year, he would attend. In October, on his return to Australia from the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Cyprus, Keating stopped 
over in Indonesia to reinforce his representations to Suharto. Australian 
journalist Sheridan described this series of meetings as: 
… one of the few occasions in Australian diplomatic history when an 
Australian prime minister has engaged in effective shuttle diplomacy with the 
leaders of the world’s largest and fourth largest nations.108  
Gyngell claimed that the APEC leaders’ meetings would not have been 
realised without Keating’s personal drive and influence: 
No, it could only have happened with Keating. He had two things going for 
him: he had drive and he was the most persuasive advocate I’ve ever come 
across among Australian political leaders. When he was in full flight he was 
awfully difficult to resist: he charmed and cajoled and argued, he was a 
brilliant advocate when he was personally committed …He had a very clear 
strategic goal.109 
The Seattle Leaders’ Meeting 
Regional and Australian press reports on the 1993 APEC meeting ranged 
from describing the meeting itself as a ‘resounding success’ to being a 
‘modest summit’.110 In contemporary assessments, the grounds for claiming 
it a success were four-fold. First, symbolically, the summit meeting attended 
by 18 Asia-Pacific leaders carried the message, particularly to Europe, of 
Asia-Pacific solidarity and showed its determination to see that the Uruguay 
Round of trade talks was brought to a successful conclusion by its current 
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December 1993 deadline.111 Also, for many Asia-Pacific leaders, the Seattle 
meeting provided a reassurance of America’s continued commitment to the 
region and to open regionalism in trade, coming as it did the day after the US 
Congress approved NAFTA. Second, the meeting produced a range of 
important outcomes including an economic vision statement for the region, a 
number of specific decisions relating to future meetings of finance ministers 
to discuss macroeconomic and monetary issues and the development of an 
investment code.112 Third, the meeting engendered personal rapport 
between the leaders and a strong sense of regional interdependence;113 and 
fourth, the leaders agreed to meet again, with Indonesia offering to host a 
follow up meeting in 1994. 
Clinton was able to use the occasion of the Seattle summit to present himself 
to the American public as world statesman, and his proposal to hold the 
meeting was described as a stroke of genius.114 For his efforts, Keating 
earned the reputation from his peers of having played a pivotal role in the 
formation of APEC. Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa welcomed the 
Australian initiative as very significant and described it as Keating’s ‘baby’.115 
In his letter of invitation to Keating to attend the Seattle meeting, Clinton said 
he wanted to give Keating credit for his idea of holding an informal meeting of 
APEC leaders, and stated:  
Australia deserves great credit for its contributions to the emerging 
structures that will chart the future of the Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold 
War era.116 
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Keating was also instrumental in influencing the style of the leaders’ 
meetings, which he considered was one of the most important aspects of the 
meetings. APEC leaders’ meetings fall into Reynolds’ category of personal 
summits, in which the emphasis is on the encounters between leaders, as 
distinct from plenary summits, in which the personal encounters are 
balanced, and complemented, by the presence of advisers, and attempts are 
made to resolve substantive issues.117 Keating claimed that: 
One of the things I had tried to insist on was a genuinely discursive meeting 
without officials. I wanted to keep any APEC leaders’ structure away from 
the pre-cooked approach of the G7 or OECD countries. Each of us was to 
have one assistant on the island who could listen in to the conversation but 
could not see it. This proposal at first appalled a number of officials in the 
region. What would become of the world if political leaders were left to their 
own devices? But the format went to the essence of what the meeting was 
about. APEC’s formal work was the responsibility of the preceding ministerial 
meeting. This left the leaders without formal agendas and free to focus on 
APEC’s goals and longer-term strategic issues. It was easily the most 
valuable thing about the meeting.118 
In his replies to questions without notice in Parliament on the APEC leaders’ 
meeting before leaving Australia on 17 November and after his return on 23 
November, Keating described the meeting as ‘historic’, bringing together the 
leaders of the Asia-Pacific at a time when the region, already representing a 
half of the world’s production, was experiencing substantive growth. Even 
greater growth and the increasing velocity of trade in the area, and 
increasing Australian integration in the area, would mean more jobs, and 
more interesting jobs, for Australians. While congratulating Clinton for 
extending invitations and hosting the meeting, Keating also reminded 
Parliament that APEC was a Labor Government initiative in 1989, and that 
the meeting followed from a proposal he made the previous year, and 
discussed with his regional colleagues. APEC also represented the kind of 
multilateral organisational structure that Australia could more naturally be a 
part of than it had been to date: 
                                            
117 Reynolds, Summits, p. 7. 
118 Keating, Engagement, p. 94‐95. 
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At various times Australia has thought that it could perhaps become a 
member of the G10 or the G7 and then found itself locked out of those 
forums, or participated in the OECD, which has become more eurocentric 
over time. For Australia to be participating in a body such as this - a body 
which Australian diplomacy has been very instrumental in setting up - is 
something which will stand it in great stead.119  
However, respect for Keating’s for his role in making the Seattle summit a 
success was overshadowed by the attention given in the Australian and 
regional press to his attack on Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir for being a 
‘recalcitrant’. In response to persistent media questions in a door stop 
interview in Seattle about Mahathir’s boycott of the meeting, Keating said that 
he ‘couldn’t care less, frankly’, whether Mahathir attended and that ‘APEC is 
bigger than all of us – Australia, the US and Malaysia and any other 
recalcitrants.120 Dr Mahathir responded on the same day, saying he regretted 
Mr. Keating’s remarks, and added that Australia’s claim that it was part of 
Asia was meaningless, because Australians did not have the values and 
manners that Asians do.121 Mahathir’s party officials and Ministers escalated 
the row by publicly calling for a downgrading of diplomatic relations and trade 
relations with Australia if the Australian Prime Minister refused to apologise. 
Keating, in response, claimed that Malaysian anger was feigned, that such 
rifts were part of the rough and tumble of national and international life and 
that, in any case, ‘recalcitrant’ was hardly the most offensive word in the 
English language. However, Keating was persuaded to send a letter of 
explanation to Mahathir on 2 December. This did not stop the rift, which 
continued for some time, resulting in the cancelling of scheduled talks in 
Malaysia with the Australian Trade Minister in December, the cancelling of 
Keating’s earlier proposed visit to Malaysia in January 1994 and the 
withdrawal of an Australian Tourist Commission advertising campaign.122  
                                            
119 Questions without Notice – APEC Meeting, CPD, H of R, vol. 37, 23 November 1993, p. 3380. See 
also Questions without Notice – APEC Meeting, CPD, H of R, vol. 37, 17 November 1993, p. 3007. 
120 M Millett, ‘Keating attacks APEC boycott’, SMH, 23 November 1993, p. 1.  
121 ‘Keating given 7 days to apologise’, FR, 25 November 1993, p. 14. 
122 J Rees & M Vatikiotis, ‘Megaphone Diplomacy: No sign of an end to Malaysia‐Australia row’, FEER, 
16 December 1993, p. 13. 
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There were, of course, deeper reasons for the rift between Keating and 
Mahathir than a tussle between two strong minded political leaders and an 
argument over manners. These related to a more serious dispute between 
Malaysia and Australia over the role of APEC, the role of the US in APEC 
and over Mahathir’s counter proposal for an East-Asian Economic Caucus, 
which would exclude ‘dominating countries’ such as the US, Australia and 
New Zealand. In an interview with the Australian Financial Review in the 
week before the Seattle meeting, Mahathir claimed that the US had 
highjacked APEC and had misled the region about the real motives of the 
body. In an indirect reference to the consensus reached at the first APEC 
Ministerial meeting in Australia in 1989 on how APEC would progress, 
Mahathir claimed: 
You know [the Seattle summit] is what we feared from the very beginning. 
We were told, ‘No, we are not going to [make APEC into a formalised body], 
we’re just going to talk’. But as you know, they didn’t keep their word. Now 
they have made it into a formal body, with a secretariat, and now they are 
even talking about an APEC community - at this point he screwed his face - 
which is ridiculous. 123 
Before the Seattle incident, Mahathir stated in the same interview that, with 
respect to Australia’s wish to be regarded as part of the region, Australia 
would have to ‘stop talking down to Asians and imposing its point of view’. He 
added: 
I think if slowly, Australia becomes Asianised culturally, then I think there is 
room for Australia in the region. But if you keep on trying to impose your 
values on others - if you keep on being discriminatory in some way … in 
other words if you are not culturally Asian even if you say you want to be 
Asian – it’s not easy.124 
Before Seattle, Australian relations with Malaysia were described on both 
sides as being business-like and proper, without the personal warmth at the 
head of government level that Australia enjoyed with some other countries in 
the region, such as Indonesia and Singapore. Keating’s outburst in Seattle 
                                            
123 ‘Mahathir sticks to guns on trade talks’, FR, 19 November 1993, p. 3. 
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highlighted some of the dangers of summitry for a leader’s reputation. While 
acknowledging that behind Keating’s remark there was a more serious 
dispute over the role of APEC, an editorial in the Financial Review on 29 
November commented: 
Obviously it was a mistake for Mr. Keating to describe the Malaysian as a 
recalcitrant. It reflects Mr. Keating’s lack of experience in foreign affairs as 
well as a more general lack of self-discipline that he should lay into the 
Malaysian Prime Minister as if he were the Premier of Western Australia.125 
The road to Bogor 
From an Australian perspective, a one-off meeting of Asia-Pacific leaders 
would have had little benefit in encouraging ongoing rapport between leaders 
and in countering the threat of US isolationism. For the purpose of building 
regional architecture, the Seattle meeting had to be followed by at least two 
more successful meetings in order to establish the practice of regular contact 
between leaders, involve the US in the region and engage the Australian 
Prime Minister in regional dialogue on a regular basis.  
Keating’s main efforts in relation to APEC after the Seattle meeting, 
therefore, were aimed at keeping the momentum going and having an 
ambitious agenda for the Bogor meeting. According to his own 
comprehensive account of his APEC diplomacy during this period in 
Engagement, he instigated thirty-six meetings or telephone calls with other 
APEC leaders, focusing on the November meeting, and offered every 
support for Suharto in pursuing an ambitious agenda. In June 1994, he 
visited Indonesia where Suharto and he agreed that APEC would set a goal 
at the Bogor meeting of free trade within the region within a fifteen to twenty-
year time-frame, taking into account the differences between developed and 
developing countries. This goal became clarified in subsequent discussions 
as a commitment, agreed at the Bogor meeting, to achieve free and open 
trade and investment in the region no later than 2020, with industrialised 
countries achieving the goal by 2010 and developing countries by 2020, but 
                                            
125 ‘Malaysia: let the line go dead’, FR, editorial, 29 November 1993, p. 20. 
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with all leaving their starting blocks at the same time in 2000. Suharto wrote 
in a letter of appreciation to Keating after their meeting in Jakarta in June 
1994, saying ‘Australia, which played a leading role in the birth of APEC, now 
also plays a pivotal role in the common endeavour to strengthen economic 
cooperation in the region’. Keating commented: ‘This pleased me because I 
was investing a lot of effort in that common endeavour’. 126  
Australia’s standing in the region 
In his statement to Parliament on the outcome of the Bogor meeting, Keating 
spoke of Australia’s new standing in the region, asserting that the Bogor 
meeting and its Declaration of Common Resolve had changed the nature of 
the region, and the future of Australia and its role in the region: 
For nearly 40 years, Australians have spoken loosely about what we have 
called ‘our region’ of the world. We have regularly talked about our ‘northern 
neighbours’. But until now these phrases have been statements of aspiration 
- hollow cliches - rather than descriptions of reality and real national intent. 
What our region was, where it extended, who was in it, whether the others 
we claimed as partners accepted that role, was always uncertain - indeed 
unknowable.  
With Bogor, however, Australians can say for the first time that the region 
around us is truly our region. We know its shape; we have an agreed 
institutional structure; we share with its other members a common agenda 
for change.127 
However, as the ensuing parliamentary debate showed, Australia was still 
not in a position to maximise the potential gains as a nation from APEC trade 
liberalisation and be accepted in the region as a strong competitive member 
of the region. Australia’s export to GDP ratio remained one of the lowest 
among OECD countries, and virtually all APEC members had higher export 
growth than Australia. In addition, Australian exports had been losing market 
share in almost every APEC country despite the fact that total exports were 
growing significantly. Australian National University Professor Helen Hughes 
was quoted in the debates as saying that the reasons for this decline in 
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127 P Keating, ‘Ministerial Statement – APEC Meeting’, CPD, H of R, Weekly Hansard, no.18, 6 
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Australia’s share of regional markets was weak macro-economic 
management, labour market inflexibility and high infrastructure charges.128 
She reportedly claimed that the pace of micro-economic reform in Australia 
was so narrow and so slow that Australia was less internationally competitive 
than it was 10 years ago. 
In Engagement, Keating claimed: 
I knew we had long way to go before the Bogor declaration could be 
implemented, but it had already served a useful purpose in acknowledging 
the interdependence of the countries in this part of the world and 
establishing a collective commitment to free trade. It had given us a much 
clearer notion of an Asia-Pacific community. It gave Australia a seat at the 
largest table we had ever sat at.129  
Keating also claimed that his period in office was a period in which ‘we 
punched well above our weight’, and used the building of APEC 
infrastructure as an example: 
I helped put the APEC Leaders’ meeting in place, and for our trouble we got 
a permanent seat at the table. It remains the most important table we sit at; 
certainly at head of government level.130  
He stated that: 
As a middle power, I saw Australia as having the opportunity of helping to 
reshape the political architecture of East Asia and the Asia Pacific in general, 
thereby adjusting power in the world to better suit Australia’s interests.131 
Summary 
The international developments in the Asia-Pacific region in the late 1980s 
and the early 1990s attest to the importance of economic factors in foreign 
                                            
128 See, ‘Australia’s Asian Challenge’, The proceedings of the Autumn Public Policy Forum in the 1994 
Bert Kelly lecture series Sydney, 24 February 1994, The Centre for Independent Studies, Sydney, 
1994. 
129 Keating, Engagement, p. 117. 
130 P Keating, ‘APEC; Australia’s biggest seat at its biggest table’, Address to the Evatt Foundation, 
Sydney, 23 August 2007, retrieved 17 March 2008, 
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policy at the end of the Cold War.132 International relations between the 
states of the region were greatly influenced by changes in the world 
economy, particularly in relation to globalisation and international trade, and 
by the economic circumstances in the individual countries. As a corollary, 
international standing for a country like Australia was assessed largely in 
economic terms. The principal notion of international standing that can be 
deduced from the study is that of a ‘well-regarded’ economic power, either as 
a partner or a competitor. The properties of ‘well-regarded’ include a 
diversified, productive, efficient and open and competitive economy, and a 
high ratio of exports to GNP and an export culture. Within this context, 
Australia, animated by the prospects of participation in growth in the region, 
began to shed its hitherto protectionist and isolationist reputation for the 
reputation of a competitive economy that was increasingly regarded as being 
an integral part of the region. Mahathir provided a dissenting voice in the 
region to this assessment of Australia’s regional standing by seeking to 
subordinate economic criteria to historical, cultural, ethnic and attitudinal 
factors in the region’s evaluation of Australia. 
Australia’s role in developing APEC to become the pre-eminent economic 
forum in the region had the effect of enhancing Australia’s standing and 
influence in the region.133 Even allowing for the important contribution of 
others, Australia was given due credit by its regional partners for the catalyst 
role it played in the formation of APEC in 1989; for the inauguration of the 
leaders’ meetings; and for its contributions to regional institutional and 
community building through participation in ministerial and senior official 
meetings, expert advisory groups, and the APEC working groups. Given its 
recent history, Japan, with divisions within its bureaucracy and an uncertainty 
about its potential leadership role in the region, preferred not to take the lead 
on regional regime formation and institutional building, and appeared happy 
                                            
132 The point was made by Lee Poh Ping, ‘Southeast Asia in 1990: a year of challenges’, Southeast 
Asian Affairs, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991, pp. 3‐17. 
133 Woolcott, The hot seat, p. 242. 
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to play a secondary role behind Australia. The US was also happy for 
Australia to take the lead on the APEC leaders’ initiative, because they felt 
that too prominent a US role could be counterproductive.134  
Oran Young outlines Australia’s lack of structural leadership assets and 
limited capabilities for regime formation and institutional building135 noting 
that this made it difficult for Australia to draw on power resources for 
bargaining leverage. Instead, Australia had to rely on its leaders’ drive, 
persuasion, intellectual and entrepreneurial skills. Both Hawke and Keating 
were strongly involved in the business of articulating Australia’s place and 
standing in Asia in the post-war world, and while there were differences - 
indeed rivalry - between them on the value of their respective contributions, 
both adhered to a common view point about the necessary linkages between 
Australia’s domestic and foreign economic policies, the importance of 
pursuing greater integration of the Australian economy in the fast-growing 
Asia Pacific region, support for the GATT international trading system and for 
multilateral institutional structures, and in improving Australia’s trade 
performance by making Australian business more competitive, export 
orientated and less reliant on protection. Indeed, it is possible to talk of a 
Hawke-Keating foreign economic policy towards Asia, which was regarded in 
the region as a joint effort. 
Both Hawke and Keating engaged in personal diplomacy in relation to APEC. 
They both regarded foreign policy with respect to APEC as being intricately 
linked with domestic economic reform and the internationalisation of the 
Australian economy, and hence the primary responsibility of the Prime 
Minister. However, the focus of their efforts on the regional and world stage 
tended, out of necessity, to be concentrated on the countries and the leaders 
that mattered to them in order to achieve their objectives. Consequently, 
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Hawke’s standing and personal reputation as statesman in the region was 
highest with the Presidents or Prime Ministers of South Korea, Singapore 
and Thailand, while Keating’s standing was highest with Presidents Suharto 
and Clinton and Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, relationships 
which in his view stood to benefit from the high-level involvement of political 
leaders.  
The first APEC leaders’ meeting in Seattle demonstrated both the 
reputational highs and lows of summitry. As Reynolds has pointed out,136 
summits have their own dynamics and are occasions for leaders to leave the 
foothills of domestic affairs behind and a chance to make or break 
reputations on the world stage. Clinton used the Seattle leaders’ meeting to 
demonstrate his role as world statesman. Keating contributed much to the 
concept, format and agenda of the leaders’ meetings, but his outburst 
against Mahathir for boycotting the Seattle meeting undermined his 
reputation as statesman with the Australian public and in the region. 
Nevertheless, Keating was able to use his close personal relationship with 
Suharto to bring about a successful outcome of the Bogor meeting in 
Indonesia the following year, which changed the nature of the region, and the 
future of Australia and its role in the region.137 Other Australian regional 
initiatives in the 1980s - such as the Australian peace initiative on Cambodia 
and the ASEAN Regional Forum - also made significant contributions to 
Australia’s good standing in the region. 
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CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDY: AUSTRALIA’S FAILED BID IN 1996 
FOR A UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT 
Introduction 
This case study examines how ‘international standing’ and ‘international 
reputation’ are understood and assessed in the United Nations context and 
the influence they exert, by taking Australia’s (unsuccessful) bid in 1996 for 
one of the five rotating non-permanent member vacancies on the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the years 1997-98. In that campaign, 
Australia was pitted against Sweden and Portugal in the Western European 
and Other States electoral group (WEOG)1 for one of the two available seats 
on the Council. The case study examines the importance of international 
standing and reputation as an object of the Australian campaign, in the 
conduct of the campaign and for its outcome. 
The case study posits that, alongside rational and strategic factors such as 
the power politics, campaign objectives and campaign strategies, reputation 
(understood as the evolving beliefs of other member nations about a member 
government’s commitment to the peace and developmental purposes of the 
United Nations) provides a necessary, if not a sufficient, reason for 
explaining Sweden’s and Portugal’s victory and Australia’s loss. To examine 
these issues, the study draws on reputation theory in relation to international 
cooperation.2 It also assesses the counter-claims by writers who have looked 
at reputation and dismissed it as a sufficient explanation3 and at alternative 
explanations, such as the Australian Government’s own initial assessment of 
                                            
1 The WEOG comprises members of the European Union, a number of small European non EU 
nations (1996), and a number of ‘others’, such as the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand 
and Israel. 
2 Tomz, Reputation and international cooperation. 
3 For example, DM Malone, ‘Eyes on the prize: the quest for nonpermanent seats on the UN Security 
Council’, Global Governance, vol. 6, 2000, pp. 3‐23. Malone was a former director‐general of global 
issues and international organizations in the Canadian Foreign Ministry. From September 1997 to 
October 1998, he oversaw Canada’s (successful) campaign for a UN Security Council seat.  
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the loss based on an examination of power politics, voting intentions and 
campaign strategy issues.  
The case study uses triangulation research methodology, comprising an 
analysis of public documents, press reports and articles by contemporary 
scholars; confidential background interviews by the author with DFAT 
officials involved in the 1996 campaign both in Canberra and New York; and 
confidential interviews and correspondence by the author with a number of 
other country representatives (n=12), who were either directly involved in the 
1996 elections or were familiar with its circumstances. The number of other  
country informants (described in the study as ‘key informants’ but not 
identified by name) is not large and is a convenience sample - not a 
representative sample (comprising respondents who were able to be 
contacted and willing to be involved in the research during the author’s 
overseas field research in 2008). The analysis is, nevertheless, informed by 
the views of a range of West European, Asian, African, South Pacific, Middle 
East and non-aligned country UN representatives. 
Under the UN Charter, the Security Council has the primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and security. It consists of five 
permanent members (The United States, Russia, China, Britain and France) 
and ten non-permanent members who are elected for two-year terms. Article 
23 of the United Nations Charter provides that the General Assembly shall 
elect the non-permanent members of the Security Council with due regard 
being specifically paid, in the first instance, to the contribution of Members of 
the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security 
and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable 
geographical distribution.4 While a seat on the Security Council has always 
                                            
4 B Conforti, The Law and practice of the United Nations, 3rd edition (revised), Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden, 2005. Until 1965, the year when Article 23 was amended, there were only 11 
members of the Security Council, six of whom were non‐permanent members. According to the 1965 
amendment, the Assembly ‘further decides that the ten non‐permanent members of the Security 
Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: (a) Five from African and Asian States; (b) 
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been considered a prize5 and jockeying for seats had always been intense in 
the WEOG, as a consequence of Council activism immediately after the end 
of the Cold War and a stalled UN reform process, a non-permanent seat on 
the Security Council in the mid-1990s was considered to be a bigger prize 
than ever.6  
Australia’s previous experience in UNSC elections 
Australia had had a good record in Council elections, having maintained a 
pattern of election and service on the Council at roughly thirteen-yearly 
intervals since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945. While 
Australia’s previous elections to the Council do not provide a good guide for 
assessing Australia’s prospects for election in 1996, they nevertheless 
indicate the importance for electoral success - in contested elections - of a 
positive image of commitment to, and involvement in, the United Nations, 
and to the role of the Australian Permanent Representative.  
In its first ever election to the Council in 1945, a system of ‘agreed slates’ 
operated to nominate the then six non-permanent members. Australia 
secured election by challenging a ‘gentleman’s agreement’, proposed by 
Britain, that Canada be included on the western ‘agreed slate’ as the senior 
Commonwealth Dominion candidate.7 In 1955, Australia was elected as the 
British Commonwealth nominated candidate for the period 1956-57 after 
Canada, India, Pakistan and New Zealand had each served their terms on 
the Council. However, in 1965, amendments to the UN Charter provisions 
related to membership of the Security Council came into effect and the 
Council was expanded to include ten non-permanent members. In the same 
                                                                                                                           
one from Eastern European States; (c) two from Latin American States; (d) two from Western 
European and other States’ (p. 62).  
5 Malone, ‘Eyes on the prize’.  
6 The New York Times commented in 1996: ‘Because most of the action in the United Nations after 
the end of the cold war has revolved around the Council, and demands to expand the body to make 
room for more voices have largely bogged down in disputes over who should receive any additional 
seats, the places that are available have become bigger prizes than ever’. B Crossette, ‘5 seated in 
Security Council after intensive manoeuvring’, New York Times, 22 October 1996, p. 5. 
7 P Hasluck, Workshop of security, F.W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1948, p. 24. 
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amendments, Australia was placed in the WEOG electoral group. Australia 
did not contest election to the Council again until 1972, after some years of 
avoiding its turn. The decision to seek the seat, and the successful lobbying 
effort, was taken by the McMahon government, and reflected the Coalition 
Government’s more flexible approach to the United Nations.8 However, by 
the time Australia’s term on the Council began on 1 January 1973, the 
Whitlam Government had taken over in Australia. On the last occasion 
(1984) Australia received 146 votes out of a possible 157 members present 
and voting. According to Woolcott,9 Australia polled especially well in the 
African group, a fact he attributed to his previous African diplomatic 
experience as head of mission in Ghana. African support for Australia could 
also be attributed to the salience of Australia’s anti-racial and anti-apartheid 
policies at the time and their appeal to African and Caribbean members of 
the Commonwealth. Australia’s election was no doubt also helped by the fact 
that Australia successfully persuaded both Italy and Austria not to stand 
against Australia, although both had previously announced their 
candidatures. This left Australia and Denmark as the two remaining 
candidates for the two WEOG vacancies. Senator Evans used the outcome 
to state that Australia’s election to the Security Council was ‘a fitting 
recognition of the standing that Australia once again enjoys in the 
international community’10  
In the 1996 elections, Sweden was elected with 153 votes on the first ballot 
and Portugal defeated Australia in the second ballot with 124 votes to 
Australia’s 57.11 After the defeat, Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander 
                                            
8 C Clark, ‘The United Nations’ in WJ Hudson (ed.), Australia in world affairs, 1971‐1975, George 
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1984, retrieved 24 September 2008, 
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Downer said: ‘I do not believe that we could have done more’.12 Having 
suffered its first ever defeat in Security Council elections, Australia did not 
seek re-election for another 14 years. However, soon after the Rudd Labor 
Government came into power in 2007, it announced that Australia would 
seek election to the Council again in 2012, for the period 2013-14.  
The question of prestige 
Malone, the coordinator of the Canadian 1998 UNSC campaign, asserted 
that ‘the dominant view at the UN is that countries aim for membership in the 
Council to underscore their international prestige’.13 He added that: 
’International prestige should almost certainly not be measured through the 
outcome of such contests, but to a considerable extent it is so assessed in 
New York’.14  
However, Malone went on to use the phrases in a broad sense in terms of 
the recognition a country receives by making a contribution to the UN’s 
peace and security functions and a willingness to ‘stand up and be counted’ 
on international citizenship matters.15 In this sense, the use of the term 
‘international prestige’ is synonymous with ‘international reputation’. 
Australia’s original aims in seeking Council membership fit into this notion of 
prestige seeking, stating that membership would enable Australia to actively 
participate in the Council’s central role in developing an effective system for 
cooperative security, at a time when the Security Council faced significant 
challenges.  
There is another notion of prestige, which became part of the discourse, and 
was used mainly by detractors of those seeking Council membership. This 
usage reflects an older (and original) use of the term based on the word’s 
Latin origin, praestringere, which has connotations of magic, an illusion, 
                                            
12 A Downer, ‘United Nations Security Council elections’, Media Release, 22 October 1996, retrieved 
8 May 2007,  <http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/releases/foreign/1996/fal>. 
13 Malone, ‘Eyes on the prize’, p. 6.  
14 Ibid., p. 18. 
15 Ibid., p. 6.     
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glamour and a conjuring trick or a deception.16 For example, Thakur stated 
that:  
Not one major foreign policy goal would have been greatly advanced by 
Australia being elected to the Council. It would have added glamour to the 
curriculum vitae of Australia’s Ambassador there, and might have provided 
the world stage for a Foreign Minister or two to strut on for brief moments of 
glory.17  
Downer’s comment on the ABC’s 7.30 Report on 1 April 2008 also appears 
to subscribe to this use of the term: 
The greatest thing you get out of it is the prestige of being on the Security 
Council, although, remember you’re only on it for a two year period, that’s it. 
You get on, you stay there for two years and then you’re off for another, 
whatever it would be, until you get re- elected.18  
The Australian press took a lively interest in the Australian campaign, 
perhaps reflecting the Australian public’s love of sporting contests, 
particularly when Australia was competing for high stakes on the world 
stage.19 After the loss, the Australian press raised questions relating to 
Australia’s prestige in the United Nations and whether Australia had 
misunderstood its importance on the world stage. The Canberra Times on 23 
October 1996 described the outcome as ‘a blow’ to Australia’. The Australian 
commented that, whatever the real story that might emerge one day to 
explain Australia’s loss, in the final analysis, Australia had overestimated its 
importance and clout in the UN,20 while The Canberra Times commented: It 
was not just a defeat, it was an absolute drubbing before the nations of the 
                                            
16 OED, Second Edition, vol. X11, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, p. 426 
17 R Thakur, ‘Australia’s unsuccessful bid for the UN Security Council’, Pacific Research, November 
1996, pp, 48‐49, p. 48. 
18 Australian Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Rudd vies for a place on the UN Security Council’, 7.30 
Report, transcript, retrieved 2 April 2008, 
<http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2007/s2205224.htm>. 
19 For example, four of the main Australian daily newspapers together devoted approximately 70 
column inches to the campaign in the month leading up to the election and over 590 column inches 
to reporting on and analysing the results, a total of approximately 660 column inches. These 
calculations are based on articles identified by means of a search of the Factiva database via the 
Deakin University Library portal. The newspapers included in the count were The Australian, The 
Sydney Morning Herald, The Age, The Canberra Times and the Financial Review. The calculation of 
column inches was based on an average of 30 words per square inch in an eight column broadsheet. 
20 C Stewart, ‘40pc lie factor stumps envoys’, The Australian, 23 October 1996, p. 8. 
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world and unless we face up to that it will not be possible to draw lessons 
from it’.21  
The Australian’s editorial, 23 October 1996, commented:  
 Australia’s failure to win a seat on the United Nations Security Council is 
disappointing, but it would perhaps have been less embarrassing if it weren’t 
for the fact that most people involved were reasonably sure of success.  
At a Senate Committee meeting on 22 October 1996 on the day of the vote 
(AEST), Senator Hill stated:  
I don’t think this will have any effect on Australia’s standing internationally. I 
think we are very well respected in the international forum. It is just that you 
can’t win every time…I would say that this has not affected our prestige as a 
nation internationally. It is a disappointment for us, but the high standing that 
we hold in international fora I am sure is not affected at all by this.22  
Key informants contacted for this study generally supported this view. 
Opposition Senators referred to the contest as a major international contest 
in which national prestige was on the line23 and asked a number of policy and 
tactical questions as to why the vote ‘was pretty overwhelming against us’, 
but cautioned against ‘bagging’ the public servant (UN Representative Butler) 
for the Government’s loss. 
Australian academics did not show a great deal of interest in the election at 
the time. In part, this could be attributed to their professional preoccupation 
with the politico-strategic and economic dimensions of Australia’s 
international relations,24 according to which the United Nations is a useful 
adjunct to Australian foreign policy, but not the centerpiece.25 Perhaps the 
view that UN elections, while riveting for those directly involved in them, are 
for others esoteric, unpredictable and not susceptible to foreign policy 
                                            
21 ‘Australia’s UN humiliation’, CT, 24 October 1996, editorial, p. 10. 
22 Australian Parliament, Senate Estimates, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 22 October 1996, pp. 
730‐746, pp. 735 &736. 
23 Ibid., p. 738. 
24 R Higgott & J George, ‘Tradition and change in the study of International relations in Australia’, 
International Political Science Review, vol. 11, no. 4, 1990, pp. 423‐438. 
25 Thakur, ‘Australia’s unsuccessful bid for the UN Security Council’.  
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analysis. However, important contributions to the debate were made by 
Dalrymple,26 Thakur27 and Makinda.28 The latter noted that any thorough 
post-mortem of Australia’s unsuccessful bid needed to take into account 
other states’ perceptions of Australia’s international behaviour and that a 
proper appraisal of this issue needed to be viewed in the contexts of history, 
theory and policy.29 
The candidates and their reputations 
‘Reputation’ in the context of this study is taken to mean the judgements of 
member nations of the United Nations of a candidate’s commitment to the 
goals of the United Nations, based on facts which are considered relevant to 
the international community.30 The approach used is based on the model 
advocated by Tomz, which in turn makes a number of assumptions. The first 
is that the beliefs of other members, which constitute a country’s reputation, 
evolve as they interpret a country’s behaviour in context. The second is that, 
in the absence of complete information, members form views about another 
country’s type, based on its commitment to the organisation. These 
reputation types, according to Tomz, and for the purposes of analysis, are 
described as ‘stalwarts’, ‘fair-weathers’, and ‘lemons’.31 Each type has 
distinct preferences about a country’s commitment to the UN that are 
reflected in different patterns of behaviour. ‘Stalwarts’ have the strongest 
commitment and the commitment tends to transcend changes in 
government. ‘Fair-weathers’, in contrast, have intermediate preferences. The 
value they attach to the UN is sufficient to motivate them when it suits them, 
but not at all times. ‘Lemons’ show the least commitment and sometimes 
break faith, in good times as well as in bad. The third assumption is that 
                                            
26 R Dalrymple, ‘Perspectives on Australian foreign policy, 1996’, Australian Journal of International 
Affairs, vol. 51, no. 2, 1997, pp. 243‐253. 
27 Thakur, ‘Australia’s Unsuccessful Bid for the UN Security Council’. 
28 SM Makinda, ‘Why ‘Good Citizen’ Australia lost the global power play’, Current Affairs Bulletin, vol. 
73, no.4, December/January 1996/1997, pp. 22‐26. 
29 Ibid, p. 23. 
30 See Tomz, Reputation and international cooperation; McNamara, Reputation and defamation.  
31 Tomz, op. cit., p. 17. 
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reputations shift when a government acts contrary to its perceived type. 
Reputations are not immutable and it is possible for a country to rise or fall 
on the reputational ladder.  
The classification of member countries as ‘stalwarts’, ‘fair-weathers’ and 
‘lemons’ is useful when distinguishing between candidates from the WEOG 
group, since as one informant commented: 
In the Western European Group, which is the one that we (and) Australia 
have to operate with, basically you’re competing with like against like. All the 
countries ... in the Western European Group would regard themselves as 
internationally respectable and reputable.32 
Sweden 
Sweden decided to seek election in late 1994. Sweden’s candidature, as 
Sweden Foreign Minister Hjelm-Wallén informed the UN General Assembly, 
was ‘an expression of our strong commitment to the United Nations and to 
international peace and security’, and ‘a matter of highest priority for the 
Swedish Government and the Swedish people’. It also reflected Sweden’s 
reputation of consistent and strong support for the United Nations and for 
multilateralism generally:  
As a member of the Council, we will make a constructive contribution to its 
work. Our dedication will be consistent with our record as a United Nations 
Member. Our support for United Nations ideals and activities is concrete, 
substantial and unwavering.33  
Sweden was considered by others in 1996 to be the archetypal ‘stalwart’ 
candidate. Sweden had impeccable credentials,34 and had stood before and 
surprisingly failed.35 Sweden campaigned on its superior aid levels and its 
campaign was helped by its membership of the European Union in 1996. 
After joining the EU, Sweden was able to argue from within the EU that the 
EU had failed developing countries in implementing the Lomé Convention, a 
                                            
32 Key informant interview # 13, 25 July 2008. 
33 Lena Hjelm‐Wallén, General Assembly, fiftieth session, 28 September 1995, Official Records, 
A/50/PV.10, p. 12. 
34 Key informant interview # 13, 25 July 2008. 
35 Key Informant # 27, facsimile correspondence, 5 January 2009. 
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trade and aid agreement between the European Union (EU) and 71 African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries, and to urge a better deal for them.36 
Sweden also attracted a sympathy vote for having narrowly lost its bid in 
1992. 
Portugal 
Portugal announced its candidature well before Australia and Sweden, and 
was considered to have had an ‘early bird’ advantage over the other two 
candidates.37 Portugal, according to Malone, was ‘not noted for its 
international credentials and lumbered with a reputation as an appalling 
colonial power until the 1974 revolution’.38 This perception of Portugal’s 
reputation, which Australia and Sweden shared, seems to have led to 
complacency on Australia’s (and Sweden’s) part about treating Portugal as a 
serious contender until late in the campaign. DFAT stated in a post-election 
assessment that it had assumed that Portugal would be discredited by its 
past policies in Africa. However, this did not prove to be the case. The 
change of government in Portugal in 1974 had been a revolution, not simply 
a change of government, and since then Portugal had embarked on a slow 
process of democratic reform, combined with support for independence of its 
former colonies in Africa and elsewhere, including East Timor, and had 
graduated to membership of the European Union. In its representations to 
Portugal’s former colonies, DFAT found that they still valued the 
attractiveness of the continuing ties with their former colonial power through 
language, culture and aid; and, rather than vote against Portugal because of 
its ‘appalling colonial past’, they preferred to stay with ‘the devil we know’.39 
                                            
36 Key informant interview # 10, 19 May 2008.  
37 One informant stated, as a reason for Portugal’s success over Australia, that ‘Portugal had made 
contact early’. Key informant # 27, facsimile correspondence, 5 January 2009. 
38 Malone, ‘Eyes on the prize’, p. 7.  
39 Key informant interview # 7, 27 June 2008. 
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The Swedish campaign strategist also conceded, ‘we all underestimated 
Portugal’.40 
Portugal provides an example of how reputations can change. Portugal had 
made a painful transition to democracy from almost half a century of 
dictatorship, and undertook decolonisation not only in response to a national 
imperative, but also because they were required to do so by the Charter of 
the United Nations and numerous resolutions of the General Assembly and 
the Security Council.41 In other words, it had moved from being a ‘lemon’ in 
terms of commitment to UN principles before 1974, to something 
approaching a ‘stalwart’. 
In the campaign, Portugal portrayed an image of itself as a nation open to 
exchanges with diverse cultures and peoples resulting from its 500 year 
history as a seafaring nation. As a consequence, it was not difficult for 
Portugal to respect, understand and have friendly feelings towards the most 
varied countries in the world. Portugal therefore had developed a ‘universal 
outlook’ and had grown accustomed to taking a global view of world 
problems, of life and mankind.42 Portugal was seen to be on the side of the 
weak and the underdog. It also received support and campaign guidance 
from the Italian Ambassador, who was regarded in the UN as a great 
campaigner and who had sided with Portugal ‘because we come from the 
same part of the world’. Portugal also gained good support in Latin America 
(which had also given good support to Australia in previous Council 
elections),43 particularly support and assistance from Brazil.  
Portugal had served on the Council on only one previous occasion before 
1996, whereas Australia had served on four previous occasions. Portugal’s 
                                            
40 Key informant interview #10, 19 May 2008. 
41 Ibid., p. 32.  
42 Statement by the President of the General Assembly, Freitas do Amaral, Annex F, DFAT, United 
Nations General Assembly: Report of the Australian Delegation, Fiftieth Session, 1995, p. 29. 
43 Australian Parliament, Senate Estimates, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade portfolios, 22 October 
1996, p. 732. 
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use of the rotational justice argument carried weight and sympathy with the 
79 smaller and mid-sized states who had never served on the Council, and 
the further 43 who had served only once.44  
Australia 
On 27 June 1994, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Senator Gareth 
Evans announced that Australia would seek election to the Security Council 
at the 51st Session of the UN General Assembly (October 1996) for a two-
year term, (1997-1998). The decision reflected the Government’s 
commitment to the principles of the United Nations; the fact that it had been a 
founding member of the UN and had served on the Council on four 
occasions; and, the intent that membership would enable Australia to actively 
participate in the Council’s central role in developing an effective system for 
cooperative security, at a time when the Security Council faced significant 
challenges.45  
While noting the potential drawback that ‘membership will mean that 
Australia will have to take a position on a range of international disputes and 
conflicts’, Evans stated that membership would also bring two kinds of 
benefits to Australia: 
There is no doubt that the gains in terms of our international profile and 
influence will be considerable. We will also be able to advance our own 
initiatives relating to preventive diplomacy and enhanced multilateral 
cooperation to promote regional and international security.46  
                                            
44 Italian Mission to the United Nations, ‘Statement by Ambassador Francesco Paolo Fulci, 
Permanent Representative of Italy, to the General Assembly on the question of equitable 
representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council’, 13 November 1995, 
reproduced in Global Policy Forum, retrieved 4 March 2008, 
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/docs/italy.htm?>. Key informant interview # 23, 6 November 
2007. 
45 Minister for Foreign Affairs, ‘Australia to seek election to the Security Council’, Press Release, 27 
June 1994. 
46 Ibid. 
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Regional and international security 
Evans’ announcement that Australia would use the opportunity of its time on 
the Security Council ‘to advance our own initiatives relating to preventive 
diplomacy and enhanced multilateral cooperation to promote regional and 
international security’ was the centre piece of Australia’s bid, and was seen 
to be so by others. The aim was to push the arms control and disarmament 
agenda forward.47 It reflects Evans’ views in the preface to his Cooperating 
for peace (1993), which he stated provided an Australian response and 
further contribution to the debate initiated by the Secretary General’s own 
reform proposals in An agenda for peace: 
The present need, as we see it, is to take stock in a systematic, balanced 
and above all realistic way of the nature of the security problems confronting 
the international community and appropriate responses to them. In our own 
contribution to this effort, we have sought to do three things in particular: 
bring some conceptual clarity, to the extent this is presently lacking, into the 
definition of problems, responses and the relationship between them; spell 
out some of the criteria which might guide decision makers in responding to 
problems; and make some specific proposals for improving structures and 
processes, particularly in the UN system.48  
As examples of demonstrated experience in building a reputation through 
contribution to cooperative security, Australia could point during the 
campaign to the fact that it had recently achieved, with others, the adoption 
of the Chemical Weapons Convention, an indefinite extension of the Nuclear 
Proliferation Treaty, acceptance of the need for a comprehensive Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty, major reviews of the conventions on landmines and 
biological weapons, and the introduction of a UN Conventional Arms Transfer 
Register. Australia had also contributed significantly to the peace settlement 
in Cambodia and been a persistent voice for United Nations reform, arguing 
in particular (through the book Cooperating for peace, launched at the 
                                            
47 For example, Le Monde reported that Australia, according to a large number of delegates, pursued 
a ‘constructive and energetic’ antinuclear campaign. AB Pour, ‘Le renouvellement des members non 
permanents a fortement réduit le poids des pays non alignés au Conseil de sécurité de L’ONU’, Le 
Monde, 23 October 1996, p. 4.  
48 G Evans, Cooperating for peace: the global agenda for the 1990s and beyond, Allen & Unwin, St 
Leonards, 1993, preface, pp. xi‐ xii.  
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General Assembly in 1993) for a fundamental rethink of the UN’s peace and 
security role in the post-Cold War era.49 
UN peace­keeping  
Australia’s participation in current UN peacekeeping operations (in Cyprus, 
the Middle East, Mozambique and Somalia) was the only specific 
(discretionary behavioural) ‘good international citizen’ activity mentioned in 
the Senator Evans’ press release of 27 June 1994. Of course, other activities 
such as Australia’s human rights diplomacy, environment issues, 
international law and economic and social issues also figured prominently in 
Australia’s campaign literature. Australia’s record with respect to UN 
peacekeeping was acknowledged at the time and welcomed, particularly by 
other major UN peacekeeping-force contributing countries, with whom 
Australia had established a reputation for being reliable. O’Neill observed: 
While it would not be a matter for any public comment, the governments of 
Western Europe see Australia as one of a very small number of outside 
states that can be relied upon to play a useful part in peacekeeping forces 
…They can be expected to sustain their efforts to keep Australia actively 
committed to the support of the United Nations.50 
Australia’s claim (based on its contribution to UN international peace 
keeping) carried some weight with the countries involved in the more than 20 
peacekeeping operations that Australia had participated in until 1995, 
including Cambodia, and, of course, also carried some particular weight with 
other contributing countries to the UN peacekeeping force. 
Development assistance 
Senator Evans’ statement did not mention Australia’s support for the United 
Nations’ role in economic and social development (though admittedly, there 
is a limit to the matters that can be included in a press statement).  Evans’ 
concept of cooperative security was multi-dimensional in character and 
                                            
49 Evans & Grant, Australia’s foreign relations: in the world in the 1990s, preface, p. xv.  
50 R O’Neill, ‘Australia and Asia: a view from Europe’, p. 53. The notion of being able to be relied 
upon suggests itself as one of international reputation’s main properties as a concept. 
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encompassed threats to a country’s economic well-being, political stability 
and social harmony and the health of its citizens and the environment.51 
Australia was however, not well-placed in the campaign (particularly in 
relation to Sweden) to argue a case based on a reputation for the provision 
of development assistance. With respect to Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) the DFAT Annual Report for 1996-97 noted that, while ODA from all 
donors who are members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee 
declined by 4 per cent in real terms from 1995 to 1996, Australia’s ODA 
declined by 10 per cent in real terms in 1996-97 on the previous year which 
reflected Australia’s reduced capacity to provide assistance because of the 
urgent need to address Australia’s budget deficit problem.52  
With respect to development assistance and its impact on a campaign, 
Malone stated that Canada did not seem to have been penalised in its 1998 
campaign by its recent drop in aid performance resulting from sharp budget 
reductions. He went on to argue that attractive platforms such as foreign 
development assistance do not, on their own, seem to be critical to 
success.53 However, Tomz argued that a country’s circumstances and their 
willingness as well as capacity to pay, are taken into account when 
assessing reputations54 and in the case of the drop in Australian aid, 
Commonwealth African and small countries considered that Australia was 
mean in its aid giving.55  
UN reform 
 On UN reform and organisational matters, the Australian campaign placed 
emphasis on conservative concerns, such as Australia’s good reputation for 
paying its dues in full and on time (a mandatory requirement) and its 
(discretionary behavioural) role in promoting the concept of an impartial, 
                                            
51 G Evans, Cooperating for peace, pp. 5‐8. 
52 DFAT, 1996‐97 Annual Report, AGPS, Canberra, 1997, pp. 14‐15. 
53 Malone, ‘Eyes on the prize’, p. 9. 
54 Tomz, Reputation and international cooperation, p. 14. 
55 Key Informant interview # 3, 30 May, 2008. 
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competent secretariat operating under modern management principles on a 
more sound financial structure. Its position on United Nations Security 
Council reform (as did Sweden’s) supported Japan and Germany as new 
permanent members and an increased non-permanent membership of 
twenty-five members. These actions and proposals, while commendable in 
themselves, had reputational appeal mainly for the older rather than the new 
members of the organisation. For example, the Australian delegation to the 
51st Session of the General Assembly (1996) cited the maintenance of 
continuing zero nominal growth for the UN regular budget as one of the 
particularly noteworthy objectives Australia managed to achieve - in concert 
with other like-minded richer countries - in the session.56 Portugal, on the 
other hand, argued that, ‘without questioning the desirability of cutting costs 
and achieving productivity gains’, it needed to be kept in mind, from a 
realistic perspective, that the United Nations was not as expensive as some 
people claimed, and that the total current budget of the UN was only a 
quarter of the current budget of Portugal’s Ministry of Education, in a country 
whose total population was only 10 million.57 
The mutual support agreement between Sweden and Australia 
After the announcement of Sweden’s candidature, the Swedish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs approached the Australian Ambassador in Stockholm with a 
proposal that Sweden and Australia mutually agree to support each other’s 
election to the Council for the 1997-98 term. At the time, according to the 
coordinator of Sweden’s campaign in the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
three ideas underpinned the Swedish proposal for a mutual support 
agreement with Australia, all of which related to Australia’s international 
reputation and image. First, the idea that Australia had a tremendous 
contribution to make in the United Nations and multilaterally ‘when they are 
not shy’. Second, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Evans, 
                                            
56 DFAT, Report of the Australian Delegation, Fifty First Session,  p. 2. 
57 ‘Statement by the President of the General Assembly, 1995, p. 35.   
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had a huge UN profile at the time on UN reform including ideas he proposed 
in his book Cooperating for Peace, which had been well received in UN 
circles. Third, Sweden thought it would be ‘very easy to sell Australia’. In 
return, Sweden believed its Nordic appeal and contacts in Europe and with 
third world countries could help Australia’s case.58 When it proposed the 
mutual support agreement with Australia in 1994, Sweden considered 
Australia to be the front runner.59  
On 1 November 1994, Stockholm and Canberra simultaneously issued a 
media statement announcing that Australia and Sweden had agreed to 
support each other’s election to the Security Council.60 In addition to their 
individual lobbying efforts, Australia and Sweden would closely and actively 
coordinate their electoral campaigns with the aim of gaining broad 
international support for each other’s election in 1996. The media release 
also stated: 
Australia and Sweden will form a strong and effective team of candidates 
from two opposite geographical points of the globe, but united in a strong 
commitment to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Both 
countries have made significant contributions to UN peace keeping and 
peaceful settlement of disputes. They strongly support the United Nations’ 
role in economic and social development.61  
According to a senior DFAT official, the agreement seemed the natural thing 
to do, given that Australia and Sweden already cooperated closely within the 
likeminded group within the United Nations, and each would gain from the 
other’s perceived strengths in their respective regions of influence - the Asia-
Pacific and the South-Pacific for Australia and Europe and Africa for Sweden. 
It was also seen, by DFAT officials, as a means of countering European 
voting solidarity. After the vote, one senior DFAT official claimed that the 
original decision to run a joint campaign with Sweden had been a tactical 
                                            
58 Key informant interview, # 10, 21 May 2008. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Minister for Foreign Affairs, ‘Australia and Sweden to support each other’s election to the United 
Nations Security Council’, Press release, 1 November 1994, retrieved 27 October 2008, Parlinfo 
database.  
61 Ibid. 
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mistake by the former government, and that: ‘It would have been better to 
have campaigned singularly for an Australian vote’.62 Another DFAT official 
closely involved in the campaign countered this view, stating that the 
agreement worked very well and ‘we got a lot out of it at the time’.63 
Australia and Africa 
According to The Australian, confidential assessments by DFAT in early July 
1996 indicated that Australia had probably obtained enough backing to win a 
seat on the Council, and Africa was the only part of the globe where support 
for Australia remained doubtful and needed to be locked in to secure 
victory.64 Australia’s representations in Africa had been based on Australia’s 
reputational attributes, such as its good record in the UN and on Australia 
being a good international citizen, and particularly its role in the 1980s in 
helping to bring about a change of government in South Africa through the 
imposition of sanctions and through negotiations. A DFAT post-election 
secret assessment, for example, stated that Australia failed to win votes in 
Africa despite Australia’s good credentials in playing a leading role in the 
successful international campaign against apartheid, an important and 
legitimate touchstone of moral credibility in most of the developing world.65 
According to one of Australia’s special envoys to Africa, African governments 
listened to representations based on these arguments, but were non-
committal, stating in many cases that the decision on how their country would 
vote would be made in New York. The only negative vibe he recalled 
receiving was that Australia needed to have a higher profile in Africa, through 
aid, to secure African votes.66 
Downer’s strategy of locking in the African vote was to appoint former Prime 
Minister Malcolm Fraser, who was well known in Africa for his significant 
                                            
62 M Dwyer & B Hale, ‘Witch‐hunt begins after UN poll defeat’, FR, 23 October 1996, p. 5. 
63 Key informant interview, # 17, 8 May 2008. 
64 C Stewart, ‘Our UN countdown’, The Australian, 8 July 1996, p. 9.  
65 Evans & Grant, Australia’s foreign relations: in the world in the 1990s, p. 37.  
66 Key informant interview # 18, 18 December 2007. 
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contributions to the region, to build on and win support for Australia’s 
candidacy among African nations,67 and to send a high-level mission, 
including Downer, Fraser, Butler, the Australian High Commissioner in 
Nairobi, Trotter (who was also accredited to the OAU), and a small team of 
senior officials to lobby for Australia at the Organisation of African Unity 
Meeting in Yaoundé, Cameroon, 8-10 July. The OAU Meeting was also 
attended by both the Swedish and Portuguese Foreign Ministers, and so 
quickly became a kind of ‘meet the local candidates’ meeting. Shortly before 
the meeting, Downer announced funding commitments to three African 
peace initiatives totaling $A350,000. 
After the OAU meeting, Downer was hopeful about Australia’s prospects of 
winning African votes. However, the last minute effort put into lobbying in 
Yaoundé does not appear to have been a success. In an interview with the 
author, an Australian senior official who attended the meeting described the 
Australian lobbying exercise in Yaoundé as ‘chaotic and a disaster’.  
Australia did not have accreditation at the meeting, and it was impossible to 
arrange appointments at short notice. The only effective lobbying was done 
on one occasion when the delegation was able to access the plenary room 
and buttonhole African leaders and their foreign ministers. Downer, as the 
relatively new Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, did not know his African 
colleagues and therefore was not very effective in lobbying them. Further, the 
last minute gestures that Australia made before the meeting showed that 
Australia did not have much to offer, and the last minute courting of African 
votes could not make up for years of Australian foreign policy neglect of 
Africa.68 The Australian’s New York correspondent, who also travelled to 
Yaoundé to cover the OAU Meeting, quoted one cynical Australian official as 
saying: ‘Never has our interest in African politics been so great’. To 
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paraphrase former US President Kennedy, he reported, ‘Australia is asking 
not what it can do for Africa, but what Africa can do for it’.69 
Reflecting on the lobbying exercise in Africa, the Australian special envoy 
quoted above said that Australia’s lack of a high profile in Africa hindered 
Australia’s cause. To be successful in winning African votes, the campaign 
would have needed to begin much earlier, even seven years earlier, and be 
part of a sustained effort, including the provision of development aid. 
According to the Swedish campaign strategist, Australia had good support in 
Africa at the beginning of the campaign. However, he noticed a change in 
African attitudes towards Australia in the month or weeks before the election. 
He was not sure why the situation changed.70 DFAT’s own post-election 
assessment conceded that Australia had lost the election in Africa, and that 
Australia’s poor diplomatic representation and its limited aid to Africa, were 
negative factors. 
The change of government in Australia in March 1996 
In March 1996, a new Coalition Government came into power in Australia 
with the leit-motif of pragmatism in foreign policy. In order to differentiate 
itself from the ‘big picture’ foreign policy positions of its predecessor, the 
Howard Government, while maintaining that Asia would remain Australia’s 
foreign policy priority, slowed the pace of Australian enmeshment with Asia, 
sought to strengthen ties with the United States and other major powers, and 
had a different philosophical viewpoint about multilateralism and Australia’s 
capacity to exert influence in the world as a good international citizen.  
The difference in philosophical commitment between the Labor and Coalition 
Governments towards the United Nations can be seen in their respective 
appeals to voters at the UN. In his Australian General Debate Statement 
(1995) The UN at fifty: looking back and looking forward, Evans expressed 
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his belief in the existence of a community of nations, comprising ‘sovereign, 
self-determined, independent states working together on the basis of equality 
in a framework of international law’, which was born at San Francisco and 
had passed the test of fifty years of life.71 It was a concept that Evans 
personally identified with as he did with the mixture of idealism and 
pragmatism on which the United Nations was founded.72 By way of contrast, 
the Coalition’s commitment was more pragmatic. In his General Debate 
Statement to the General Assembly on 30 September 1996 (less than a 
month before the Council elections), Downer stated:  
Australia’s particular commitment to the United Nations is founded on the 
belief, articulated as far back as the 1950s by the then Foreign Minister, 
Richard Casey, that the United Nations represents the practical effort of the 
governments and peoples of the world to attain the high goals to which they 
are pledged through the UN Charter - international peace and security, and 
the economic and social advancement of all peoples.73 
The change of Government did not appear to have dented Australia’s 
prospects of winning a Council seat. Australia’s Council bid (as with previous 
Australian bids) had bipartisan support and the new Government, though 
with a different philosophical commitment to the United Nations and 
multilateralism, was no less arduous than its predecessor in pursuing the bid. 
None of the informants for this study mentioned the change in Government in 
Australia per se as the sole reason for Australia’s loss, although Swedish 
sources did mention that Australia’s ‘attractiveness’ did alter with the change 
of Government.74  
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A reputation for independence  
The new Coalition Government’s firm intention to reinvigorate the US alliance 
was pursued at the annual AusMin talks in Sydney in July 1996 resulting in 
the Sydney Statement on the Australia-United States strategic partnership for 
the Twentieth Century, which announced agreement on an extension of the 
lease of the Pine Gap Joint Defence facility in Australia and an agreement on 
closer military training. The communiqué also noted that Australia and the 
United States shared the goal of effective multilateral cooperation in arms 
control and non-proliferation and their joint resolve to continue to work 
towards the signing of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at the outset of the 
fifty-first session of the UN General Assembly in September.75 US Secretary 
of Defence William Perry, in a well-meaning remark that would cause the 
Australian Government some discomfort when professing its independent 
credentials at the UN, went so far as to describe Japan and Australia as the 
‘anchors’ of the US military presence in the region.76  
In the first week of September 1996, President Clinton ordered cruise missile 
strikes against targets in southern Iraq in retaliation for Iraqi aggression 
against the Kurds. Prime Minister Howard was fulsome in his support for the 
US decision, saying that he both understood and supported the action, 
claiming there had been a clear breach by Iraq of the broad conditions of UN 
Security Council resolutions.77 The Security Council, however, was divided 
over the issue, with France opposed and Britain supporting the strikes, thus 
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giving the issue a high profile internationally. The British Secretary of State 
for Defence, who visited Australia the following week, welcomed Australia’s 
strong support for the US missile strikes, and said that he hoped that 
Australia’s stance would not have a negative impact on Australia’s bid for a 
two-year term on the Council. 78 
In his first cable, reporting to DFAT on Australia’s lost bid, Butler stated that 
he had detected ‘attitudes and asides’ that Australia’s relationship with the 
United States may have harmed its prospects.79 Makinda argued that a 
thorough post-mortem of Australia’s loss needs to take into account ‘other 
states’ perceptions of Australia’s international behaviour, and especially its 
capacity to play an independent role in post-Cold War politics’.80 Campbell 
described US support for Australia’s efforts to rescue the text of the CTBT 
nuclear test ban treaty as a ‘kiss of death’ for Australia’s Council campaign: 
‘The mass of UN members are not interested in seeing the US receive 
automatic support on the Council’.81 These comments suggest that a 
reputation for independence in foreign policy is an important criterion for 
election to the Council. Interestingly, this is the understanding of reputation in 
international affairs that the Lowy Institute adopts in its poll of public opinion 
on Australia in the world; its survey question relates the question of 
Australia’s reputation to perceptions of how much attention Australia pays to 
US views in its foreign policy.82 
Having an independent viewpoint on international peace and security issues 
was an important platform for the Australian bid, as indicated in the following 
extract from an Australian campaign brochure: 
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Membership of the Security Council would enable Australia to pursue, in 
cooperation and consultation with member states, initiatives relating to 
preventive diplomacy, reform of sanctions mechanisms and improved 
multilateral cooperation to promote regional and international security. Being 
an independent, middle-sized, non-European power, Australia would be able 
to bring a greater Asia-Pacific and Southern-Hemisphere perspective to the 
Security Council and enhance the Council’s influence amongst an increasing 
number of states.83  
Australia’s capacity to influence Council decisions depended, in its view, on 
the originality of its ideas, the strength of its influence with the Permanent 
Five (P-5) and its reputation as an impartial middle power, which would 
enable it occasionally to broker deals which larger powers could not.84 For 
developing countries, however, it was critically important that a candidate for 
membership of the Council was seen to have an independent voice on 
matters coming before the Council: 
It is very important at least on the point of view of developing countries to 
see the country has an independent voice and an independent stance when 
it comes to membership of the Council.85 
Also, one African informant commented that uncertainty about the direction 
of Australian foreign policy was an important factor for African countries in 
the vote: 
John Howard became Prime Minister in March 1996 and signaled a return of 
Australia to the position of being an outpost of Western Europe and NATO, 
and that had some influence on the attitudes of African countries because 
they were not sure towards the end of 1996 where Australia was heading.86 
Key informants did not consider that Australia’s alliance relations per se were 
an impediment to being elected on the Security Council, suggesting that 
countries view alliance relationships in perspective: 
Everybody is aware that Australia is an ally in good standing with the United 
States… I certainly don’t think that countries voting in the UN are going to 
expect a U.S. ally to go into the Council and be vociferously anti-American, 
nor would I imagine they would expect that they would come what may be 
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pro-American. They’d expect them to exercise their own judgment, but they 
wouldn’t have any illusions about where they stand…the diplomats in New 
York have a very clear idea where countries sit on the spectrum. It’s not 
going to be halted by one particular thing, although it may influence a vote at 
a particular moment.87 
The following comments, made to the author in an interview with one Arab 
nation UN Ambassador, illustrate how reputations in foreign affairs form and 
how they impact on perceptions of a country’s independence at the UN. 
When asked about the 1996 change of government in Australia, he replied: 
‘No, I don’t think that the change of government had an impact on the vote’. 
When asked about Australian support for the US airstrikes against Iraq, he 
replied: ‘I wouldn’t take this as an issue that people would take into 
consideration when voting if Australia would go to the Security Council or 
not’. On the question of Australia’s voting patterns in the UN General 
Assembly on Middle East issues generally in the last six months before the 
council election, he commented: 
Ambassador Butler was taking positions, against almost all Arabs, on Arab 
issues that raised a lot of concern about the membership of Australia in the 
Security Council…and raised concerns among a wider circle of non-aligned 
countries about how the issues were going to be perceived if other issues 
were going to pop up at a later stage.  
The informant attributed Australia’s lost bid: 
… a large extent to the personal behaviour of Ambassador Butler, but more 
to the positions Australia took at the time on nuclear proliferation issues, 
both in relation to the NPT and the CTBT.  
He describes these positions as being ‘too close to the P5 and the 
Americans in particular’. He claimed that: ‘It would have been better for 
Australia to be the broker for reaching agreement on the issues of 
disarmament and non-proliferation’.88 
 According to Swedish sources, Australia had support among Middle East 
countries until about a week before the election, when a number of Arab 
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countries, that had earlier indicated their support for Australia, decided to 
switch their support to Portugal. In the event, DFAT believed that Australia 
received few votes from the twenty or so Middle East countries. A shift in a 
large number of votes of this order in the last weeks of the campaign would 
have made a great deal of difference to Australia’s and Portugal’s respective 
first ballot results, and if Australia had been placed ahead of Portugal on the 
first ballot, this may have changed the dynamics of the second ballot. 
The reputation of the local candidate  
The term, ‘the Butler factor’, was coined by Malone when he stated:  
 Evidence of the importance of the personal standing of the New York 
representative of a candidate country can be found in the case of Australia’s 
Richard Butler. A tough, hard driving, and cerebral veteran of multilateral 
forums, Butler bruised a number of egos in New York in several negotiating 
processes in the run-up to the 1996 Security Council elections. Australia’s 
loss in 1996 is widely chalked up to ‘the Butler factor’, although many other 
factors were also clearly relevant. Representatives in New York who make 
up their own mind on their country’s vote will frequently vote with their 
personal friendships in mind. 89 
In contrast, Butler’s rival candidate, Portugal’s Ambassador Mr Pedro 
Catarino, was ‘an unassuming and well-liked man’.90 Others commented that, 
in terms of interpersonal relations, Catarino ‘quietly ran rings around Butler in 
1996’.91  
Butler was Australia’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 
1992-1996. Woolcott described him as a ‘talented diplomat with extensive 
experience in multilateral diplomacy and a great knowledge of disarmament 
issues’,92 who was uniquely placed to pursue the Australian Government’s 
aim in seeking Council membership by helping the Council to develop an 
effective system for cooperative security. According to one of Butler’s 
counterparts at the UN in 1996: ‘It was acknowledged in the UN community 
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that he was a man with a strong cerebral grasp of issues who liked to get into 
the filigree of complex matters like CTBT and to try to break new ground in 
the way he spoke and thought about them. However, in terms of 
interpersonal relations with diplomatic colleagues at the UN, Butler lacked 
the necessary interpersonal skills’.93 
Many key informants for this study, in unprompted comments, referred to the 
‘Butler factor’ as a major contributing factor in Australia’s loss. Sample 
comments include: 
Australia had a dynamic Foreign Minister who was well respected. One 
could not say the same of Australia’s Permanent Representative to the UN!’ 
(Asian Permanent Representative) 
Richard Butler's style of lobbying had not helped because of a perception 
that he had been trashing the Portuguese case as the other main WEOG 
candidate and because he sometimes came across as a bit of a bully. 
(WEOG Permanent Representative) 
However, others comments were more direct; for example: 
The plain fact is that his personality had a lot to do with it …I’m not saying it 
was the only factor, and these other things were always at play in the 
system, but had that campaign been conducted with greater finesse and skill 
and softness of touch, I think the outcome might’ve been different.94 
That personal relationships were important in the vote is evident in the 
following comment from another Permanent Representative present at the 
vote in 1996: 
While most countries follow the lead of their capitals, a number of small 
countries take a local decision in New York. Personal relationships between 
heads of mission are an important contributing factor. Clearly Australia 
suffered adversely in this regard in terms of the behaviour of its head of 
mission.95  
The ‘Butler factor’ was the most commonly quoted reason (but not the sole 
reason) in the international press for Australia’s loss. For example, New 
Straits Times of Singapore published an article by Ramesh Thakur on the 
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day after the elections which stated that: ‘Sometimes the reason for a 
country’s failure to be elected to the Security Council is that its UN 
Ambassador can rub people the wrong way’.96 Le Monde reported that ‘the 
personality of its (Australia’s) Ambassador at the United Nations, Richard 
Butler, judged by many as too arrogant (trop arrogant), had perhaps played a 
role’.97 The Financial Times of London, commented about Butler’s style of 
diplomacy, and purported to detect an Australian trait in his style: 
His in-your-face style – once called Down Under undiplomacy – won no 
praise while he was his country’s chief UN delegate and may have cost 
Australia in a race against Portugal two years ago for a key Security Council 
seat. (Balloting is secret and can easily be influenced by personality and 
friendship, regardless of government instructions).98  
DFAT officials claim that the Department only became fully aware of the 
adverse and possibly damaging aspects of the ‘Butler factor’ when it sought 
informal feedback after the campaign, some of which was reported back by 
emails rather than by cables. These reports were to the effect that Butler had 
a lot of hubris; he was known to throw his weight around, was overbearing 
and may have been damaging to Australia - all other things being equal - 
when permanent representatives who had been given a great deal of 
discretion by their Governments, decided to use it to Australia’s disadvantage 
in the Council votes. The feedback came from all parts of the world, but not 
all respondents said that Butler was the problem. Indeed, from the 
Department’s point of view, Butler had done ‘some really good things’ in 
pushing Australian interests in relation to the Non Proliferation Treaty and the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.99  
In the above comments, it is possible to draw a distinction between Butler’s 
combative negotiation style and his representational manners. The 
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descriptors ‘tough’, ‘hard driving’, ‘bruising a number of people in the 
negotiating process’ and ‘rubbing people up the wrong way’ reflect his blunt, 
straight-forward, hard-nosed negotiating style, focused on aggressively 
pursuing Australian interests as he saw them and winning at all costs. In 
some negotiating situations, these attributes would be regarded as assets. 
The irony in Butler’s case is that if Australia has been successful in the 1996 
elections, and if he had been given an opportunity push through Australia’s 
disarmament, preventive diplomacy and UN reform agenda, he, like the 
former External Affairs Minister Evatt, who also had a combative style, would 
have been remembered for his achievements and contributions to the UN, 
rather than the methods he used to achieve the results.  
The other set of comments referring to his being ‘arrogant’, a ‘bruiser’, a 
‘bully’ and not being well-respected in New York relate to his manners and 
interpersonal skills, or lack thereof. In her book, Why manners matter: the 
case for civilised behaviour in a barbarous world,100 Lucinda Holdforth 
argued that manners matter in international relations, as in society, not 
because manners are an absolute good in themselves but because they 
enable communities and societies to achieve their mutual objectives. In 
diplomatic discourse, manners reflect the values enshrined in the 1961 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations which, downloaded to the 
personal level of diplomatic representatives, include the values of mutual 
respect and the promotion of friendly relations. As well as enabling the 
system to function efficiently, these values provide some protection for small 
status countries and their representatives to operate in a world also inhabited 
by state predators.  
While DFAT may not have become fully aware of the ‘Butler factor’ problem 
until after the campaign, the Australian Foreign Minister was made aware 
earlier. New Zealand Foreign Minister Don McKinnon recalled in an interview 
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with the author that his Australian counterpart, Alexander Downer, rang him 
after the Australian elections in March 1996 to seek his advice on UNSC 
campaign strategy. McKinnon told him the best thing he could do was to ‘get 
rid of Butler’. According to McKinnon, Downer was reluctant to follow his 
advice because Butler had all the contacts in New York.101 However, if 
Downer had taken McKinnon’s advice, would the outcome of the vote have 
been dramatically different? According to one non-aligned Permanent 
Representative, the ‘Butler factor’ comprised three integrated components:  
The personality of the Ambassador; his positions at the time on  
disarmament issues; and the perception that he was too close to P5 and 
Americans in particular.102  
In other words, it is not possible to completely separate out the 
representative from the Government foreign policy positions he was 
representing.  
The UNGA vote on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
The Australian campaign appeared to receive a boost six weeks before the 
vote. This followed Australia’s successful initiative in September 1996 to 
break the deadlock on the stalled Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
disarmament talks in Geneva. Butler gained support for using the device of 
forwarding the disputed CTBT text as a ‘national paper’ for adoption by the 
General Assembly. As a result, on 10 September (11 September AEST) the 
General Assembly adopted the Treaty with 158 countries voting in favour.103 
Foreign Minister Downer welcomed the vote as an historic vote for which he 
said Australia could be proud, since it had led international action to save the 
CTBT.104  
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The report of the Australian Delegation to the United Nations General 
Assembly Fifty-first session (1996) described the securing and opening for 
signature of the CTBT as ‘a milestone in international efforts to combat 
nuclear weapons proliferation, and a major impediment to the development 
of new generations of nuclear weapons’.105 The report stated that a number 
of heads of delegation, including President Clinton, praised Australia’s 
leading role in bringing this about - though a former Australian UN diplomat 
described the US President’s support for Australia’s role in taking the leading 
role on the CTBT as a ‘kiss of death’ in Australia’s campaign for the Security 
Council.106 Nevertheless, Australian officials believed that success in signing 
the Treaty would boost Australia’s campaign107 and, according to Butler, the 
Australian Mission in New York, aware of the danger of overkill, especially 
after Australia’s high profile on the comprehensive test ban treaty, did ease 
up on its lobbying, trying a ‘softer, warmer style’ in the weeks leading up to 
the vote.108  
However, writing about Australia’s prospects in the Council elections a week 
before the vote on 21 October, the International Documents Review, a 
weekly newsletter on the United Nations, stated that Australia was said to be 
riding high because it successfully marshalled the votes in support of the 
CTBT:  
But it remains to be seen whether the CTBT manoeuvres it executed will 
translate into electoral support, for many countries felt that the treaty was 
being thrust down their throats.109  
Non-aligned and developing countries decried the ‘forced consensus’ 
procedures utilised by Australia and criticised the Treaty for defending the 
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power of the nuclear weapon states; for not including computer simulation of 
tests (which give major industrial states, particularly the US an edge); and, 
for not including a specific timeframe for nuclear disarmament. According to 
one Asian Permanent Representative, the ‘public spat’ between Australia 
and India (which did not subscribe to the Treaty, and without whose 
signature the Treaty could not enter into force) ‘must have affected 
Australia’s chances’.110 Thakur added: 
If Canberra had not led the CTBT charge at the UN, Australia and India 
could have helped each other’s Security Council campaigns. As it is, they 
may have effectively sabotaged each other’s efforts.111 
Small states 
Canada’s UN Ambassador Fowler, in relation to Canada’s 1988 campaign, 
commented to the press on the importance of paying regard to small states:  
The UN is an association of little guys…Some 150 members of the UN are 
smaller than we are in population. I think it’s sometimes hard for Canadians 
to see themselves as the big guy, but in this context we are.112  
On the 1996 campaign, the Toronto Star commented:  
 Australia, widely regarded as a shoe-in for a seat, lost badly to Portugal after 
a campaign that didn’t pay enough attention to the smaller players.113  
One small nation state informant who nominated UN reform as a key issue 
when he/she commented: 
 Popular wisdom attributes the loss to a somewhat injudicious lack of humility 
in Australia’s general approach….I think Australia’s campaign was 
insufficiently sensitive to particular susceptibilities or concerns.114  
Further, fueled by a confidence that Australia already had enough votes to 
win, Ambassador Butler let it be known that some votes, particularly those of 
smaller states, did not matter: 
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I understand that the Australian Permanent Representative took the view 
and let it be known that, the South Pacific support was of course valuable to 
Australia but not strictly necessary … it would be nice to have - and welcome 
- but not absolutely necessary…I wasn’t there when it was said but it was 
told by somebody who was present and, if that’s the case, then it was an 
example of overconfidence, and unwise.115 
In UN Security Council elections in the 1990s, Malone attributed the success 
of small states like New Zealand and Portugal largely to the ‘AVIS factor’ (of 
having to try harder),116 and, in the case of New Zealand, ‘its dogged 
persistence and its appealing determination to make clear that all votes 
mattered keenly’ and in having a strong second ballot strategy.117 By 
contrast, Malone observed ‘Australia, which not unnaturally, cast itself as a 
middle power campaigned mostly on its (excellent) credentials but found this 
ineffective’.118 Indeed, in Malone’s view, Australia’s ‘excessively complacent 
view’ of its own standing within the UN may have contributed to its defeat in 
1996.  
Reputation and public diplomacy 
Public diplomacy was considered important in an era marked by the end of 
the Cold War, the rise of global communications, the influence of global non-
government organisations in which nation states, both large and small, 
became increasingly aware of the importance of their image and reputation 
as an essential part of a state’s ‘strategic equity’ in global affairs.119 
Reputation is thought to influence and be influenced by other factors involved 
in promoting a positive image by a psychological process known in marketing 
as the ‘halo effect’.120 Two issues, both having a negative ‘halo effect’ for 
Australia, appeared on the radar in the last weeks of the campaign. 
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The ‘Hanson debate’ 
It is one of the ironies of recent Australian UN diplomatic and Australian 
cultural history that on the same day (10 September 1996) that Australia took 
action in New York to secure the passage of the CTBT in the UN General 
Assembly and to bask in the prospect of securing a seat on the Security 
Council, an Independent Australian MP, Pauline Hanson, in her maiden 
speech to the Federal Parliament, unleashed a ‘raw debate about Australian 
identity’.121 The speech evoked community - albeit isolated community - 
expressions of racial prejudice and discrimination, threatening to undermine 
Australia’s international image as a vibrant and peaceful society (as 
presented in the Australian UNSC campaign promotion literature).122 In her 
wide-ranging and rambling maiden speech, Hanson inveighed against 
positive discrimination in favour of Australia’s Aboriginals to the disadvantage 
of other Australians, immigration (‘I believe we are in danger of being 
swamped by Asians’), Australian foreign aid (‘corruption and 
mismanagement in many of the recipient countries are legend’), and said that 
Australia must ‘stop kow-towing’ to international organisations, review its 
membership and funding of the UN (with its ‘huge tax-free American dollar 
salaries, duty-free luxury cars and diplomatic status’).123 
While the Minister for Immigration responded that Ms Hanson’s comments 
were misconceived and unacceptable to the Government, the Prime 
Minister’s refusal to show leadership by publicly condemning her views about 
Australian society became an issue in Australia and in Australia’s region. 
While the Prime Minister took the view that to do so would only give 
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prominence to her views, others saw this as indicating either a sympathy with 
the circumstances that gave rise to her radical views, or a ‘concern not to 
alienate what seemed to be a significant part of the electorate that would 
have voted for the Coalition in the March election’.124 The Government 
eventually agreed to sponsor a motion in Parliament, confirming Parliament’s 
commitment to equal rights for all Australians and demonstrating strong 
bipartisan support for racial tolerance, in the Prime Minister’s words: 
 At a time when it is appropriate and in the national interest to send a clear 
and unambiguous signal, particularly to the nations of our region but not only 
to the nations of our region, of the kind if society we are.125  
However, a decision on tabling the motion had to wait until the results of the 
by-election on 19 October 1996 (three days before the Security Council vote) 
in the Federal seat of Lindsay.126  
The Hanson issue was noted by delegates in New York, but informants for 
this study did not recall this being an issue in the vote. The ‘Pauline Hanson-
type thing’ was considered to be ‘the sort of thing that pops up and will pop 
up in lots of countries and does…even here or…in other countries as well’.127 
However, the issue was not helpful for the Australian candidature. 
East Timor 
Just days before the vote, The New York Times carried an article on the 
award of the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize to Bishop Belo of East Timor and 
Ramos-Horta which reported the Bishop’s statement that the award also 
‘honors all those who work for peace, for reconciliation, for openness and the 
defense of human rights’, criticised Indonesia on human rights and 
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highlighted Portugal’s call for self-determination for the East Timorese.128 
One informant commented: ‘My  recollection…is that it didn’t count, actually 
…in terms of shifting votes on the day. It didn’t. Nevertheless, it would’ve 
done no harm to the Portuguese at that point’.129  
Ramos-Horta claimed the day after the vote that the East Timor issue was an 
important, but not decisive factor in Australia’s failure to win a seat on the 
Council.130 He considered that most important factors in Australia’s failure at 
the election were its overt pro-American stance since the March elections, 
the race debate sparked by Hanson, and cuts in foreign aid. On the Hanson 
issue, he claimed: ‘The whole xenophobic debate in Australia, without a 
strong response from the [Federal) Government, raised serious concerns in 
African and Asian countries about Australia.131  
DFAT reactions 
UN New York  
Documents obtained by the Financial Review in January 1997 under 
Freedom of Information provisions, revealed that Ambassador Butler sent a 
secret cable to the Department on Friday 18 October 1996, predicting that 
Australia would win a seat on the United Nations Security Council with 125 
first ballot votes in the ballot scheduled for the following Monday.132 Butler 
said that his estimate took account of what he called the ‘RLB’ or ‘rotten lying 
bastard’ factor, and ‘other justified sources of scepticism’. While he 
expressed a note of caution that the Mission was ‘not sanguine’ and had 
planned strategies for second and other ballots, the core message from the 
cable was that Australia would win.  
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In his first cable reporting on the adverse vote, Butler noted: ‘There is a 
widespread feeling that these results were idiosyncratic, to say the least’.133 
In a second cable on the same day, he stated that the results provided a 
clear indication that ‘extra-systematic factors’ may have kicked in. He offered 
a number of reasons for Portugal’s success, including Portugal portraying the 
agreement by Australia and Sweden to support each other’s candidatures as 
an exclusionary ‘ticket’; Portugal’s offer to use its good offices to help African 
and eastern and central European countries in their relations with the 
European Union; Italy’s championship of Portugal’s candidature; and the fact 
that Portugal may have paid the bills of some member states. He added that 
he had detected ‘attitudes and asides’ that Australia’s relationship with the 
United States may have harmed its prospects.134 
As reported in the Financial Review, this analysis failed to satisfy the 
Department in Canberra, and in a ‘curt cable’ to Butler, it demanded ‘further 
detailed analysis’ focusing on ‘where, when and why our support shifted 
(assuming that we had anything like our estimated support in the first place – 
and if we didn’t, how could we have so misread the situation?)’.135 In his 
reply, Butler sought to shift the blame by saying that ‘the central 
phenomenon’ in the voting ‘was lying on an unprecedented scale’ and that ‘it 
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will not be easy to identify in any great detail who lied to us and nor will we 
be able to obtain this within a few days’.136 
In a follow-up cable to Butler’s earlier cable, another Australian diplomat in 
New York offered the further observation that Australia’s poor diplomatic 
representation in Africa and its limited aid to Africa were negative factors. 
The diplomat added that ‘we were not prepared to do whatever it took to get 
elected, however dirty or expensive’.137 In a final overview on 24 October, 
Butler again noted that Australia had lost the election in Africa, complained 
again about ‘the magnitude of lying that took place’ and added: ‘When the 
media or others ask ‘Why didn’t we know?’ unsatisfactory though it is, the 
only rational answer is because neither we nor anyone else could have 
known.138  
Geoffrey Barker of the Financial Review commented that eventually the 
Department embraced Butler’s unpredictability thesis and took this line in a 
possible answer to a parliamentary question prepared by the Department for 
its Minister. Without seeking to allocate responsibility for the failure to 
correctly predict the outcome, the Department recommended the need for 
more critical assessments of voting intentions in the future. Barker added 
(correctly in the author’s view):  
 The difficulty with the unpredictability thesis is that many factors cited for 
Australia’s defeat were apparent before the vote. These included its weak 
diplomatic representation in Africa compared with Sweden and Portugal; the 
power of Portugal’s and Sweden’s EU connections; the unpopularity in the 
Middle East of Australia’s strong support for US action against Iraq; 
Sweden’s superior aid levels and the similarity of Swedish and Australian 
views on UN reform; the doubtful benefit of Australia’s mutual support 
agreement with Sweden; and the likelihood of sympathy votes for Sweden, 
which had failed to win in 1992 and had to withdraw in 1994; and Portugal, 
which pushed its status as a small country that had made a painful transition 
to democracy.  
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DFAT explanations 
According to the Financial Review, DFAT subsequently prepared an 
assessment for Cabinet after Australia’s defeat, but this has not been made 
public. The Financial Review, however, managed to obtain a leaked DFAT 
analysis, which it described as ‘a watered-down version’ of an assessment 
prepared for Cabinet that was provided to the Joint Standing Committee of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade on 4 December 1996.139 According to the Review’s 
Barker, the assessment repeated the earlier Department line that Australia 
went into the ballot ‘cautiously optimistic of election’, but that the loss was a 
surprise ‘not only to us but to our supporters and a wide range of other 
countries’.140 It revealed that the Department suspected, going into the vote, 
that around 40 countries had made commitments to all three candidates, but 
it believed that all would suffer ‘a roughly equal diminution in votes as a 
result’.141  
DFAT was surprised that the bulk of these countries chose to dishonour their 
commitments to Australia. It attributed this drop in support for Australia to the 
superior bilateral bargaining position of its competitors: ‘Clearly, more 
bilateral dividends offered by other candidates swayed their votes on the 
day’.142 Also, Australia ran a classic campaign, with a budget of about 
$500,000, and was not able to entertain on the same scale as Sweden or 
Portugal, particularly in the last weeks of the campaign: ‘We ran a cut-price 
campaign compared to others, which cost us votes’.143 The analysis claimed 
that Australia’s mutual support agreement with Sweden ‘was one of the 
central failures of our campaign strategy’. It conceded that Australia’s foreign 
policy, focused as it was on the Asia-Pacific region, was not sufficiently 
global for these multilateral elections, especially since Australia lacked a 
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strong presence in Africa.144 Moreover, according to the analysis, Australia 
did not sufficiently woo the various UN permanent representatives in New 
York and found itself off-side with Italy, which the analysis noted is: 
Outstandingly successful in winning UN elections and sees Australia as 
home (sic) of the prime opponents to Security Council reform which seek to 
stop Germany from becoming a permanent member.  
Looking to the future, the analysis suggested that Australia should consider 
changing its policy on Security Council reform:  
While we need to maintain our support for permanent seats for Japan and 
Germany, our national interests would be best served by the Italian proposal 
for rotating seats, which would give us better opportunities for more frequent 
membership.145  
Summary 
Australia’s bid in 1996 for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations 
Security Council for 1997-1998 became a high profile international contest 
between Sweden, Australia and Portugal for one of the two seats available 
for the WEOG electoral group.  All aspects of Australia’s international 
standing and reputation and image were put under the spotlight during the 
two-year campaign, and will be in any future campaigns.  Australia’s 
international prestige in contests such as this was important to the Australian 
public, as was evident in the amount of coverage devoted to the issue in the 
Australian press.  
Australia’s unsuccessful bid resulted from a failure by Australia to properly 
assess its comparative standing and reputation in the UN context and to 
address shortcomings. In this contest, the reputation of the Australian UN 
Permanent Representative was a significant, but not the only, factor 
contributing to Australia’s defeat.  Australia also failed to accurately assess 
the reputation and standing of its competitors, Sweden and Portugal, both of 
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whom presented as ‘small’ countries in an organisation that has a majority of 
small country members.   
The notion of broad national reputation – which Malone146 asserted was a 
poor guide to the likely success of Security Council member candidates – 
was broken down into its component parts in this study by asking the 
questions: ‘reputation for what?’ and ‘reputation with whom?’  This resulted in 
the indentification of various component reputations, such as a commitment 
to the principles of the United Nations, a good record in peace-keeping and 
development assistance, and independence in foreign policy. Tomz’s model 
of how reputations are formed was useful in distinguishing types of 
reputation, and for distinguishing  between the contending candidates, 
according to whether they were regarded as ‘stalwarts’, ‘fair-weathers’ or 
‘lemons’. One of Australia’s problems in the campaign was that it was 
considered, particularly after the March 1996 elections, as a ‘fair-weather’ on 
most counts, but it was competing against the longstanding ‘stalwart’ 
Sweden. In addition, Portugal had made considerable efforts to shake off its 
old image before the 1974 revolution and presented itself as an aspiring 
‘stalwart’. Both Sweden and Australia underestimated Portugal, both in terms 
of its changed reputation and for its skilled campaign, assisted by Italy.  
Since the vote in the elections is by a secret ballot of UN permanent 
representatives, it is well-nigh impossible to know which countries voted for 
or against Australia in 1996, and the reasons why they voted in one way or 
another. DFAT attempts at finding an answer for Australia’s loss, including a 
re-examination of campaign strategy, proved inconclusive. This account of 
the international standing and international reputation factors that played a 
role in the Australian campaign offers a necessary but not sufficient reason 
for the outcome of the Australian campaign. However, they are matters that 
were generally overlooked or given scant attention in the campaign and, in a 
tight election contest, they are ignored at a country’s peril. 
                                            
146 Malone, ‘Eyes on the prize’. op. cit. 
247 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The thesis has demonstrated the salience of the dual concepts of 
international standing and international reputation in the formulation of 
Australian foreign policy goals, and for the implementation of these goals at 
various times during the post-Second World War period. The four case 
studies examined the concepts and their influence in some depth. The 
findings in respect to each case study are summarised at the end of each 
study, and a brief précis for each follows: 
Australia and the Colombo Plan: Within the overall context of attaining 
the foreign policy objective of Commonwealth solidarity and, in the 
1950’s, to meet the perceived threat of communist expansion in the 
South and South-East Asian region by encouraging the United States 
to pay a more active role, Australia had concerns about its ‘in-
between-empires’ status1 and its standing with the new independent 
states in the South and South-East Asian region. A key Australian 
diplomatic objective in relation to the Colombo Plan was to break 
down the wealth of misunderstanding between Australia and the Asian 
countries,2 for which it was deemed necessary to turn around a 
reputation for insularity, exclusion and lack of concern for the poverty 
and economic under-development in the region in favour of being 
regarded as a good neighbour. 
Australia and the Cambodian conflict: During the 1980s, the ongoing 
conflict in Cambodia and its resolution presented Australia with 
strategic, economic and humanitarian challenges. Australia sought to 
improve its standing as a concerned and engaged partner with South-
East Asian countries, seeking a regional resolution of the conflict. At 
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times, this pitted Australia against major power interests. Since 1983, 
Australia’s reputation for independence in foreign policy towards Indo-
China, its reputation as a generous provider of humanitarian aid and 
its reputation as a major settler country since 1975 for Indo-Chinese 
refugees (despite some vocal domestic political opposition) were 
important factors in ensuring that Australia would have credibility, be 
given a voice and be taken seriously on both regional and world 
stages. 
Australia and the formation of APEC: When Australia launched its 
regional economic consultation and cooperation initiative in 1989, the 
nation’s future standing in the fast-growing Asia-Pacific region and 
threats to the international trading system were matters of great 
concern. Australia’s reputation as a free trader and its efforts to build 
an internationally competitive economy were critical for its role in the 
establishment of APEC and the building of regional architecture. The 
APEC leaders’ meeting provided the vehicle to establish personal 
relations between leaders and especially to develop the attributes of 
openness and trust, which were important for the consolidation of 
APEC as a pre-eminent regional economic forum. 
Australia and the United Nations Security Council: By way of contrast, 
it is argued that Australia’s unsuccessful bid for the United Nations 
Security Council seat in 1996 resulted from a failure by Australia to 
properly assess its standing and reputation in the UN. Australia also 
failed to accurately assess the international standing reputation and of 
its competitors (Sweden and Portugal) both of whom presented 
themselves as ‘small’ countries in an organisation with a majority of 
small country members. In this contest, the reputation of the 
Australian UN Permanent Representative was a significant factor 
contributing to Australia’s defeat. 
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The thesis highlights an ongoing concern in Australian foreign policy since 
the Second World War for Australia to move from being regarded as a nation 
on the periphery of international events to being regarded as a central player 
on issues which impact on its national interests. Major developments in the 
international context impinging on Australia, such as the end of the British 
Empire, the Cold War and the shift in geopolitical gravity from Europe to Asia 
in the 1950s and 1960s, decolonisation and anti-racism, and changing 
patterns in Australian trade from Empire to region, necessitated a revolution 
in Australia’s thinking about its place in the world.3 Australian activism in 
respect of the Colombo Plan, Cambodia and APEC can be seen as attempts 
by Australia to be ‘policy makers’ rather than ‘policy takers’ in response to 
international events when its vital interests are at stake. 
Spender, Evans and Keating sought to make their marks on history. They 
were makers of history in the dual sense of the term - as activists and 
chroniclers of their own time and contributions. The multi-country 
perspectives approach used in the thesis has enabled their contributions and 
their reputations to be assessed in a wider context. By examining the 
contributions of other actors and countries, the thesis has been able to 
construct an historical reality of which Australian participants at the time may 
not have been fully aware (since they relied on their own interpretations of 
events and could not see the cards in others’ hands).4  The multi-country 
perspectives approach has also demonstrated the relativity of national power 
and influence.   
This thesis is the first attempt to unravel the dual concepts of international 
standing and international reputation as they apply to Australian diplomacy, 
and to examine their influence in particular historical circumstances. One of 
the major problems encountered in analysing the concepts is the problem of 
vocabulary and associated fields of meaning. By focusing on the use of 
                                            
3 D Reynolds, ‘Empire, region, world: the international context of Australian foreign policy since 
1939’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 51, no. 3, 2005, pp. 346‐358. 
4 Reynolds, Summits, p. 9. 
250 
 
words in diplomatic and academic discourses, rather than dictionary 
meanings, this thesis has been able to identify various meanings and 
establish a typology for the domains of strategic policy, international 
cooperation and public diplomacy. Within these domains, the thesis has been 
able to separate out various strands of meanings. Through application to four 
case studies and by drawing on the theories and definitions of reputation in 
other disciplines, the thesis has produced a toolbox of analytical tools, which 
prove useful for comparison of Australia’s reputation with those of other 
countries and for gaining a better understanding of Australia’s position. Table 
2 below provides a summary of the tools and their main use for Australia in 
planning, positioning, executing and reviewing foreign policy. The key 
questions and suppositions in the toolbox have been validated in this thesis 
focusing on international cooperation, but the tools can be used in other 
domains, such as strategic and economic policy and public diplomacy. 
Table 2: Toolbox for taking international standing and international reputation 
into account when developing or reviewing existing foreign policy 
Key questions 1. Reputation for and international standing in respect of what? 
2. Reputation and international standing with whom? 
3. Do/did international standing and reputation matter? 
4. How are results assessed? 
Suppositions 1. The international community is a normatively ranked 
hierarchy of nations with a rough consensus of rankings and 
a rough consensus of criteria which determine rank. 
2. A country’s international standing comprises both ‘hard’ and 
‘soft’ power. 
3. Because broad national reputations are difficult to identify 
and to analyse, it is preferable to begin by examining the 
various components and assessing which reputation is 
relevant to a community or a group of countries in a 
particular circumstance. 
4. Reputations are not fixed for all time, and are continually 
being revised. 
5. Reputations take time to develop, but change when a 
country acts contrary to its perceived type. 
6. Communities or groups of countries assess a country’s 
reputation according to whether it is perceived to be a 
‘stalwart’, ‘fairweather’ or a ‘lemon’.
Working definition  
of a reputation 
A reputation is a judgement of a country’s behaviour in international 
relations, based on facts that are considered relevant by a 
community. 
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The most commonly used key words accompanying the use of international 
standing and reputation in this thesis were ‘weight’ and ‘credibility’. Australia 
was described as a nation of ‘substantial but limited weight’ but without the 
capacity to secure objectives by the exercise of national power. Its economic 
weight was relative to countries in the region, ‘whose weight in global affairs 
was steadily increasing’. However, through foreign policy innovation and 
activism and contribution to joint endeavours, Australia was able to ‘punch 
above its weight’, but to be fully functional in the region, Australia had to shed 
the ‘dead weight of its protectionist past’ and the legacy of the White 
Australia policy. ‘Weight’ was also used in the sense of having one’s views 
noticed and taken into account, as in; ‘Our views at this time were not 
necessarily welcomed by all the parties, but they were given weight and 
taken into account’.  
‘Credibility’ was the key word more likely to be associated with the term 
reputation. In the Cambodian case study it was the term dominating policy 
discourse and the term used by Australian policy makers to characterise 
Australian policy on Indo-China. Credibility comprised a reputation for, or 
perception of, capability, interest, independence and commitment. Credibility 
was also used to describe a necessary congruence between domestic and 
foreign policy, as, for example, with respect to the promotion of human rights 
abroad.  
The case study on Australia’s failed bid for a Security Council seat in 1996 
calls into question whether Australia (and other states) possess a single 
international reputation, such as being regarded as a good international 
citizen. International cooperation in the UN context implies that states can be 
relied on to play their full part in every aspect of good international 
citizenship, including development aid, peacekeeping, refugee programs, 
human rights promotion, international health issues and environmental 
protection. The thesis suggests that states compartmentalise these issues 
into single issues of concern or into pairs and groups of related issues that 
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are important to them; and that beliefs about the value and reliability of the 
contributions of others to their own and the general good are considered 
within this compartmentalised model. Consequently, states receive a number 
of reputations from a number of sources - often separate - which are 
sometimes difficult to recognise as a composite entity, or to reconcile under 
the chapeau of good international citizenship.  
This is not to say that reputations established in one field do not flow on and 
prove helpful and matter in other fields. For example, Australia’s good 
reputation in the provision of humanitarian assistance to refugees in 
Cambodia and refugee camps in Thailand, and above all, its reputation as a 
recipient country for Indo-Chinese refugees after 1979, proved helpful when 
Australia was being considered as a participant to the 1989 Paris 
International Conference on Cambodia. This resulted in Australia being given 
a substantial role at the Conference, which flowed on to the Australian peace 
initiative on Cambodia. 
I argue that reputations take time to develop, especially when policy-makers 
seek to overturn long-standing perceptions of a country’s standing or 
behaviour. In the case of the Cambodian peace initiative, it took Australia the 
best part of six years to build up a reputation as a concerned and informed 
partner in the region. With respect to the APEC initiative, a similar time frame 
was required to demonstrate Australian seriousness about its policy of 
enmeshment in the region. The thesis also demonstrates that reputations are 
not immutable. A country like Australia, with a poor reputation of engagement 
in the region in the 1950’s, and a country like Portugal with a poor reputation 
as a former colonial power in Africa, can signal their willingness to change. 
As a result they may have their reputations altered after a probationary 
period. But changes do not happen overnight, or as a result of political 
rhetoric. 
I show that reputation matters at all levels of diplomacy from the head of 
government and ministerial levels to the actual day to day conduct of 
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international diplomacy. The Cambodia and APEC case studies show that, in 
diplomatic negotiations, the efforts made by Australian diplomats in the 
region well before the introduction of the initiatives established cooperation 
and personal relations that greatly facilitated trust and reduced the 
transactional costs of negotiations. Openness and trust were also important 
aspects of personal relations between leaders, especially in the APEC and 
Cambodian examples. On the other hand, British and especially Canadian 
mistrust of Spender as Chair at the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee 
meeting in Sydney (1950) made the Australian task of selling its proposals on 
technical assistance extremely difficult. Likewise, Butler’s manner and 
diplomatic style were considered to have lost Australia votes in the UNSC 
elections in 1996.  
Finally, Australian Ministers and Prime Ministers in their reporting to 
Parliament claimed that the outcomes related to the Colombo Plan, APEC 
and Australia’s peace initiative in Cambodia enhanced Australia’s 
international standing and esteem, and stated that this should be a source of 
national pride. The opinion of others is an indispensible part of personal 
development and self-worth; and an individual’s sense of self-worth is 
intimately related to how other people see them, and that means reputation 
matters.5 Translated to the level of Australia’s international relations, the 
judgement of significant others, as reflected in their views on Australia’s 
international standing and in relation to the country’s various reputations, can 
contribute to Australian national identity formation. In this sense, for national 
cultural reasons also, international reputations can be said to matter. 
                                            
5 McNamara, Reputation and defamation, p. 46. 
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